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Abstract  
 
Judging the intentionality of others͛ actions is a key aspect of social cognition; 
it gives meaning to actions and helps us predict what others will do. The 
ability to correctly judge intentionality is central to everyday social 
interactions as well as our justice system, where responsibility rests on the 
judgement of intentionality. Despite the clear importance of accurately 
judging other peoples͛ action, it has been suggested that humans have a bias 
towards intentional attributions (Rosset, 2008). To explain this, Rosset (2008) 
introduced a dual-process model of intention attribution which suggests that 
there is an automatic tendency to judge all action as intentional, but that this 
can be overridden by higher-level controlled cognitive processes, leading to 
unintentional explanations of behaviour. Consequently, the model predicts 
that factors facilitating controlled processing (e.g., time to engage in 
processing, cognitive maturity linked to age, cognitive ability and availability 
of cognitive capacity) play a role in judging intentionality. In this thesis, I 
tested some of these predictions, however, apart from a replication of 
Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ study, suggesting time pressure increases individuals͛ 
intentionality endorsement, results do not support the dual-process model.  
 
Additionally, I investigated judging intentionality in Autism Spectrum 
Conditions (ASC) and the role of Theory of Mind (ToM). Individuals with ASC 
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showed an increased tendency to attribute intent to ambiguous behaviour 
compared to neurotypicals, which could not be explained by differences in 
ToM. These results could indicate a difference in intention attribution style 
rather than failing to perceive mental states in ASC, which could help 
understand one aspect of social difficulties in ASC.  
 
In summary, the empirical evidence gathered in this thesis suggests that 
judging intentionality cannot be fully captured in a dual-process model. 
Therefore, at the end of this thesis, other approaches including a revised 
dual-process model and a single-system framework will be explored. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
General Introduction 
Imagine a man is walking his dog along a sports ground. All of a sudden, he is 
hit by a ball on the back of his head. He turns around and sees a boy in muddy 
shorts looking at him. He quickly infers that this was an intentional assault, 
takes the ball and - as hard as he can -  throws it in the other direction, down 
a hill. 
 
Now imagine a different scenario. The man is struck by a ball on the head, 
and as he turns around he sees a boy in muddy shorts. However, as he judges 
from the look in the boy͛s face, he is concerned and surprised, which makes 
the man infer that he was hit with the ball by accident. He therefore playfully 
throws the ball back towards the boy. 
 
Our judgments of intentionality shape our social interactions. Whereas in 
the first case, judging the boy͛s action to be intentional led to a hostile 
reaction in the man, in the second case, judging it to be an accident led to a 
playful interaction between the two parties. Importantly, at this point, it is of 
little relevance which interpretation of the boy͛s action was correct. What is 
indeed important, however, is that both interpretations had different 
  18 
consequences. This applies to a wide range of social contexts. For example, 
during a romantic date, intentionally brushing someone͛s arm might lead to 
the conclusion of reciprocated sexual interest in the other, and similarly, 
intentionally failing to greet a colleague in the morning might lead to them 
feeling ignored and avoiding helping out in the future. Our perception of 
others͛ intentions are the building blocks of our social worlds. Sometimes, 
they are even more important than the actions themselves, as for example in 
cases in which punishment of an action only occurs when the action was done 
intentionally (e.g., punishment of handball in a football game; Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association, 1995).  
 
Perceived intentionality plays a crucial role in how we interpret our 
surroundings ʹ it provides meaning to the flow of social information and cues 
we receive. As social beings, the intentional status of other people͛s actions 
is of fundamental importance, as we do not simply perceive a chain of 
unrelated and meaningless movements, but instead, we go beyond the 
surface features of movements, making inferences about the mental states 
that might produce them (Baldwin & Baird, 2001). These judgements of 
intentionality, and how we arrive at them, are the focus of this thesis. 
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Perceiving intentional action 
According to Dennett (1987), there are three stances (i.e., perspectives) in 
which we can interpret our surroundings: the physical stance, the design 
stance and the intentional stance. The physical stance predicts an event or 
behaviour of an object to be controlled by physical laws (e.g., an object falls 
on the ground because of gravity). The design stance predicts the behaviour 
of an object to be controlled by its design or function (e.g., when the button 
is pushed, coffee maker produces coffee because it is designed to do so). The 
intentional stance can be seen as the highest (i.e., most advanced) level at 
which to analyse and predict an object͛s or system͛s behaviour. It can only be 
applied to objects or systems with some form of intelligence ʹ here action is 
interpreted as being controlled by mental states and implies some degree of 
agency, rationality and goal-directedness (Dennett, 1987). 
 
When interpreting events caused by inanimate objects or systems such as 
machines, the physical and design stances are suitable to identify the causes 
for most events. When interpreting human behaviour, though, the first two 
stances alone are of minimal use. Although some of our actions might be 
primarily caused by physical laws (e.g., falling off a tree), or some of what we 
do can be interpreted from a design stance (e.g., watering of the eyes as a 
self-cleaning function), most people believe a large part of what we humans 
do is caused by our mental states - one of them being intention. Using the 
intentional stance, therefore, is often more useful when explaining one͛s own 
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and others͛ behaviour than trying to explain every action as a chain of 
movement of atoms.   
 
In his Intentional System Theory, Dennett (2009) further argues that 
perceiving an agent as an intentional system facilitates predicting future 
events or actions as it decreases the number of possible events, i.e., adopting 
the intentional stance has more predictive validity. To explain this, Dennett 
(2009) uses the example of playing chess against a computer. Predicting the 
computer͛s next move assuming its ͞intention͟ is to win the game, decreases 
the number of possible moves substantially (i.e., the prediction is more likely 
to be accurate) and is also less costly (in time and energy) than considering 
all possible moves the computer͛s code (design stance) or the laws of physics 
(physical stance) allow it to do (Dennett, 2009). Similarly, when predicting 
human action, when one perceives another as an intentional agent and has a 
good idea of what their intention could be, the number of possible events is 
smaller than, for example, all physically possible events. In other words, our 
social environment generally becomes more predictable and easier to 
navigate around when perceiving others as intentional agents who act 
purposefully (Dennett, 2009).  
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Implication of perceiving actions as intentional 
In our complex social world, we are constantly exposed to the actions of 
others. A key demand of us as social agents is to judge which actions are 
intentional and which are accidental (i.e., not caused by intention). 
Identifying and understanding others͛ intentions is thus a key element of 
social cognition. It shapes how we interact with each other, as we react 
differently to behaviour judged to be intentional as opposed to unintentional. 
Notions of praise and blame only make sense when viewed through the prism 
of intentional action (Shaver, 1985). Unkind behaviour that is judged to be 
intentional leads to a stronger emotional response, is condemned more 
readily and is more likely to evoke a negative reaction (Taylor, Shuntich, & 
Greenberg, 1979;  Gilbert, Lieberman, Morewedge, & Wilson, 2004;  Gray & 
Wegner, 2008;  Cushman, 2008), perhaps because an intentional action is 
conclusive in terms of the agent͛s motivation and how likely the action is to 
reoccur. Similarly, intentional helping-behaviour is more likely to be 
reciprocated than helping-behaviour that is unintentional (e.g., Swap, 1991), 
maybe because we want to reward and reinforce altruistic behaviour in each 
other. Additionally, intentionality determines whether, and to what extent, 
actions are punished. For example, in football, the punishment of a handball 
depends on whether a ball was intentionally or unintentionally touched 
(Fédération Internationale de Football Association, 1995), which shows that 
an agent͛s intention has sometimes more weight than the actual action. Also, 
intentionality has judicial implications as, for example, in the United Kingdom 
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it provides the basis for distinguishing between murder and manslaughter 
;͞Homicide; Murder and Manslaughter: Legal Guidance: The Crown 
Prosecution Service,͟ ϮϬϭϳͿ. In summary, we do not only have one-off 
interactions with each other but are likely to repeatedly interact with the 
same people. To predict future action, it is necessary to understand other 
agents͛ motivations and desires. This could be why we pay so much attention 
to each other͛s intentions and why our judgement of intentionality shape our 
social interactions.  
 
Why it is important to study how we judge intentionality of ambiguous 
action? 
As alluded to above, judgements of intentionality are important because they 
play a role in the success of interpersonal social interaction (e.g., aggressive 
reaction to harmful behaviour, reciprocation of helping behaviour etc.) as 
well as, for example, how individuals are punished in legal or sports settings. 
What is often overlooked, though, is the fact that the actions we witness are 
often ambiguous in terms of their intentional status, i.e., there are no strong 
cues marking intentionality. Although, in everyday life, we seem to be fairly 
good at judging intentionality of action that surrounds us, when it goes wrong 
it can lead to negative consequences ranging from simple misunderstandings 
to, for example, aggressive reactions towards accidental behaviour.  
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A substantial part of the intention attribution literature focuses on actions 
of unambiguous intent and investigates the accuracy of intention reading in 
children or individuals with psychiatric or neurological conditions. However, 
little is known about how individuals deal with incomplete information and 
how they judge ambiguous action. By studying ambiguous action (i.e., action 
for which no strong cues marking intentionality lead to normative correct 
answers), one can detect variability in individuals who would otherwise likely 
pick up on strong cues overriding default responses and, hence, conform in 
their judgements. This approach allows us to detect basic attributional styles 
in judging intentionality, which in turn opens up new possibilities for studying 
patterns of intention attribution. For example, one can compare groups (e.g., 
neurotypicals vs. individuals with Autism Spectrum Conditions) or look at 
changes across the lifespan. Findings from such studies can potentially help 
explain social difficulties in certain populations. Additionally, as there are no 
obviously correct answers, judgements of intentionality can be more easily 
manipulated which enables us to study factors contributing to intentional 
reasoning. 
 
Also, by studying ambiguous action, we can investigate whether people 
tend to process observed behaviour in a certain way. In other words, when 
there are no strong cues marking intentionality, we can test whether there is 
a default judgement of others͛ behaviour.  As suggested by Rosset (2008), 
people have an automatic tendency to perceive others͛ action to be 
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intentional. This tendency could be a feature of human cognition for a 
number of different reasons, including a general need or desire to detect 
patterns in our surroundings and the potentially higher predictive value of 
intentionality compared to accidental action.  
 
Given the importance of detecting and understanding others͛ intentions, 
our cognitive system seems to be strongly attuned to cues marking 
intentionality. We appear to preferentially process and recall intent-relevant 
information, whilst discounting intent-irrelevant information (Baldwin & 
Baird, 2001; Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Zadny & Gerard, 1974). As early work 
from Heider and Simmel (1944) suggests, we do not only have a sensitivity 
towards perceiving intentional agents but perhaps even a hypersensitivity 
that leads us to readily perceive intent in inanimate objects such as moving 
geometrical shapes (a phenomenon also known as animacy). It has been 
suggested that this tendency to perceive intentional agents is caused by a so-
called Hyperactive Agency Detection Device, which yields more false positives 
(i.e., detecting intentional agent when none is there) than false negatives 
(failing to detect intentional agent; Barrett, 2000). If a physical object behaves 
(e.g., moves) in a way that violates one͛s expectations of physical objects it is 
perceived as an agent. On this view, one evolutionary advantage could be 
that we are more likely to detect hidden or disguised agents (e.g., hungry 
animals; Barrett, 2000; Guthrie, 1993). Therefore, understood in the light of 
the so-called Error Management Theory (Haselton & Buss, 2000), perceiving 
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intentional agents increases evolutionary fitness. Importantly, as the Error 
Management Theory suggests, two underlying assumptions that need to be 
met for a cognitive bias to evolve are i) some uncertainty over a genuine 
signal and ii) asymmetry of inferential error-cost (Haselton & Buss, 2000; 
Haselton & Nettle, 2006). In the context of the actions of others, both 
assumptions seem to be met:  a substantial proportion of actions are 
ambiguous in intentionality (i.e., uncertain signal), and failing to detect 
intentionality is likely to be more costly (e.g., making communication and 
interaction difficult as well as failing to predict harmful behaviour). 
 
Similarly, animism (attribution of mental states to inanimate objects) is 
also a key feature of religion. As Guthrie (2001) explains, it is important to 
have a low threshold to detect other intentional agents, as their interests are 
often different to that of the observer and, therefore, in ambiguous 
situations, failing to detect an intentional agent (e.g., another human, a god, 
etc.) might be more costly than falsely detecting one, as it can lead to 
confrontation caused by the conflict of interest. For example, if one sees 
certain patterns in the environment such as stones arranged in a certain way 
it would be more beneficial to assume this to be the work of another 
intentional agent (e.g., god) rather than disregarding it and potentially 
missing an important sign and the presence of an agent (e.g., Guthrie, 2001).  
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This overarching predisposition to perceive intentional agents might be 
involved in what Rosset (2008) coined the intentionality bias ʹ an automatic 
tendency to perceive ambiguous behaviour to be intentional. Being aware of 
such a tendency and better understanding the underlying cognitive 
mechanisms (e.g., dual-process model, explained further below) would not 
only be beneficial in everyday social interactions but also in legal settings, for 
example, involving eyewitness testimony. The aim of this thesis, therefore, is 
to investigate how we judge intentionality of ambiguous action and what 
factors influence our judgements. 
 
A folk concept of intentionality 
Importantly, the focus of this thesis is perceived intentionality rather than 
intentionality per se (which could be understood as the quality of mental 
states that are targeted towards an outcome or state). Therefore, it is not a 
precise definition of intentionality that is of interest but rather how and why 
actions are judged to be intentional. An essential consideration, however, is 
that without a shared understanding of intentionality, making inferences 
about other people would be fairly inefficient and difficult, and thereby 
defeat the purpose, as an inference that does not deliver accurate predictions 
is hardly worth achieving. Therefore, a key point of discussion has been 
whether there is a common understanding of intentionality shared across 
individuals and how individuals arrive at a judgement of intentionality.  
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As discussed by Baldwin and Baird (2001), there are broadly two 
traditional approaches attempting to explain how humans discern intentional 
action. One approach understands intentional inferences to be reliant on the 
sensitivity to certain perceptual cues, for example, intentionality can be 
inferred from detecting certain kinematic cues ;BaronͲCohen, Campbell, 
KarmiloffͲSmith, Grant, Θ Walker, ϭϵϵϱ; Premack Θ Premack, ϭϵϵϱͿ. The 
other approach views them as constructed through knowledge and past 
experience (e.g., Baldwin & Baird, 1999; Malle & Knobe, 1997; Malle, Moses, 
& Baldwin, 2001). Both approaches have in common that they predict the 
ability to discern intentionality as a skill that develops and matures with age 
ʹ a notion that was later challenged by Rosset (2008) in her dual-process 
model. To illustrate how Rosset͛s model compares to more previous ways of 
explaining intention attribution, I will now discuss one - Malle and Knobe͛s 
(1997) Folk Concept of Intentionality - as an example of a traditional approach 
viewing intentional inferences being based on past experience and 
knowledge. Subsequently, I will explain Rosset͛s dual-process model of 
intention attribution. 
 
Malle and Knobe (1997) see intentionality as a social fact rather than an 
objective fact about the mind. This means that although it can be questioned 
whether intentionality is a genuinely objective attribute of human cognition, 
it is undeniable that humans infer intentions from each other͛s behaviour. 
They argue further that a model aiming to describe intentional action needs 
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to capture a concept that applies to how people experience and judge 
intentionality (as previously emphasised by Heider, 1958). In contrast to 
earlier models of intentional action that are largely theoretical accounts of 
intentionality (e.g., Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Ossorio & Davis, 1968; 
Shaver, 1985), Malle and Knobe͛s (1997) model is directly based on empirical 
evidence. In three studies they investigated people͛s understanding of 
intentionality and what components were required for an action to be 
regarded as intentional. They introduced the so-called Folk Concept of 
Intentionality, which they argue is a concept shared across individuals on 
what constitutes an intentional action. It takes into account the social role of 
intentionality (i.e, understanding that intentionality is influenced by the social 
context rather than an objective attribute of the mind) and is based on the 
premise that intentionality is not a purely theoretical concept but that people 
have a common understanding of it, which they automatically apply to form 
judgments of intentionality. In other words, people seem to agree on 
whether an action is done intentionally or unintentionally. Their empirical 
model involves five components: The desire for an outcome; beliefs about an 
action that leads to an outcome; an intention (decision) to perform the 
action; the skill to perform the action; the awareness of fulfilling the intention 
while performing the action (Figure 1.1). As Malle and Knobe argue, all five 
components have to be present for an action to be judged as intentional. In 
other words, behaviour that leads to the desired outcome, that involves an 
understanding of how to achieve that outcome, that was decided to be done, 
  29 
that shows the actor͛s ability to perform the action and their awareness 
thereof, is considered to be intentional (Malle & Knobe, 1997).  
 
 
Figure 1.1. IllƵƐƚƌaƚion of Malle and Knobe͛Ɛ ;ϭϵϵϳͿ Folk Concept of Intentionality. 
 
It is important to note here that, according to this model, judging others͛ 
action to be intentional requires the observer to have some information on 
these five components. This was illustrated in Malle and Knobe͛s ;ϭϵϵϳͿ Study 
3, in which participants͛ judgements of intentionality were influenced by 
explicit manipulation of some components (e.g., Desire: ͞Frank hatesͬlikes 
George.͟; Awareness: ͞ Frank was ;notͿ aware of bumping into the blue BMW 
behind him.͟; Belief: ͞Frank knewͬdid not know that the blue BMW was 
George͛s car͟Ϳ. Such manipulations turned out to drastically change 
judgements of intentionality. Participants tended to judge actions to be 
intentional if, a) they led to the desired outcome, b) the agent held beliefs 
about them and, and c) the agent was skilled at performing them. However, 
if the agent did not desire an outcome, had no beliefs about an action or was 
not skilled at performing the action, it was hardly ever judged to be 
Desire
(for an outcome)
Belief 
(knowledge about action 
and outcome) 
Intentional Action
Intention
(decision to act)
Skill
(to perform action)
Awareness
(of fulfilling intention)
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intentional. This demonstrates how what we know about an agent͛s mental 
state influences how we judge their intentionality.  
 
While in Knobe and Malle͛s experiments, participants had explicit 
information about others͛ mental states, in real-life situations we usually do 
not have direct access to an agent͛s mental state. Because of this, we need 
to infer the existence of these mental states based on available information. 
Although we might in theory broadly agree on what criteria make an action 
intentional, our estimations of whether these criteria are met might vary 
across individuals and situations. As mentioned above, a premise of Malle and 
Knobe͛s ;ϭϵϵϳͿ model ;as well as other models preceding itͿ is that the true 
skill lies in detecting intention in an action. The assumption here is that this 
skill develops with age and experience. This would entail that the quality of 
intentionality endorsement increases with age as individuals become more 
sensitive to, and have established a more in-depth knowledge of, relevant 
cues. As mentioned above, it is exactly this notion that is challenged by an 
alternative framework proposed by Rosset (2008). According to her, the true 
marker for mature intentional reasoning is the ability to judge behaviour to 
be accidental. At the core of this framework is an intentional heuristic that 
leads to an automatic tendency to judge behaviour to be intentional and it is 
the inhibition of such tendency that develops with age. This alternative 
framework will be discussed in the next section. 
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A dual-process model of intention attribution 
Rosset (2008) proposed that we are biased towards attributions of intent 
when judging other people͛s actions. To explain this so-called intentionality 
bias, Rosset put forward a dual-process model of intention attribution 
comprising two streams: an automatic stream that is always active and leads 
to intentional judgments and a non-automatic, controlled stream involving 
higher-level processing that can override automatic judgments (Figure 1.2). 
The higher-level stream involves cognitive capacity to enable reasoning about 
alternative causes for behaviour, detection of situational and perceptual cues 
and inhibition of an automatic response. Inherent to this theory is the idea 
that it is not the concept of intentionality that develops throughout infancy 
and childhood but the ability to override intentional heuristics. This ability can 
be compromised in situations of increased cognitive load (i.e., decreased 
availability of cognitive processing capacity) or lack of knowledge of 
alternative causes or cues (Rosset, 2008).  
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Figure 1.2. A schematic illƵƐƚƌaƚion of RoƐƐeƚ͛Ɛ dƵal-process model of intention attribution. It 
comprises two streams: A fast automatic stream leading to an intentional explanation for the 
observed behaviour (shown in red on the figure), and a slower, controlled stream enabling 
analytical processing of observed behaviour (shown in green on the figure). The controlled 
stream can inhibit and override the judgement of the automatic stream and lead to an 
unintentional explanation of behaviour. (Please note, for simplicity, when talking about 
observed behaviour we do not only refer to visually observed behaviour but all behaviour that 
is perceived, processed and judged.) 
 
A key element of this framework and a premise of this thesis is that 
situations of true interest are ones that are ambiguous with respect to their 
intentionality, i.e. situations in which no easily observable perceptual or 
situational cues control the judgement of intentionality. Studying ambiguous 
situations allow us to investigate how individuals deal with incomplete 
information, what biases they potentially express, and how people differ in 
their responses.  
 
Action Observation
Automatic Stream: 
intentional
Controlled Stream: 
intentional OR unintentional
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Empirical evidence for the dual-process model of intention attribution 
Rosset (2008) 
Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ paper introducing the dual-process model of intention 
attribution consists of three experiments. In Experiment 1, Rosset made use 
of the Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm specifically created for this paper. In 
this task, participants were presented with sentences describing actions that 
could either be done intentionally or unintentionally (e.g., She broke the vase, 
He typed the email, etc.). Each sentence either belonged to one of two 
unambiguous control categories (accidental: Accidental control sentences; 
intentional: Intentional control sentences) or to one of two ambiguous test 
categories (ambiguous but prototypically accidental: Prototypically 
Accidental test sentences; ambiguous but prototypically intentional: 
Prototypically Intentional test sentences; Figure 1.3). Participants were asked 
to judge whether each sentence described an action generally done on 
purpose or by accident. They made these judgements in one of two 
conditions: a speeded condition, where participants were given 2.4 seconds 
to respond, or an un-speeded condition, where participants were given 5 
seconds to respond. This manipulation was introduced to alter the availability 
of cognitive resources, which was thought to be required for judgments 
involving the controlled stream. 
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Figure 1.3. Example stimuli for each test- and conƚƌol caƚegoƌǇ of RoƐƐeƚ͛Ɛ AmbigƵoƵƐ 
Sentence Paradigm. A) Example for Prototypically Accidental test sentence, B) example for 
Prototypically Intentional test sentence, C) example for Accidental control sentence and D) 
example for Intentional control sentence. Participants are presented with one sentence at a 
time and are asked to judge whether the action depicted in the sentence is generally done on 
purpose or by accident. Please note ƚhaƚ RoƐƐeƚ͛Ɛ oƌiginal Ɖaƌadigm ǁaƐ condƵcƚed ƵƐing 
paper and pen, however, studies conducted in this thesis used a computer version of the 
paradigm in which participants were asked to respond by clicking on the corresponding box. 
 
 For all four categories, an intentionality endorsement score was 
computed by calculating the percentage of on purpose judgments in a given 
category, which was thought to reflect each participant͛s tendency to judge 
ambiguous actions to be intentional (Rosset, 2008). Of particular interest are 
intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental test 
sentences. This is because these depict ambiguous but prototypically 
accidental actions, which are expected to be judged differently depending on 
whether analytical processing is involved or whether the judgement is driven 
by a default process. Indeed, results showed that participants were more 
likely to judge ambiguous but prototypically accidental actions (Prototypically 
He ripped the piece of paper.
He sneezed from allergies. She baked a cake.
She broke the vase.
on purpose by accident
on purpose by accident
on purpose by accident
on purpose by accident
BA
DC
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Accidental test sentences) to be intentional when under time pressure (Table 
1.1), which suggests that under conditions that tax the controlled cognitive 
processing, humans are more likely to judge ambiguous but prototypically 
accidental actions to be intentional. Additionally, participants in the speeded 
condition were more likely to judge Accidental control sentence to depict 
intentional action. 
 
Table 1.1. Mean intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically  
Accidental test sentences (PA), Prototypically Intentional test sentences (PI),  
Accidental control sentences (UA) and Intentional control sentences (UI) taken 
from Rosset (2008).  No standard deviations were given.  
 PA** PI UA* UI 
Speeded 22 66 2 98 
Un-speeded 15 69 5 98 
**p<.001 
*p<.02 
 
In two follow-up studies, the idea of intentional judgments as the 
automatic response was tested by using an implicit measure (Experiment 2) 
and by assessing recall of test items (Experiment 3). Results of Experiment 2 
suggest when participants are asked for spontaneous descriptions of events 
(i.e., not explicitly bringing to mind a possible accidental nature of the event), 
participants were significantly more likely to give an intentional analysis of 
events, even for prototypically accidental stimuli (e.g., She broke the vase.). 
To further investigate whether more processing is required to interpret an 
action as intentional, Experiment 3 introduced a surprise recall task, based on 
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the idea that more in-depth processing facilitates recall. Participants were 
asked to judge 12 sentences (unambiguously intentional or unintentional) in 
one of two aspects: pleasant/unpleasant (control group) or 
intentional/unintentional (experimental group). Analysis revealed a greater 
recall of unintentional sentences in the experimental compared to the control 
group. This suggests that judging actions to be unintentional requires more 
processing than judging them on other aspects. Together, these three studies 
form the basis for Rosset͛s formulation of the dual-process theory. 
 
Importantly, a replication attempt has been published by Hughes, Sandy 
and Trafimow (2012). They found that results from Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ 
Experiment 1 could only be partly replicated, in so far as intentionality 
endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental test sentences were not 
significantly higher in the speeded condition. However, when both test 
sentence categories were combined (Prototypically Accidental and 
Prototypically Intentional), intentionality endorsement scores were 
significantly higher in the speeded compared to the un-speeded condition. 
;Similar to Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ study, participants in the speeded condition also 
showed significantly higher intentionality endorsement scores for Accidental 
control sentences.) The absence of a significant difference between the 
speeded and un-speeded condition for the Prototypically Accidental test 
sentences in this replication attempt could be due to the comparatively 
smaller sample size and a different data analysis approach to Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ 
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study. Therefore, in Chapter 2 the different ways of analysing the Ambiguous 
Sentence Paradigm will be explored in order to find the optimal approach. 
  
Moore and Pope (2014) 
One criticism that has been raised against Rosset͛s paradigm is that the 
tendency to judge actions to be intentional could be a linguistic effect arising 
from the stimuli used to measure it. As Rosset (2008) pointed out herself, an 
accidental action might be marked by the use of the passive voice, or by 
explicitly calling it accidental. To deal with these potential linguistic 
confounds, Moore and Pope (2014) developed a non-linguistic video 
paradigm (Ambiguous Movement Paradigm), in which people are asked to 
judge the intentionality of a simple hand movement. A hand is shown resting 
on a keyboard with one finger strapped to a key. In every video, the finger 
moves down and pushes the key (Figure 1.4). Participants are told that this 
action can either be an intentional key-press (the actor actively pushes the 
key down) or an unintentional key-press (the finger is pulled down via a pulley 
mechanism hidden under the keyboard).  
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A     
B  
FigƵƌe ϭ͘ϰ͘ Mooƌe and PoƉe͛Ɛ AmbigƵoƵƐ Moǀement Paradigm: A) Illustration of the pulley 
mechanism: A finger is fixed to a key with a Velcro strap. A pulley hidden under the keyboard 
can pull the key - and with it the finger - down. B) Screenshot of the video stimulus. 
 
Unknown to the participant, all 24 stimuli show the same movement. This 
ensures that there is perceptual consistency across all trials so that any 
behavioural effect cannot be linked to perceptual differences in the video. 
There are three different movement onset times, so as to encourage 
participants to believe they are seeing a different video on each trial. 
Importantly, the movement is unintentional (i.e., the finger is pulled), which 
is crucial as only a tendency to judge a genuinely unintentional movement to 
be intentional can function as evidence for a bias.  To compute the 
intentionality endorsement score, the percentage of trials judged as 
intentional is calculated. In Moore and Pope͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ study, the mean 
intentionality endorsement score was 64.2% (statistically significantly higher 
Velcro Strap
Key
Pulley
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than 50%), which led the authors to conclude that when observing 
ambiguous movements people are more likely to judge them to be 
intentional rather than unintentional (Moore & Pope, 2014).  
 
Moore and Pope͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ conclusion is in line with Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ 
definition of the intentionality bias, although total scores reflecting a bias are 
understood differently because of the differential nature of the paradigms. 
Whereas in Moore and Pope͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ Ambiguous Movement Paradigm an 
intentionality endorsement percentage score over 50 is thought to reflect a 
bias, Rosset (2008) does not specify any precise cut-off points but rather 
takes increased intentionality endorsement percentage scores under 
speeded conditions as evidence for an intentionality bias. Considering this, 
detecting an intentionality bias per se is not particularly meaningful. 
However, meaningful indeed is understanding tendencies of intention 
attribution, the underlying cognitive processes and the variability across 
conditions. In this thesis, therefore, the emphasis will be placed on the latter.  
 
Another important difference between the paradigms is that the target 
actions are of a different level of complexity. Whereas the Ambiguous 
Movement Paradigm involves low-level actions with no outcome and little 
context, the Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm provides a bit more context (e.g., 
He bumped into a classmate in the hall. -> school context) and depicts actions 
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that are commonly associated with an outcome (e.g., He set the house on fire. 
-> house burns down). Also, an unintentional action as understood in the 
Ambiguous Movement Paradigm is inherently passive, whereas in the 
Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm unintentional actions are still largely active. 
Additionally, some of the stimuli in the Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm 
involve or could potentially affect others (e.g., She woke the baby up., She 
ignored the question.). These differences have to be kept in mind when 
comparing results from studies using the different paradigms.  
 
Type ϭ and Type Ϯ processing in Rosset͛s dual-process model  
As discussed above, Rosset͛s dual-process model of intention attribution 
assumes two streams within which information can be processed and which 
can lead to differential judgements (Figure 1.2). Dual-process models are a 
widely used way of explaining cognition and have been used in different 
cognitive domains. In essence, most of them propose two distinct 
information processes (i.e., streams): A Type 1 process, which is assumed to 
be automatic, intuitive, quick and to operate in a parallel fashion (also known 
as heuristic process); and a Type 2 process, which is assumed to be analytical, 
reflective, slow and to operate in sequential fashion (Evans, 2003; Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013). Type 1 processing leads to responses that involve little 
reflection, whereas, Type 2 processing involves hypothetical and abstract 
thinking, mental simulation and prediction of future events (Evans, 2003). 
Dual-process models in general - and the Rosset͛s dual-process model of 
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intention attribution specifically - will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 
2 and 8. For the purpose of this introduction, the key point is that the 
automatic stream and controlled stream of Rosset͛s dual-process model 
reflect Type 1 and Type 2 processes respectively. It is important to note that 
they are qualitatively distinct cognitive processes, but not necessarily distinct 
neuroanatomical systems.  
 
Controlled cognitive processes and cognitive load in a healthy 
population 
Following on from this, according to Rosset͛s dual-process model, controlled 
cognitive processes (i.e., Type 2 processes) enable us to form unintentional 
judgments. Healthy adults have a broad knowledge of potential non-
intentional causes for events and are thought to usually have the cognitive 
resources available to access and make use of this knowledge. However, if 
knowledge or cognitive resources are compromised they seem to over-
attribute intent (Rosset, 2008; Rosset & Rottman, 2014).  
 
As has previously been described, Rosset manipulated cognitive control by 
running a speeded vs. un-speeded condition. In follow-up work, Bègue, 
Bushman, Giancola, Subra and Rosset (2010) used alcohol to disrupt cognitive 
control. They asked participants to complete a modified version of Rosset͛s 
(2008) Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm under acute alcohol intoxication or 
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when sober. Intoxicated participants were more likely to judge ambiguous 
behaviour to be intentional. The authors concluded that alcohol consumption 
disrupts higher-level cognitive processes that are essential for making 
accurate judgments. The results can potentially explain the link between 
alcohol intake and aggression. For example, when facing harmful behaviour, 
people are more likely to react aggressively if they perceive it to be 
intentional (Taylor et al., 1979). So, if an intoxicated individual is more likely 
to perceive harmful behaviour as intentional, they are more likely to react 
aggressively and, therefore, this leads to more aggressive reactions than if 
the person was sober. Also, the results are evidence for the involvement of 
frontal lobe processes in intentional attribution. Acute alcohol intoxication 
has been shown to impair cognitive functioning such as planning, motor 
control and memory (Peterson, Rothfleisch, Zelazo, & Pihl, 1990), which are 
all associated with frontal brain areas (Miller, 2000). 
 
Controlled cognitive processes, including inhibitory control, are thought to 
develop throughout infancy, childhood and adolescence (e.g., Welsh, 
Pennington, & Groisser, 1991). Based on empirical evidence suggesting an 
age-related decrease in tendency to judge ambiguous behaviour to be 
intentional (e.g., Schult & Wellman, 1997; Smith, 1978), Rosset and Rottman 
(2014) developed a framework which suggests unintentional explanations for 
behaviour are the true marker for intentional reasoning maturity (NICED 
framework; for more detail see Chapters 3 and 4). They argue that this 
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developmental trend of intention attribution is due to the improvement of 
executive functioning, more precisely inhibitory control, rather than the 
increased proficiency in identifying intentionality. In Chapters 3 and 4, 
therefore, age-related changes in intentionality endorsement as a marker for 
the maturation of cognitive control will be explored.  
 
Atypical intention attribution patterns and social dysfunction 
As discussed above, our judgements of intentionality have an impact on our 
social interactions. Some neurological and psychiatric conditions that are 
associated with social dysfunction show patterns of intention attribution 
different from those of neurotypical controls. Such conditions are often 
associated with frontal lobe dysfunction. Controlled cognitive processes and 
executive functions are reliant on frontal lobe activity. Therefore, the link 
between psychiatric/neurological conditions and atypical intention 
attribution patterns strengthens the idea of the involvement of controlled 
cognitive processes in judging intentionality. In this section, I will discuss two 
groups of conditions associated with atypical patterns of intention 
attribution. 
 
Judging intentionality in Schizotypy and Schizophrenia spectrum disorder 
It has long been suggested that people suffering from schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders show reduced inhibitory control (Frith, 1979). 
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Schizophrenia spectrum disorders are heterogeneous and are associated 
with a range of symptoms including hallucinations, delusions and 
disorganised speech (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). However, it is 
widely assumed that psychotic symptoms lie on a continuum and 
schizophrenic traits can also be found in individuals of the general population, 
also known as schizotypy. Highly schizotypal people who are not diagnosed 
with schizophrenia may still show performance on various cognitive tasks 
similar to diagnosed individuals (Van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, 
& Krabbendam, 2009).  
 
Moore and Pope (2014) investigated the relation between intentionality 
endorsement of ambiguous action and schizotypy. They found a significant 
positive correlation between the intentionality endorsement of ambiguous 
action using the Ambiguous Movement Paradigm and schizotypal traits. They 
argued that this link could potentially be due to impaired cognitive control in 
highly schizotypal individuals.  
 
A similar pattern has also been observed in individuals with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia. Peyroux, Strickland, Tapiero and Franck (2014) used a verbal 
paradigm similar to the Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm. A key difference to 
the Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm was that the set of sentences used in this 
study consisted of unambiguously intentional and unambiguously 
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unintentional scenarios only, there were no ambiguous sentences. 
Participants with a schizophrenia diagnosis (subtypes not specified) and 
healthy controls were asked to judge whether the action described in each 
sentence was intentional or unintentional. People with a schizophrenia 
diagnosis judged a significantly higher proportion of sentences to be 
intentional compared to the control group. This shows a tendency to 
misinterpret behaviour as intentional in individuals with schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders. In addition, within the schizophrenia group, they found 
an association between intentionality endorsement scores and the 
excitation-dimension of the five-dimensional Positive and Negative 
Symptoms Scale (Lancon, Aghababian, Llorca, & Auquier, 1998). More 
precisely, correlations were found between intentionality endorsement 
scores and the items poor impulse control and excitement. Based on this, the 
authors suggested the inability to suppress the automatic tendency to judge 
behaviour to be intentional (i.e. a lack of inhibitory control) as a possible 
explanation for the increased attribution of intentionality in individuals with 
schizophrenia (Peyroux et al., 2014).  
 
Judging intentionality in Autism Spectrum Conditions  
Another condition associated with impaired executive functioning (see Hill, 
2004) and social dysfunction (see Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Klin, Volkmar, & 
Sparrow, 1992; Volkmar et al., 1987) is autism. Autism is a spectrum condition 
that comprises of different subgroups including Asperger͛s Syndrome, high-, 
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medium- and low functioning autism (see Simon Baron-Cohen, 2006). 
Although the condition is heterogeneous, there seem to be aspects shared 
by all affected individuals; namely, deficits in social communication and 
interaction as well as restricted interest and repetitive behaviour (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-5) refers to autism as Autism Spectrum Disorder 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). As argued by Baron-Cohen (2017) 
the term ‘disorder͛ implies some malfunctioning in the individual͛s behaviour 
and/or cognition and brings with it the risk of stigma. However, in the 
appropriate environment, an affected individual can function just as well as 
or sometimes even better than neurotypicals ;BaronͲCohen, ϮϬϭϳͿ. 
Therefore, in line with the concept of neurodiversity, the term Autism 
Spectrum Conditions (ASC) will be used in this thesis. This means that 
although some aspects of an individual͛s condition might be a disability, the 
autism condition per se is not. 
 
An area in which individuals with ASC have repeatedly shown deficits is 
accurately identifying an agent͛s intention, as for example in studies involving 
the comic strip paradigm or faux-pas detection tasks ;BaronͲCohen, Leslie, Θ 
Frith, 1986; Zalla, Sav, Stopin, Ahade, & Leboyer, 2009). However, for these 
tasks, participants are usually asked to correctly identify intentions of actions 
and little is known about how individuals with ASC categorise ambiguous 
actions in terms of their intentionality. In other words, they struggle with 
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identifying normative correct solutions, however, there is little research into 
how they judge the intentionality of actions that are neither clearly 
intentional nor unintentional. ASC is associated with social difficulties (Klin et 
al., 1992; Volkmar et al., 1987) and it is likely that appropriate intentionality 
judgements play a significant role in the success of social interaction. 
Therefore, the focus of Chapters 5 to 7 will be how individuals with ASC judge 
intentionality of ambiguous action. These three studies are potentially 
informative as they will help us to better understand 1) intention attribution 
styles in a highly prevalent spectrum of conditions (more than 1 in 100; 
Brugha et al., 2012), and 2) the cognitive processes underlying intentionality 
judgements by investigating cases deviating from the neurotypical norm.  
 
General aims and objectives 
The overarching aim of this thesis is to gain a better understanding of how 
humans form judgements of intentionality by testing Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ dual-
process model of intention attribution and the assumptions based on it. Due 
to the reasons discussed above, the focus of this research will be ambiguous 
action. More specific aims and objectives are outlined below: 
 
1. The aim of Chapter 2 is to replicate one of Rosset͛s key findings of 
increased intentionality endorsement under time constraints. This 
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will enable me to evaluate some of the empirical evidence the dual-
process model is based on. 
 
2. I will explore the role of factors in forming intentionality judgements, 
as predicted by the model. These include age and cognitive ability 
(Chapters 3 and 4). This will enable me to examine whether 
assumptions made by the dual-process model are valid and, hence, to 
indirectly test the model without manipulating any variables. 
 
3. The dual-process model will be directly tested by manipulating 
working memory load and capacity, which ʹ as the model suggests ʹ 
might be essential for inhibiting automatic responses (Chapter 8).   
 
4. Judgments of intent for ambiguous actions in ASC will be explored 
(Chapters 5 to 7). This will give us a better understanding of intention 
attribution in general by studying cases deviating from the norm. Also, 
I hope to shed some light on some potential underlying reasons for 
social difficulties in ASC. 
 
The thesis concludes with a general discussion, in which key findings and 
general limitations are discussed. I will critically evaluate whether the 
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evidence gathered supports Rosset͛s dual-process model of intention 
attribution and consider possible future directions including the potential 
need to revise the model.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Judging intentionality under time pressure: A 
replication of Rosset (2008). 
Abstract 
According to Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ dual-process model of intention attribution, 
humans tend to automatically judge behaviour to be intentional, but that this 
can be overridden, leading to a judgement that the behaviour was 
unintentional. Rosset found evidence in support of this model by showing 
that intentionality endorsement is higher in speeded vs. un-speeded 
conditions. The explanation for this is that in the speeded condition there is 
insufficient time to engage in controlled processing and, hence, responses 
are guided by automatic processing. This study tried to replicate Rosset͛s 
speeded vs. un-speeded finding. An online version of the task was developed 
to reach a wider population and to increase the sample size relative to 
Rosset͛s study. In support of Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ findings, we found a significantly 
higher intentionality endorsement for ambiguous but prototypically 
accidental actions in the speeded compared to un-speeded condition. To 
fine-tune and optimise the paradigm for future use, we explored alternative 
data analysis approaches. 
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Introduction 
Dual-process model of intention attribution 
Generally speaking, dual-process models assume that the presence of 
constraints to reasoning, such as time constraints, will lead to an increased 
tendency to give a default (heuristic) response (Evans, 2007; Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2003).  The reason for this is that the constraints 
inhibit cognitively demanding analytical processing (Type 2), which could 
override heuristic processing (Type 1; Evans, 2007; Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 
2005; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Analytical processing (Type 2), in contrast, is 
sequential and requires more time and cognitive capacity (Evans & Stanovich, 
2013). Indeed, some empirical studies have found that individuals are more 
likely to make biased responses based on heuristic inferences when under 
time pressure (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Forgues & Markovits, 2010; 
Markovits, Brunet, Thompson, & Brisson, 2013; Roberts & Newton, 2001; 
Shafto, Coley, & Baldwin, 2007). 
 
In her 2008 study, Rosset asked participants to judge whether actions 
depicted in a series of sentences were done on purpose or by accident, under 
speeded (2.4 seconds) or un-speeded (5 seconds) conditions. Participants 
under time constraints showed significantly higher intentionality 
endorsement scores for ambiguous but prototypically accidental as well as 
unambiguously accidental action. However, this was not the case for 
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prototypically intentional or unambiguously intentional actions. Rosset used 
these findings (in addition to findings from two other experiments of the 
same study1) to support her argument that when cognitive processing is 
hindered by, for example, time constraints, intentionality judgements are 
driven by an automatic process that assumes all actions to be intentional. 
When individuals are allowed time to process intentionality of an action more 
thoroughly (un-speeded condition), the automatic response can be inhibited. 
This experiment forms the basis of Rosset͛s dual-process model, which 
assumes that two processes govern intention attribution: an automatic 
process leading to intentional judgements, and an analytical and controlled 
process that can inhibit the automatic response and lead to a judgement that 
the behaviour was unintentional.  
 
To our knowledge, one previous replication attempt of Rosset͛s key finding 
has been published (Hughes, Sandry, & Trafimow, 2012). This only partly 
replicated Rosset͛s findings, however, results of this previous replication 
study are somewhat inconclusive because 1) the sample size was significantly 
lower (i.e., decreased power) and 2) data were analysed in a different way 
than in Rosset (2008). The aim of the present study was to run a more 
thorough and conclusive replication attempt. An online version of the task 
 
1 In Experiment 2, an implicit measure was used asking participants to describe their mental 
image of the action to assess perceived intentionality. Participants tended to report mental 
images of intentional action. In Experiment 3, the recall of test items was measured. More 
unintentional test items were remembered, which Rosset took as evidence for more in-
depth processing. 
  53 
was developed, which enabled us to recruit a more substantial sample size. 
Also, the task was streamlined by reducing the number of control sentences 
ʹ these are irrelevant to the measure of interest and therefore can be pared 
down so as to lessen participants͛ fatigue. Finally, two different analyses on 
the data were run: a replication of Rosset͛s analysis separately analysing both 
control- and test categories, and an alternative analysis treating control 
categories as screening tools, which might be more appropriate given the 
task structure.  
 
Hypothesis 
Our hypothesis was that participants in the speeded condition would show 
higher intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental test 
sentences (which is one of two ambiguous test categories of the paradigm). 
Although Rosset (2008) also found significantly higher intentionality 
endorsement scores for unambiguously Accidental control sentences, we 
made no prediction regarding them, because the focus of this thesis is 
ambiguous action and, as we will argue, control sentences are more 
appropriately used as screening measures. Furthermore, in line with Rosset 
(2008), we predicted no group differences for ambiguous but Prototypically 
Intentional test sentences.  
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Methods 
Participants 
The study was approved by Goldsmiths College Department of Psychology 
Ethics Committee. An a priori sample size calculation based on Rosset͛s 
(2008) results using G*Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) 
revealed a required sample size of 290 participants (dсϬ.ϯ, αсϬ.Ϭϱ, 
Power=0.80). Participants were recruited via Testable Minds, an online 
platform in which participants are monetarily reimbursed for their 
participation. The study description asked for English native speakers of at 
least 18 years of age. 340 participants started the study. Data from 
participants who did not complete the study or who missed ≥ 25% of the trials 
were excluded. This resulted in a final sample size of 294 participants, 165 in 
the un-speeded condition and 129 in the speeded condition. The unequal 
sample sizes are a result of more participants in the speeded condition being 
excluded as a consequence of missing too many trials. 
 
Measures and Procedure 
At the beginning of the study, participants were presented with general 
information on the study and were asked for their consent. Only if they had 
given consent to take part in the study and had confirmed they were at least 
as old as 18 years of age could they proceed with the study.  
 
  55 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of the two conditions 
(speeded, un-speededͿ. Participants͛ task was to judge whether an action 
depicted in a sentence was more likely to be done on purpose or by accident. 
There were 54 sentences in total; 22 of which were ambiguous but 
prototypically accidental test sentences (Prototypically Accidental test 
sentences), 12 were ambiguous but prototypically intentional test sentences 
(Prototypically Intentional test sentences), 10 were unambiguously 
accidental control sentences (Accidental control sentences) and another 10 
were unambiguously intentional control sentences (Intentional control 
sentencesͿ. Note that Rosset͛s original paradigm comprises ϮϬ sentences of 
each control category, however, in this study, the number of control 
sentences was halved to decrease the total duration of the study and, hence, 
keep fatigue and drop-out rates to a minimum. Please see below for some 
examples of the stimuli used (Figure 2.1). A full list of the stimuli used can be 
found in Appendix 1. Sentences were presented in a set-randomised order, 
one at a time. As in Rosset (2008), in the speeded condition, participants were 
presented with each sentence for 2.4 seconds and in the un-speeded 
condition for 5 seconds, during which they had to make their decision by 
clicking one of two boxes labelled on purpose or by accident. All sentences 
are roughly the same length and are, according to Rosset (2008), sufficiently 
simple to be read in the given time frames. After every eight sentences, 
participants could take a short break. This ensured that participants who had 
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missed a trial could gather themselves before continuing with the 
experiment.  
 
 
Figure 2.1. Example stimuli for each test- and conƚƌol caƚegoƌǇ of RoƐƐeƚ͛Ɛ Ambiguous 
Sentence Paradigm. A) Example for Prototypically Accidental test sentence, B) example for 
Prototypically Intentional test sentence, C) example for Accidental control sentence and D) 
example for Intentional control sentence. Participants are presented with one sentence at a 
time and are asked to judge whether the action depicted in the sentence is generally done on 
ƉƵƌƉoƐe oƌ bǇ accidenƚ͘ PleaƐe noƚe ƚhaƚ RoƐƐeƚ͛Ɛ oƌiginal Ɖaƌadigm ǁaƐ condƵcƚed ƵƐing 
paper and pen, however, studies conducted in this thesis used a computer version of the 
paradigm in which participants were asked to respond by clicking on the corresponding box. 
 
Analyses 
Analysis I 
For this analysis, an intentionality endorsement score for each test sentence 
category and each control sentence category was calculated for every 
participant. Intentionality endorsement scores reflect the percentage of trials 
judged to depict intentional actions. In line with Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ analysis, we 
He ripped the piece of paper.
He sneezed from allergies. She baked a cake.
She broke the vase.
on purpose by accident
on purpose by accident
on purpose by accident
on purpose by accident
BA
DC
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first analysed all sentence categories separately. Unsurprisingly, both types 
of control sentence-categories were heavily skewed. Therefore, non-
parametric Mann Whitney-U tests were used to examine whether there were 
differences in intentionality endorsement scores between the speeded and 
the un-speeded group. Subsequently, a parametric independent samples t-
tests for both types of test sentence-category was conducted. Please note 
that Rosset (2008) conducted non-parametric Mann Whitney U tests for all 
sentence categories. In contrast, we chose parametric independent samples 
t-tests for the test sentence categories as our data do not deviate from 
normality sufficiently to justify non-parametric tests. For completeness, 
results of non-parametric Mann Whitney U tests for the test sentence-
categories can be found in Appendix 2. There is no change in significance of 
results when conducting non-parametric tests. 
 
Analysis II 
The analysis described above is perhaps not the most appropriate analytical 
approach given that control sentences are treated the same way as test 
sentences and no participants are excluded on the basis of answering 
incorrectly to control items. Under normal circumstances, in a neurotypical 
sample (i.e., without atypical social attribution patterns), multiple incorrect 
responses to control items are only to be expected when an individual does 
not attempt to complete or pay attention to the task. In light of this, a second 
analysis in which the control items functioned as a screening tool was 
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conducted. Hence, for this analysis, only the intentionality endorsement 
scores for each test sentence category were calculated.  Firstly, participants 
who had responded incorrectly to more than one control item of any test 
category were removed. This ensured that participants who had not paid 
attention to or who had misunderstood the task would be excluded. 
Secondly, similar to Analysis I, for the remaining sample, two independent 
samples t-tests were conducted to investigate whether there were any 
differences in intentionality endorsement scores between the speeded and 
un-speeded condition.  
 
 
Results 
As in Rosset (2008), only participants who responded to at least 75% of the 
test stimuli in either experimental category were included in the analysis.  
 
AnalǇƐiƐ I͗ ReƉlicaƚion of RoƐƐeƚ͛Ɛ ƌeƐƵlƚƐ 
There were no extreme outliers (based on inter-quartile range rule with a 
multiplier of 3.0; Hoaglin, Iglewicz, & Tukey, 1986), i.e., no participants were 
excluded from analysis on the basis of being an outlier. Mean results per 
group for each sentence category are presented in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1. Mean intentionality endorsement scores and standard deviations in 
brackets for Prototypically Accidental test sentences (PA), Prototypically 
Intentional test sentences (PI), Accidental control sentences (UA) and 
Intentional control sentences (UI) for participants of the speeded and the un -
speeded condition included in Analysis  I .  
 PA PI UA UI 
Speeded       
(n= 129) 
32.27 (18.66) 
 
68.41 (22.07) 
 
11.9 (18.35) 
 
91.04 (15.55) 
 
Un-speeded 
(n=165) 
26.81 (14.69) 73 (17.55) 5.45 (12.3) 95.96 (8.85) 
 
Control sentences 
Pooled across conditions, participants responded correctly to on average 
91.72% of Accidental control sentences and 93.80% of Intentional control 
sentences. This shows that participants generally understood the task 
instructions and paid attention to the task. Two non-parametric Mann-
Whitney U tests revealed significant differences between the speeded and 
the un-speeded condition. Same as Rosset (2008), the speeded group had 
higher intentionality endorsement scores for Accidental control sentences 
(U=8494.5, p<.001, one-tailed, Figure 2.2 A). However, not in line with Rosset 
(2008) who found no group differences, the speeded condition had 
significantly lower intentionality endorsement scores for the Intentional 
control sentences compared to the un-speeded group (U=8755, p=.001, two-
tailed; Figure 2.2 B).  
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A   
 
B   
Figure 2.2. Intentionality endorsement scores for the speeded and un-speeded condition for 
Accidental control sentences (A) and Intentional control sentences (B) for Analysis I. Mean 
intentionality endorsement scores are marked by horizontal lines. 
 
 
 
  61 
Test sentences 
Two independent samples t-tests revealed a significant difference between 
intentionality endorsement scores for Accidental test sentences between the 
speeded and the un-speeded condition, with the speeded condition showing 
higher intentionality endorsement scores (t(238.37)=-2.73, p=.004, one-
tailed, Figure 2.3 A). There was no significant difference between 
intentionality endorsement scores of the speeded and un-speeded group for 
Intentional test sentences (t(240.07)=1.93), p=.055, two-tailed, Figure 2.3 B).  
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A  
B   
Figure 2.2. Intentionality endorsement scores for the speeded and un-speeded condition for 
Prototypically Accidental test sentences (A) and Prototypically Intentional test sentences (B) 
for Analysis I. Mean intentionality endorsement scores are marked by horizontal lines. 
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In summary, results Prototypically Accidental test sentences, Prototypically 
Intentional test sentences and Accidental control sentences are in line with Rosset 
(2008). However, in contrast to Rosset (2008), we found decreased intentionality 
endorsement scores in the speeded condition for Intentional control sentences. This 
could be driven by factors such as inattentiveness or not understanding the task. 
 
Analysis II:   
Participants who had responded incorrectly to more than one control item 
were excluded from this analysis, resulting in a sample size of 207 participants 
(speeded: 76; un-speeded: 131). This ensured that only data of participants 
who had understood the task instructions and paid full attention to the task 
were used. There were no extreme outliers (based on inter-quartile range 
rule with a multiplier of 3.0; Hoaglin, Iglewicz, & Tukey, 1986). Mean 
intentionality endorsement scores for both groups can be seen in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2. Mean intentionality endorsement scores and standard deviations in 
brackets for Prototypically Accidental test sentences (PA)  and Prototypically  
Intentional test sentences (PI ) for participants of the speeded and the un -
speeded condition with participants who ha d answered incorrectly to too many 
control items excluded (Analysis  I I).  
 PA PI 
Speeded (n= 131) 
 
28.2 (16.74) 
 
74.32 (20.65) 
 
Un-speeded (n=76) 23.13 (12.6) 73.83 (17.82) 
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Test sentences 
Two independent samples t-test revealed a significant difference between 
intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental test 
sentences of the speeded and un-speeded group (t(124.66)= -2.29, p=.012, 
one-tailed; Figure Ϯ.ϯ AͿ. This is in line with Rosset͛s key finding. There was 
no significant difference between intentionality endorsement scores for 
Prototypically Intentional test sentences (t(205)= -.18, p=.865, two-tailed; 
Figure 2.3 B).  
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A  
B  
Figure 2.3. Intentionality endorsement scores for the speeded and un-speeded condition for 
Prototypically Accidental test sentences (A) and Prototypically Intentional test sentences (B) 
for Analysis II. Mean intentionality endorsement scores are marked by horizontal lines. 
 
Discussion 
The main aim of this study was to investigate whether individuals would show 
a higher tendency to judge ambiguous but prototypically accidental 
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behaviour to be intentional when under time pressure. We replicated 
Rosset͛s findings in so far that individuals who had to judge whether 
ambiguous but prototypically accidental behaviour was intentional or 
unintentional within 2.4 seconds judged more actions to be intentional 
compared to individuals who had more time to respond. Results were 
significant for both analyses conducted (Analysis I and Analysis II). 
 
Biased intentionality judgements under time constraints ʹ implication of 
findings 
These findings are in line with predictions of the dual-process model of 
intention attribution, which suggests that our automatic response is to judge 
ambiguous behaviour to be intentional (Type 1 processing), which can only 
be overridden by an analytical process when sufficient cognitive capacity and 
time is available (Type 2 processing). Type 1 processing is assumed to be 
rapid, parallel and automatic, i.e., it generates a response quickly and is not 
greatly affected by time constraints. Type 2 processing, in contrast, is 
assumed to be sequential, controlled and to require sufficient time to 
analytically process information, to take into account stored knowledge and 
to apply logic (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Evans, 2007; Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 
2005; Shafto et al., 2007). Assuming Rosset͛s dual-process model is valid, by 
manipulating available response time, we decreased participants͛ ability to 
engage in Type 2 processing and, hence, their responses were mainly driven 
by Type 1 processing. 
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In Analysis I the data were analysed in the same way as Rosset (2008). In 
line with Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ results, we found significantly higher intentionality 
endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental test sentences in the 
speeded condition. However, contrary to Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ findings, results 
revealed significantly lower intentionality endorsement scores for 
Prototypically Intentional test items. A reason for this could be that as for the 
current study the number of control items was reduced by half, a single item 
accounts for a larger percentage and therefore a larger proportion of the 
intentionality endorsement score.  
 
Sentence categories: How to treat control sentences and what analysis to 
choose 
Another aim of the current study was to more closely inspect the usefulness 
and appropriateness of the sentence categories of the Ambiguous Sentence 
Paradigm and find a way of how best to treat them. 
 
Rosset (2008) initially analysed all sentences separately. Control 
categories were treated as test categories (i.e., their label is misleading) and 
no participants were excluded, which means even inattentive individuals 
were included in the analysis. Inattentiveness or lack of motivation could be 
more detrimental in the speeded condition (as participants have to pay more 
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attention to avoid missing trials) and therefore, could potentially explain the 
significantly worse performance on the control items (Analysis I).  
 
Hughes and colleagues (2012), in contrast, conducted an omnibus test, 
which we judge as unsuitable for two main reasons: 1) Overall, participants 
tend to respond relatively accurately on control items. This implies scores are 
generally not normally distributed, i.e., omnibus tests assuming a normal 
distribution of the dependent variable (e.g., ANOVA) are perhaps not the 
most appropriate, and 2) Test and control sentences are qualitatively 
different.  
 
Therefore, we argue that the most appropriate way to analyse data from 
the Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm is to treat test sentences as a screening 
measure to filter out the participants who had not fully paid attention to the 
task and/ or had not fully understood task instructions (see Analysis II). The 
real focus of this field of research are ambiguous actions as they give us a 
handle on attributional biases. As Rosset (2008) argued herself, if cues 
strongly suggest an action is accidental (e.g., embarrassed facial expression 
of the agent, verbal cue, etc.), they will override any default intentional 
judgement. Furthermore, the emphasis should be put on Prototypically 
Accidental test sentences. Items of this category describe actions that are 
ambiguous in nature but more likely to be accidental. Impairment of 
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analytical processing (e.g., through time constraints) required for judging the 
action to be accidental would have an effect for these items, as they would 
by default be judged as intentional. Prototypically Intentional test items, in 
contrast, incorporate cues indicating that the actions described are more 
likely to be intentional. Therefore, analytical processing and automatic 
processing are more likely to lead to similar responses and, therefore, this 
category is not of great use for this research. Also, the number of items in 
Prototypically Intentional test sentences is significantly lower than in the 
Prototypically Accidental test sentences (12 vs 22). As intentionality 
endorsement scores reflect percentage of items judged to be intentional, in 
the Prototypically Intentional test category, a single item accounts for a 
higher percentage (i.e., a higher spread of scores is to be expected).  
 
Limitations of time manipulation 
In this study, we attempted to prevent controlled processing by applying time 
pressure in order to see whether this would lead to an increased tendency to 
judge ambiguous but prototypically accidental action to be intentional. 
Although our results are in line with predictions, a problem with such 
manipulations is that when introducing time pressure, it cannot easily be 
determined which cognitive functions are affected. Dealing with time 
pressure has been argued to involve multiple processes, as for example, 
selective attention, affect control, and parsimony of information processing 
(Stiensmeier-Pelster & Schürmann, 1993). Therefore, our results could be 
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due to factors other than simply having insufficient time to engage in 
controlled processing.  
 
Anxiety is another factor that might have contributed to the group 
differences induced by time pressure. It has been suggested that people are 
more anxious when required to make decisions under time pressure (Maule, 
Hockey, & Bdzola, 2000). Increased anxiety could also lead to participants 
perceiving the actions described in the stimuli as more threatening. Some of 
the sentences depict actions with negative consequences and a threatening 
interpretation thereof would be to judge them to be intentional, i.e., the 
agent intended to cause harm. In the final two experiments of this thesis (see 
Chapter 8) we use a more controlled way of preventing Type 2 processing, in 
order to overcome some of these limitations. 
 
General limitations 
As Rosset (2008) herself pointed out, it could be that what really becomes 
apparent with the time manipulation is a linguistic bias rather than an 
intentionality bias. In the English language, accidental action is frequently 
marked by the use of passive voice or linguistic cues ;e.g., ͞by mistake͟, ͞by 
accident͟, etcͿ. In the final two experiments of this thesis (see Chapter 8) we 
use a non-linguistic paradigm to investigate whether intentionality 
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endorsement increases when engagement of controlled processes is 
prevented through increased working memory load. 
 
Another limitation of this study is that a large number of participants had 
to be excluded because of too many missed trials, which affected the 
speeded group more than the un-speeded group. This not only resulted in 
un-equal sample sizes but also could mean that the participants in the 
speeded condition included in our analysis were a biased sample of ͞quick 
responders͟, i.e. individuals who are quick and efficient in processing 
information and/or individuals who are more likely to respond intuitively and 
jump to conclusions. Also, as in Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ as well as Hughes and 
colleagues͛ ;ϮϬϭϮͿ experiments, no participants were reported to have 
missed too many trials, the question has to be raised how the authors 
ensured that participants stuck to the time manipulation with a paper and 
pen test and whether some participants only wrote down their answer after 
the trial had passed. This would mean that the time manipulation was not 
conducted rigorously. 
 
Conclusion 
In this study, we replicated Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ findings of individuals showing 
higher intentionality endorsement scores for ambiguous but prototypically 
accidental actions when under time pressure. Furthermore, two approaches 
  72 
to analyse responses of the Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm were discussed 
and a preferable way for subsequent analysis was specified. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Exploring intentionality judgements across the 
lifespan 
Abstract 
Previous research in adults found an automatic tendency to perceive 
ambiguous behaviour to be intentional. Rosset (2008) proposed a dual-
process model to explain this tendency. It suggests that all actions are 
automatically judged to be intentional until inhibited by higher-level cognitive 
processes leading to non-intentional explanations. In line with this, Rosset 
and Rottman (2014) proposed a framework to explain developmental 
changes in intentional reasoning, arguing it is the ability to identify accidental 
action that characterises mature intentional reasoning. This study aims to 
test this hypothesis by investigating whether there are age-related effects in 
the intention attribution of ambiguous action. Data of 312 participants aged 
between 12 and 67 years were included in the analysis. Linear regression 
analysis suggested no significant effects of age on intentionality endorsement 
scores. Therefore, our findings do not support Rosset and Rottman͛s 
framework. 
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Introduction 
In the previous chapter, one core prediction of Rosset͛s dual-process model 
(increased intentionality endorsement when under time pressure) was 
replicated. In this chapter, we will explore another key prediction of the dual-
process model, namely the involvement of age in judging intentionality of 
ambiguous action. Distinguishing intentional from unintentional actions is a 
cornerstone of social cognition and therefore of relevance to all age groups 
(Baldwin & Baird, 2001; Feinfield, Lee, Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1999; 
Premack, 1990; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). Previous 
research has placed a focus on when and how the ability to understand 
intentionality develops (Baird & Astington, 2005; Meltzoff, 1995; Mull & 
Evans, 2010; Tomasello et al., 2005). Children were assumed to acquire the 
understanding of intentionality and the ability to detect intentional actions 
over time and, thereby, to develop into more mature social agents. However, 
Rosset and Rottman (2014) put forward an alternative framework that 
suggests that it is not the ability to identify intentional action per se that 
marks mature intentional reasoning, but rather this maturity is characterised 
by the ability to understand that an observed action can be unintentional or 
accidental. This ability, Rosset and Rottman (2014) argue, might require 
knowledge of alternative causation and might be more cognitively 
demanding than simply attributing intent. 
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Are unintentional judgements cognitively more demanding? 
In line with Rosset and Rottman͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ assumption that judging behaviour 
to be unintentional is more cognitively demanding than simply attributing 
intent, previous research suggests that adults have an automatic tendency to 
attribute intent to ambiguous action (i.e., action that can be intentional or 
unintentional), sometimes referred to as the intentionality bias (Moore & 
Pope, 2014; Peyroux, Strickland, Tapiero, & Franck, 2014; Rosset, 2008; 
Slavny & Moore, 2018). Rosset (2008) proposed a dual-process model to 
explain this tendency. It states that all action is automatically considered to 
be intentional and only ever perceived to be unintentional if an automatic 
judgement is inhibited and overridden by a higher-level cognitive system. This 
higher-level system is assumed to involve reasoning about alternative 
causation and to take into account past experience and knowledge of the 
situation.  
 
Empirical evidence for this dual-process model comes from three lines of 
research: 1) Findings, suggest that when under time pressure (i.e., when 
deployment of the higher-level cognitive process is hindered), individuals are 
more likely to judge ambiguous but prototypically accidental action to be 
intentional (see Rosset, 2008; and our replication in Chapter 2); 2) An 
increased tendency to perceive action to be intentional has also been 
associated with schizophrenia (a disorder associated with frontal lobe 
dysfunction (Peyroux et al., 2014); 3) Acute alcohol intoxication, which is 
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known to temporarily diminish executive functioning has been shown to lead 
to more intentional judgements for behaviour (Bègue, Bushman, Giancola, 
Subra, & Rosset, 2010). This strengthens the argument that judging 
behaviour to be unintentional is the more cognitively demanding response.  
 
However, to-date Rosset and Rottman͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ framework has not been 
directly tested. In other words, it has not been investigated whether there 
are any age-related changes in the expression of the intentionality bias. It is 
worth noting that ambiguous action is of primary interest here for two 
reasons: a) biased judgement patterns will only be observable in ambiguous 
situations (i.e., no strong external cues indicate intentionality of action), and 
b) a great deal of real-life social situations is ambiguous and actions are not 
always explicitly intentional or unintentional. The aim of this study, therefore, 
is to investigate age-related changes in intentionality endorsement of 
ambiguous action. 
 
Developmental framework 
As mentioned above, previously held views assume that understanding 
intention as a possible cause for behaviour develops with age (Baird & 
Astington, 2005; Miller & Aloise, 1989; Tomasello et al., 2005). Rosset and 
Rottman (2014) termed this traditional approach the Intention as Causal 
Explanation Develops (ICED) framework. According to the ICED framework, 
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at first, children are not capable of understanding that behaviour can be 
caused by an individual͛s mental state ;e.g., their intention). This ability 
emerges during the course of development in line with a more mature 
understanding of human action. A key focus of this framework is on when and 
how children develop an understanding of intention. 
 
In contrast, the Non-Intention as Causal Explanation Develops (NICED) 
framework put forward by Rosset & Rottman (2014) suggests that it is the 
continuous increase in unintentional judgements of observed behaviour that 
indicates mature intentional reasoning (Figure 3.1). They argue that once the 
cognitive system has developed to have a sufficient understanding of 
intentionality, intentional explanations for action will be the default 
judgement. Furthermore, during childhood and adolescence the expression 
of this default is attenuated as a) individuals accumulate knowledge of 
alternative causes (e.g., biological causes such as a reflex for sneezing), b) 
individuals get better at identifying action cues/triggers (e.g., visual and 
acoustic cues for sneezing), and c) executive functioning skills mature, 
resulting in better inhibition of automatic responses.  
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Figure 3.1. An illustration of the contrasting developmental prediction of the traditional 
approaches (left) and the NICED framework (right) taken from Rosset and Rottman (2014). 
 
Rosset and Rottman͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ NICED framework is based on examples from 
the developmental literature. Considering infant studies, there is evidence 
demonstrating that intentionality is already perceived at a very early age, i.e. 
suggesting that it is not slowly and effortfully acquired over time. For 
example, at three months of age, infants seem to perceive human as well as 
non-human actions to be goal-directed (Luo, 2011; Sommerville & 
Woodward, 2005). Later, during language development in the second year of 
life, children perceive adults͛ intentions when acquiring new words (e.g., 
Tomasello, Strosberg, & Akhtar, 1996). Around the same age, perceiving 
intentional actions directs infants͛ behaviour, as they are more likely to 
imitate intentional than accidental actions (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 
1998) and do not simply copy an action gone wrong but re-enact the intended 
action (Meltzoff, 1995). Furthermore, there is evidence suggesting that 
toddlers use information regarding others͛ intentions to solve novel problems 
(Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2002; DiYanni & Kelemen, 2005). Together, this 
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demonstrates that by at least two years of age, children have developed an 
understanding of intentionality.  
 
Although this alone does not function as evidence for either framework, 
both make different hypotheses for the subsequent developmental 
trajectory of intentional reasoning. The ICED framework suggests intentional 
explanations increasingly dominate reasoning about human action in the 
course of development, whereas the NICED framework suggests that 
intentional explanations will become less prominent as development 
progresses (Rosset & Rottman, 2014).  
 
When considering studies with slightly older children than discussed 
above, data seem to be more consistent with the NICED framework. For 
example, Smith (1978) presented 4- to 6-year olds with videos showing four 
types of actions: voluntary actions with intended side effects, voluntary 
actions with unintended side effects, involuntary actions, and ͞object-like͟ 
movements (e.g., arm hooked by umbrella). 4-year olds judged all actions to 
be intentional, whereas 5-year olds on average only judged voluntary actions 
to be intentional. 6-year olds tended to judge only actions to be intentional 
that were voluntary and intended, a pattern that was also found in adults. As 
Rosset and Rottman (2014) argue, this shows a developing ability to identify 
non-intentional action. Similarly, other research suggests that although 
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children around three to four years of age might acknowledge that the cause 
for behaviour could be physical or biological, their initial automatic 
judgement tends to be an intentional explanation for behaviour, especially in 
younger children of that age group (Schult & Wellman, 1997). 
 
In summary, the developmental literature demonstrates that children 
have a sensitivity towards perceiving intentions, to the extent that they seem 
to over-attribute intention to observed behaviour, which gradually reduces 
with age. This is why Rosset and Rottman developed the NICED framework, 
which suggests it is not the ability to detect intention but rather the ability to 
understand that a behaviour is not caused by intent that develops and 
matures with age. 
 
Most studies investigating the development of intentional explanation 
have focused on infants and children rather than adolescents or young adults. 
Although Rosset and Rottman (2014) make no explicit prediction as of when 
intentional reasoning maturity is typically reached, they suggest that 
development of intentional reasoning is a gradual process. Importantly, the 
inhibition of intentional explanations is likely to be tied to frontal lobe 
functions, which are known to continue developing into adolescence and 
early adulthood (see Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006; Romine & Reynolds, 
2005). One can, therefore, assume that the development of mature 
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intentional reasoning, as proposed by the NICED framework, will show 
developmental changes that continue into adolescence and beyond. 
 
Present study 
The NICED framework was based on existing literature but as mentioned 
above, to date, no study has attempted to empirically test age-related 
changes of intentionality judgements of ambiguous action. The aim of the 
current study is to test whether, in line with the predictions from the NICED 
framework, intentionality judgements gradually decrease with age. 
Importantly, this decrease is expected to mirror changes in executive 
functioning skills, so one would also predict that this decrease will plateau 
after full maturation of the frontal lobes (between early and late 20s; Giedd 
et al., 1999; Sowell et al., 2003; Sowell, Thompson, Holmes, Jernigan, & Toga, 
1999; Sowell, Thompson, Tessner, & Toga, 2001).  
 
Methods 
Participants 
Visitors to the Science Museum in London aged 12 years and above were 
invited to take part in the study between June 11 and July 22, 2018. As 
Goldsmiths Department of Psychology Ethics committee only approved for 
individuals of 12 years or older to participate, no younger individuals were 
included. In total, 1083 museum visitors took part in the study. Data from 312 
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participants were included in the analysis (180 females, 129 males, 3 not 
specified). The age range was 12 to 67 years (M=25.78, SD=10.83; Figure 3.2). 
Data from 770 participants were excluded on the basis of the following 
criteria: English not being their first language, responses were incomplete, 
data for age was missing or they had incorrectly responded to one or more 
control items of any test category which tested their understanding of the 
task. Such stringent exclusion criteria needed to be applied as a result of the 
testing environment being busy and noisy and aimed to keep inattentiveness 
as a confounding factor to a minimum.  
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Measures  
A modified version of Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm was 
used to measure participants͛ tendency to judge ambiguous actions to be 
intentional. Participants were presented with 33 test sentences describing 
ambiguous actions that could either be intentional or unintentional. 21 of 
these sentences described ambiguous but prototypically accidental actions 
(Prototypically Accidental test sentences; e.g., He stepped in the puddle.) and 
12 described ambiguous but prototypically intentional actions (Prototypically 
Intentional test sentences; e.g., She averted her eyes.). Additionally, 
participants were presented with 10 unambiguously accidental control 
sentences (Accidental control sentences; e.g., He fell down the stairs.) and 9 
unambiguously intentional control sentences (Intentional control sentences; 
e.g., She followed the recipe.). (Because of a technical error the number of 
Prototypically Accidental test stimuli and Accidental control stimuli deviate 
by one item each from the number of items usually used in this thesis. We do 
not assume this to have a confounding effect on the results because 
intentionality endorsement scores reflect percentage scores of all stimuli 
respondent to and stimuli are not assumed to differ qualitatively.)  
 
The control sentences were used to assess reading ability and correct 
understanding of the task. All sentences were presented one at a time in a 
set-randomised order and participants had to respond by indicating whether 
the sentence presented was more likely to describe an action done on 
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purpose or by accident. In contrast to Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ original paradigm, 
participants in this study were given no time constraints to respond to each 
sentence. This ensured that reading speed would not confound the results. 
Also, there were no breaks between sentences, but participants were asked 
to complete the task in one go. For each type of test sentence, an 
intentionality endorsement score was computed, reflecting the percentage 
of sentences judged to describe an intentional rather than accidental action.  
 
Procedure 
The experiment was completed using the online survey software Qualtrics. 
Participants could either use their smartphone or a tablet provided to 
complete the experiment. Information, consent form and instructions for the 
task were presented online. After participants completed the task, they were 
debriefed and had the opportunity to ask questions. The study was approved 
by Goldsmiths College Department of Psychology Ethics Committee. 
 
Results 
One statistically significant outlier was removed prior to all analyses (based 
on inter-quartile range rule with a multiplier of 3.0; Hoaglin, Iglewicz, & 
Tukey, 1986). Mean intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically 
Accidental test sentences were 19.24 (SD=11.09) and mean intentionality 
scores for Prototypically Intentional test sentences were 69.20 (SD=17.55). 
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They are similar to previously reported scores in purely adult samples (Rosset, 
2008; Slavny & Moore, 2018).  
 
Age effects on judging intentionality of ambiguous action 
As Rosset and Rottman (2014) had not specified the shape of the relation 
between age and intentionality endorsement but simply predicted a gradual 
decrease in intentionality endorsement, linear effects of age on intentionality 
endorsement scores were tested. Simple linear regression analyses were 
conducted to examine whether age would predict intentionality 
endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental (Figure 3.3) and for 
Prototypically Intentional test sentences (Figure 3.4). The results were non-
significant for both types of test sentences: Prototypically Accidental: 
(F(1,310)=.035, p=.852, R2 <.001, βс.Ϭϭϭ; Prototypically Intentional: 
F(1,310)=3.206, p=.074, R2=.010, βс-.101). Given that age was not normally 
distributed both the analysis was repeated with a logarithmic transformation 
of age (base-10; Appendix 3), which did not change the significance of the 
results. 
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Figure 3.3. Scatterplot showing the association between months of age and intentionality 
endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental test sentences with linear trendline. 
Intentionality endorsement scores reflect the percentage of sentences judged to describe 
behaviour done on purpose. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Scatterplot showing the association between months of age and intentionality 
endorsement scores for Prototypically Intentional test sentences with linear trendline. 
Intentionality endorsement scores reflect the percentage of sentences judged to describe 
behaviour done on purpose. 
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Discussion 
The NICED framework put forward by Rosset and Rottman (2014) predicts a 
negative association between age and intentionality endorsement based on 
the idea that as we get older, we accumulate a greater knowledge of 
alternative causation for action and the development of our executive control 
allows us to inhibit and ͞override͟ an automatic judgement of intentionality. 
However, results of the current study did not suggest an association between 
age and intentionality endorsement of ambiguous action and, hence, our 
data do not support an intention attribution model as assumed by the NICED 
framework.  
 
Role of factors other than age 
As there was no relation between age and intentionality endorsement, other 
factors not accounted for in the NICED model are likely to explain individual 
differences in intentionality endorsement. These could be factors that are not 
necessarily linked to age, such as personality, psychopathological traits, social 
background, socioeconomic status or similar. The NICED framework suggests 
a rather simple model of intentional reasoning that predicts a similar 
developmental trajectory for all individuals and is influenced only by 
exposure to alternative action causes and individual differences in executive 
control (both of which supposedly mediate the relation between 
intentionality endorsement and age). Other possible contributors are not 
factored in. However, our data suggest that age alone does not explain 
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variability in intentionality scores and, hence, variability must be caused by 
other factors.  
 
Range in intentionality endorsement scores  
When looking at Figure 3.2, it becomes apparent that the majority of our 
participants were adolescents and young adults. This age group also shows 
the highest range in intentionality endorsement scores. This could be simply 
because with a larger sample size come more extreme scores, or because of 
variability inherent to these age groups. If the latter is the case, a sample with 
more older adults would be required to reveal this trend. Factors contributing 
to a wider range of intentionality endorsement scores could be cognitive 
ability, working memory, language competence, Theory of Mind skills, which 
in adolescence/early adulthood have possibly not fully matured yet and, 
hence, lead to more extreme scores. 
 
Plateau before 12 years 
A major limitation of the current study was that only participants of 12 years 
and above were allowed to participate in the study. Considering previous 
intentional reasoning literature, substantial changes happen between the 
ages of four to six years (e.g., Schult & Wellman, 1997; Smith, 1978) and 
already 6-year olds seem to judge intentionality of action similarly to adults 
(Smith, 1978). According to Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ dual-process framework, 
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executive functioning skills and knowledge of alternative causes are required 
for judging behaviour to be accidental. As the stimuli include everyday actions 
(e.g., He forgot his homework., He tracked mud inside., He arrived 5 minutes 
late for class.), individuals of 12 years and above may have already acquired 
a good knowledge of alternative causes, i.e., differences would not be 
expected to greatly influence intentionality endorsement. On the contrary, 
perhaps children and adolescents are more familiar with some of the 
scenarios and are more likely to do these accidentally themselves. For 
example, arriving late for class by accident is a) more likely to happen to an 
individual still at school and b) younger individuals are less likely to schedule 
their own commute to school, so they are more reliant on others͛ punctuality. 
Therefore, any age-related differences could only stem from differences in 
executive functioning. However, it is possible that by the age of 12 years and 
above their executive functions are already developed enough to inhibit 
automatic responses to the deployed stimuli. In that sense, the lack of age-
related effects would be unsurprising. 
 
Role of available cognitive capacity 
Following on, if we assume for the used scenarios alternative causes come to 
mind easily and possibly not a great amount of executive control is required 
to judge them to be accidental, cognitive capacity would need to be 
compromised to detect age-related changes specifically related to executive 
functioning.  
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As Rosset (2008) argues, even mature intentional reasoners are still likely 
to demonstrate biased responses when their cognitive resources are 
compromised (e.g., due to time pressure, see Chapter 2). It is possible that 
executive functioning ability (i.e., ability to inhibit an automatic response) 
only plays a role under conditions in which it is really needed. Therefore, it is 
possible that age-related effects are only apparent when availability of 
cognitive capacity or time to engage in higher-level processing is limited, 
which presumably was not the case in this study. Future studies should 
consider a speeded condition similar to Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ Experiment ϭ (see 
Chapter 2), to investigate whether younger individuals tend to engage in 
more biased thinking than adults when engagement in higher-level 
processing is made more difficult.  
 
Future directions 
As discussed above, future studies should include younger participants, 
ideally including children as young as four years. If including children who 
cannot read independently, a different paradigm would have to be used. A 
version of Heider and Simmel͛s ;ϭϵϰϰͿ task could be used, which is an implicit 
measure of perception of goal-directed behaviour. However, we are unsure 
whether such a task would capture the same concept that is the focus of our 
research. In their task, participants are shown moving shapes and they 
frequently perceive these shapes as having mental states and goals, indicated 
by how the participants refer to the shapes and their ͞actions͟ (Heider & 
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Simmel, 1944). In other words, the task measures whether participants 
perceive an agent that caused an action per se, however, we are interested 
in how participants perceive an individual͛s action ʹ to be intentional or 
unintentional. Therefore, we assume that a novel paradigm would be 
required to measure the same concept as the Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm 
but suitable for younger as well as older individuals. 
 
Furthermore, future research could consider including a condition of 
limited cognitive capacity (e.g., through time pressure) to highlight 
differences in intentionality endorsement due to the efficiency of executive 
functions. As discussed above, any age-related effects are more likely to be 
detected under conditions in which cognitive ability (i.e., efficiency of 
information processing) and executive functions have to be sufficiently 
developed to counteract biased reasoning and automatic judgements. 
 
In addition, future research could investigate whether individual 
differences in executive functioning skills and cognitive ability are associated 
with intentionality endorsement across development, particularly given the 
assumptions set out by the dual-process model (Rosset, 2008). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Exploring the effects of age and IQ on 
intentionality judgements in a school sample 
Abstract 
Previous research suggests that humans have a tendency to judge actions to 
be intentional. According to Rosset (2008), this tendency is the product of a 
dual-process system underpinning intention attribution. On this view, action 
observation triggers automatic attributions of intent, which may then be 
͞overridden͟ by higher-level cognitive processes if available. More recently, 
Rosset and Rottman (2014) suggested that this overriding of intentional 
judgements (and the associated deployment of higher-level cognitive 
processes) is a marker of mature action understanding; and so it is the ability 
to detect unintentional, rather than intentional, causation, that is the 
defining feature of successful cognitive development. In this study, we set out 
to probe some of the predictions made by Rosset and Rottman͛s 
developmental model of intention attribution. More specifically, we 
investigated the relationship between intention attribution on the one hand, 
and age and cognitive ability on the other. We tested a sample of eight- to 
12-year old children and found that neither age nor cognitive ability could 
predict intentionality endorsement of ambiguous action. Therefore, our data 
do not appear to support Rosset and Rottman͛s framework. 
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Introduction 
Intentionality and maturation of intention attribution system ʹ NICED 
framework 
As discussed in the previous chapter, in line with Rosset and Rottman͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ 
NICED framework, understanding that actions can be unintentional is 
assumed to be a marker of mature intentional reasoning rather than 
understanding intentionality per se. The study discussed in the previous 
chapter set out to measure the effect of age on intentionality judgements of 
ambiguous action in a large sample of visitors to the London Science Museum 
aged between 12 and 67 years of age. As discussed in the previous Chapter, 
12 years of age might have been too old to detect age-related changes in 
judging intentionality in ambiguous action. Therefore, in this study, we aimed 
to further investigate Rosset and Rottman͛s developmental model of 
intention reasoning by examining the effect of cognitive ability, as well as age, 
in a sample of school-aged children (i.e., partially younger participants than 
in the previous study).  
 
According to Rosset and Rottman (2014), several factors contribute to the 
ability to judge behaviour to be accidental, including knowledge of alternative 
causes as well as executive functioning skills necessary to inhibit automatic 
responses. These are factors that develop and improve with age (e.g., 
Huizinga, Dolan, & van der Molen, 2006). For example, over time, individuals 
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are repeatedly exposed to and learn differential, non-intentional action 
causes (e.g., biological causes such as a reflex for sneezing). Simultaneously, 
children cognitively mature; frontal lobe processes develop throughout 
childhood and adolescence, allowing for increasingly refined executive 
functioning skills (Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006; Romine & Reynolds, 2005). 
Age, therefore, acts as an index for mature intentional reasoning.  
 
However, by studying intentionality endorsement as a function of age 
only, as in the previous chapter, it is not possible to disentangle whether it is 
age in general, or cognitive maturity specifically, that underlies the decreased 
tendency to judge behaviour to be intentional. In other words, it is not 
possible to tell whether it is greater social experience or greater cognitive 
ability that enable an individual to judge ambiguous action to be accidental. 
Therefore, in addition to investigating age-related effects, the aim of this 
study is to test whether individual differences in cognitive ability (i.e., the 
efficiency with which information is processed, usually measured with 
specific cognitive ability tests; see Evans, 2003, 2007; Evans & Stanovich, 
2013) have an effect on intentionality endorsement of ambiguous action. 
According to the dual-process model of intention attribution (Rosset, 2008), 
Type 2 processing inhibits an intentional judgement and enables an 
unintentional judgement. We assume greater cognitive ability to facilitate 
Type 2 processing and, hence, to be associated with lower intentionality 
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endorsement for ambiguous action. In other words, higher levels of general 
cognitive ability would enable mature intentional reasoning. 
 
Intentionality endorsement and cognitive ability ʹ Type 1 and 2 processing 
Dual-process accounts of reasoning assume that Type 1 processing is 
independent of cognitive ability whereas Type 2 processing is correlated with 
it (see Evans, 2003, 2007; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). People with higher 
cognitive ability are thought to be more able to resolve a conflict between 
Type 1 and Type 2 processes, to engage in decoupled and analytical 
reasoning, and in doing so, achieve an answer that is not purely guided by 
heuristics (e.g., Baron, 1991, 1995; Brenner, Koehler, & Tversky, 1996; 
Galotti, 1989; Kardash & Scholes, 1996; Klaczynski, 1997; Klaczynski & 
Gordon, 1996; Kuhn, 1991, 1993; Nickerson, 1987). A vast amount of 
empirical evidence suggests a positive association of cognitive ability and the 
ability to find normatively correct solutions to problems (e.g., Capon, 
Handley, & Dennis, 2003; Klaczynski, 2000; Klaczynski & Daniel, 2005; 
Klaczynski & Gordon, 1996; Neys, 2006).  
 
In terms of judging intentionality of ambiguous action, if we assume a 
dual-process model, in which action is judged to be unintentional only if an 
automatic response is overridden by a Type 2 process, then higher cognitive 
ability will be associated with lower intentionality endorsement scores. 
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Indeed, findings from the cognitive bias-literature suggest an association 
between cognitive ability and decreased susceptibility to biased thinking 
(Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007; Klaczynski & Lavallee, 2005; Kokis, 
Macpherson, Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2002; Newstead, Handley, Harley, 
Wright, & Farrelly, 2004; Toplak, Liu, MacPherson, Toneatto, & Stanovich, 
2007). This further supports the prediction of a negative association between 
cognitive ability and intentionality endorsement of ambiguous action. 
 
Verbal and visual paradigm 
The study presented in the previous chapter only included Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ 
Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm. However, criticism has been raised the 
intentionality bias in Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ studies could have emerged out of a 
linguistic bias (see Moore & Pope, 2014). As Rosset (2008) pointed out 
herself, an accidental action, for example, might usually be marked by the use 
of passive voice or by explicitly calling it accidental. Therefore, an increased 
tendency to judge behaviour to be intentional under conditions such as time 
pressure could mark biased responding due to the nature of the paradigm 
and unrelated to intentional reasoning. If this is the case, a response pattern 
guided by a more pronounced linguistic bias could potentially be found in 
children, which could be a potential limitation of the study. 
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To deal with such potential linguistic bias, Moore and Pope (2014) 
developed a non-linguistic video paradigm (Ambiguous Movement 
Paradigm). As described in Chapter 1, it involves short video clips of 
ambiguous finger movements that can either be judged to be intentional or 
unintentional. We included this measure in this study to ensure that a greater 
tendency to judge ambiguous behaviour to be intentional (if found) is not 
paradigm- or domain-specific.  
 
Hypotheses 
For both paradigms (Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm, Ambiguous Movement 
Paradigm), we make the following two hypotheses: 
1) Age in months and full-scale IQ as a measure of general cognitive 
ability will be negatively related to intentionality endorsement scores 
(for the Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm as well as the Ambiguous 
Movement Paradigm). 
2) If this is the case, the association between age and intentionality 
endorsement will be mediated by full-scale IQ. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
The study was approved by Goldsmiths College Department of Psychology 
Ethics Committee. Neurotypical school students aged between 8 and 15 
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years (n=62; mean age=10.1 years, SD=1.35; 32 females) participated in the 
study. They were all students from one of two participating schools, one 
Primary and one Secondary School in East London, United Kingdom. 
 
Testing took place over a period of five weeks in the form of one-to-one 
and group sessions. Participants completed up to three tasks (WASI-II, 
Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm, Ambiguous Movement Paradigm; see 
below), which were not necessarily conducted on the same day or in the 
same order for each participant. Not all participants completed all tasks. 
Therefore, participants are described in more detail for each of the two 
experimental measures (Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm and Ambiguous 
Movement Paradigm) below.  
 
Measures and Procedure 
The study involved three tasks, one standardised IQ measure (WASI-II) and 
two experimental paradigms investigating participants͛ tendency to judge 
ambiguous actions to be intentional. Additionally, all participants͛ age in 
months at the time of the IQ testing was recorded. (Note: Although IQ testing 
and the other tasks were not necessarily conducted on the same day, all 
experimental sessions per form (year group) would usually be conducted 
within a week.) 
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IQ measure 
Participants͛ IQ was measured using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence II (WASI-II; Wechsler, Zhou, Corporation., & Laboratory, 2011). It 
involves four sub-tasks, two of them (Vocabulary, Similarities) measuring 
verbal reasoning ability (VCI) and the other two (Block Design, Matrix 
Reasoning) measuring non-verbal perceptual reasoning ability (PRI). Each 
participant received a VCI and a PRI score and a full-scale IQ score (FSIQ4), 
which is a measure of performance on all sub-tasks taking age into account.  
 
RoƐƐeƚ͛Ɛ AmbigƵoƵƐ Senƚence Paƌadigm 
Participants were asked to complete a modified version of Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ 
Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm to measure their tendency to judge 
ambiguous actions to be intentional. As in Chapter 2, participants were 
presented with 34 test sentences describing ambiguous actions that could 
either be intentional or unintentional. 22 of them were ambiguous but 
prototypically accidental (Prototypically Accidental test sentences) and 12 
were ambiguous but prototypically intentional (Prototypically Intentional test 
sentences). Additionally, participants were presented with 10 unambiguously 
accidental control sentences (Accidental control sentences; e.g., The girl had 
a seizure.) and 10 unambiguously intentional control sentences (Intentional 
control sentences; e.g., He listened attentively.). Sentences were presented 
one at a time in a set-randomised order on a computer- or laptop screen. 
Participants were asked to indicate whether they thought the action 
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described in each sentence was done on purpose or by accident by clicking 
on the corresponding answer. As in the previous study, there were no time 
constraints given to respond to each stimulus, to ensure that reading ability 
and -speed would not confound the results. Also, there were no breaks 
between sentences, but participants were asked to complete the task in one 
go. 
 
 Testing took place in classroom settings of four to 27 students.  Each 
student completed the task independently on a laptop or computer. At the 
beginning of each session, task instructions were given to the whole group. 
Students were also instructed not to talk to each other and to complete the 
task in their own time. When participants started the task, they were 
presented with the first screen which repeated the task instructions to allow 
participants to read through them in their own time and to ensure all 
participants understood the task. After completing the task, participants 
quietly left the room. 
 
Intentionality endorsement scores were calculated for each category of 
test sentences, comprising of the percentage of items for which actions were 
judged to be intentional. 
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Ambiguous Movement Paradigm 
In this paradigm, participants were asked to judge the intentionality of a 
simple hand movement. More precisely, they were asked to judge the 
intentionality of a finger strapped to a keyboard pressing a key. (For more 
details of the paradigm, please refer to the Chapter 1.) There were 24 trials 
and to compute the intentionality endorsement score the percentage of trials 
judged to be intentional was calculated (Video intentionality endorsement 
score). 
 
Results 
Results Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm  
Exclusion 
Participants who only responded to 75% or less of the test items and 
participants who incorrectly responded to more than one control item of 
either category were excluded from further analysis. This resulted in a sample 
size of 50 participants (mean age=125.36 months (10.45 years), SD=14.27). 
By excluding participants who responded to more than one control item of 
any test category incorrectly, inattentiveness due to the nature of the in-class 
testing is not assumed to be a great confounding factor. 
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There were no statistically significant outliers in intentionality 
endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental nor Prototypically 
Intentional test sentences (based on inter-quartile range rule with a 
multiplier of 3.0; Hoaglin, Iglewicz, & Tukey, 1986). 
 
Correlations 
Pearson͛s correlation analyses for the following variables were run: age in 
months, intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically Intentional test 
sentences, intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental 
test sentences, spatial reasoning ability (PRI), verbal reasoning ability (VCI), 
full-scale IQ (FSIQ4). 
 
There were no significant correlations between the variables of interest 
(intentionality endorsement scores for either type of test sentences) and any 
of the other variables, however, there was a significant negative correlation 
between age and verbal reasoning and full-scale IQ (Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1.  Pearson correlations for n=50 among age in months, spatial  
reasoning abil ity (PRI),  verbal reasoning abil ity  (VCI),  full-scale IQ (FSQ4), 
intentionality endorsement scores for Ambiguous but Prototypically Accidental 
test sentences (PA) and for Ambiguous but Prototypically Intentional test 
sentences (PI).  All  values in bold are s ignificant either at the level of 0.05 (*, 
two-tailed) or at the level of 0.01 (**, two -tailed).  
n=50 PRI VCI FSIQ4 PA PI 
Age months -.231 -.326* -.300* -.107 .182 
PRI - -.423** .821** -.186 -.051 
VCI - - .843** -.169 .074 
FSIQ4 - - - -.200 .019 
PA - - - - .302* 
  
Further inspection of the data revealed that this correlation was driven by 
the four oldest students of the dataset from one particular school with lower 
than average IQ. At this particular school, the study was advertised to parents 
by the school͛s Special Educational Needs Coordinator. As a result, only 
parents who were regularly in contact with them (i.e., parents of students 
who struggled at school) gave consent for their children to participate. 
 
After excluding these four students, age and IQ did not significantly 
correlate any longer (Table 4.2). As these four students seem to represent a 
subgroup, they were excluded from subsequent analyses, which resulted in a 
final sample size of 46 students (mean age=122.5 months (10.21 years), 
SD=9.7; age range: 113-140 months; Table 4.3). (Note, all remaining students 
were from a single school only.) 
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Table 4.2.  Pearson correlations for n=46 among age in months, spatial  
reasoning abil ity  (PRI),  verbal  reason ing abil ity (VCI),  full -scale IQ (FSQ4), PA-  
and PI  intentionality endorsement scores. All  values in bold are s ignificant  
either at the level of 0.05 (*, two-tailed) or at the level of 0.01 (**, two -tailed).  
n=46 PRI VCI FSIQ4 PA PI 
Age months -.064 -.014 -.054 -.190 .267 
PRI - -.311* .809** -.170 -.049 
VCI - - .797** -.178 .064 
FSIQ4 - - - -.231 -.002 
PA - - - - .291* 
 
 
Table 4.3. Mean age, full-scale IQ (FSIQ4), spatial reasoning abil ity ( PRI),  
verbal reasoning abil ity (VCI),  intentionality endorsement scores for 
Prototypically Accidental - (PA) and Prototypically Intentional test sentences 
(PI) and standard deviations in brackets for n=46.  The mean age equivalates to 
10.2 years.  
n=46 
Age 
(months) 
FSIQ4 PRI VCI PA PI 
 
122.5   
(9.7) 
102.07 
(11.32) 
96.41 
(12.11) 
106.61 
(11.83) 
24.14 
(13.4) 
64.76 
(16.02) 
 
 
Multiple regression analyses 
For this part of the analysis, full-scale IQ (FSQ4) was used as a predictor 
variable rather than both sub-domains separately as no prediction regarding 
spatial or verbal ability specifically was made and both variables correlate. 
Two multiple regression analyses with age and full-scale IQ as the predictor 
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variables and intentionality endorsement scores as the dependent variables 
were run (Figure 4.1 - 4.4). 
 
Age and full-scale IQ did not significantly predict intentionality 
endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental test sentences (F(2, 
43)=2.249, p=.118) nor intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically 
Intentional test sentences (F(2, 43)=1.652, p=.204). Because our independent 
variables did not significantly predict intentionality endorsement scores, no 
further analysis (i.e., mediation analysis) was conducted. 
             
 
Figure 4.1. Scatterplot of months of age versus intentionality endorsement scores for 
Ambiguous but Prototypically Accidental test sentences with a linear trendline. Intentionality 
endorsement scores reflect the percentage of trials judged to be intentional. 
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Figure 4.2. Scatterplot of full-scale IQ (FSIQ4) versus intentionality endorsement scores for 
Ambiguous but Prototypically Accidental test sentences with a linear trendline. Intentionality 
endorsement scores reflect the percentage of trials judged to be intentional. 
  
 
Figure 4.3. Scatterplot of months of age versus intentionality endorsement scores for 
Ambiguous but Prototypically Intentional test sentences with a linear trendline. Intentionality 
endorsement scores reflect the percentage of trials judged to be intentional. 
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Figure 4.4. Scatterplot of full-scale IQ (FSIQ4) versus intentionality endorsement scores for 
Ambiguous but Prototypically Intentional test sentences with a linear trendline. Intentionality 
endorsement scores reflect the percentage of trials judged to be intentional. 
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sample size of 37 (mean age=123.08 months (10.26 years), SD=10.78; age 
range: 94-139 months; Table 4.4). 
 
Table 4.4. Mean age in months, full-scale IQ (FSIQ4), spatial reasoning abil ity  
(PRI),  verbal reasoning abil ity ( VCI),  intentionality endorsement scores for the 
Ambiguous Movement Paradigm and standard deviations  in brackets . 
n=37 Age (months) FSIQ4 PRI VCI i. e. score 
 123.08 (10.78) 99.62 (14.15) 95.00 (14.23) 104.62 (13.37) 52.93 (5.09) 
 
 
Intentionality bias 
A one-sample t-test with a test value of 50 revealed that participants judged 
significantly more than half of the trials to show intentional movements 
(M=52.93, SD=5.09; t(36)=3.498; p<.001). This suggests participant did not 
answer randomly but tended to favour intentional explanations. Although 
this trend is in accordance with Moore and Pope͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ findings in an adult 
sample, mean intentionality endorsement scores of this study are below 
those reported in Moore and Pope (M=64.2, SD=17.6). This is not in line with 
our prediction of higher intentionality endorsement scores in younger 
people. 
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Correlations  
Pearson͛s correlation analyses for the following variables were run: age in 
months, Ambiguous Movement Paradigm intentionality endorsement score, 
spatial reasoning ability (PRI), verbal reasoning ability (VCI), full-scale IQ 
(FSIQ4). 
 
There was no significant correlation between the variables of interest 
(Video intentionality endorsement score) and any of the other variables 
(Table 4.5). 
 
Table 4.5. Pearson correlation among age in months, spatial reasoning abil ity 
(PRI),  verbal abil ity (VCI),  full-scale IQ ( FSQ4), intentionality endorsement 
scores of the Ambiguous Movement Paradigm. All  values in bold are s ignificant 
either at the level of 0.05 (*, two-tailed) or at the level of 0.01 (**, two -tailed).  
n=37 PRI VCI FSIQ4 i.e. score 
Age months -.297 -.183 -.054 .118 
PRI - .452** .830** .101 
VCI - - .834** .030 
FSIQ4 - - - .125 
i. e. score - - - - 
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Multiple regression 
As above, for this part of the analysis full-scale IQ was used rather than both 
sub-domains separately as no prediction regarding spatial or verbal ability 
specifically was made and both variables correlate. A multiple regression 
analysis with age and full-scale IQ as the predictor variables and intentionality 
endorsement scores as the dependent variable was run. Age and full-scale IQ 
did not significantly predict intentionality endorsement (F(2, 34)=.739, 
p=.485; Figure 4.5). As our independent variables did not significantly predict 
intentionality endorsement scores, no further analysis (i.e., mediation 
analysis) was conducted. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Scatterplot of months of age versus intentionality endorsement scores for the 
Ambiguous Movement Paradigm with a linear trendline. Intentionality endorsement scores 
reflect the percentage of trials judged to be intentional. 
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Figure 4.6. Scatterplot of full-scale IQ (FSIQ4) versus intentionality endorsement scores for the 
Ambiguous Movement Paradigm with a linear trendline. Intentionality endorsement scores 
reflect the percentage of trials judged to be intentional. 
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size makes it difficult to draw clear conclusion about the absence of an effect 
(i.e., the study could have been under-powered), our findings do not seem to 
support an intention attribution model as assumed by the NICED framework.  
 
In the previous chapter possible explanations for the lack of association 
between age and intentionality endorsement of ambiguous action were 
discussed, including the possibility of most significant changes happening at 
an earlier age than test-age. Although in this study we included slightly 
younger participants, it is still possible that most relevant changes happen 
before the study͛s minimum test age ;ϴ yearsͿ, i.e., we acknowledge this as a 
major limitation. However, as this was already discussed in the previous 
chapter, the focus of this discussion will be on the lack of association between 
cognitive ability and intentionality endorsement scores.  
 
Role of other individual differences 
A possible reason for the apparent lack of association between cognitive 
ability and intentionality endorsement for ambiguous action could be that the 
association might be ͞over-shadowed͟ by thinking dispositions (tendency for 
actively open-minded thinking/ need for cognition or lack thereof; West, 
Toplak, & Stanovich, 2008), which might play a deciding role in whether an 
intentionality judgement is guided by Type 1 or Type 2 processing.  
  114 
Stanovich and West (1997), for example, found that individual differences 
in cognitive ability, as well as open-minded thinking, predicted performance 
on a task requiring participants to question prior beliefs and detaching them 
from argument evaluation (i.e., engagement of Type 2 processing). Open-
minded thinking predicted variance in task performance even when cognitive 
ability was controlled for. This shows that cognitive ability is not the only 
factor deciding whether prior beliefs or analytical thinking guide judgements. 
As Stanovich and West (1997) argue, some individuals might put low 
emphasis on using computational capacity to assess an argument on its 
validity, and instead use the capacity to determine whether it violates 
previously held beliefs. At the same time, equally cognitively able individuals 
might dedicate most of their cognitive resources to decoupling prior beliefs 
from assessing the argument. This means that in this study some cognitively 
able participants might not have used their cognitive resources on overriding 
an intentional judgement of ambiguous action, whereas others did. This 
would explain the apparent lack of association between cognitive ability. 
 
According to Anderson (1990), the thinking disposition (or the rational 
level as Anderson calls itͿ is concerned with the system͛s beliefs and goals and 
puts constraints on how the system acts in the best possible way for the 
organism. It is more plastic than cognitive ability (the algorithmic level) and 
can be influenced by, for example, task instructions (e.g., asking participants 
to disregard prior beliefs). It constantly adapts the behaviour to its 
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environment and tries to optimise it. As will be outlined further below, it is 
possible that in this study, no specific instructions to inhibit default 
judgements or any another motivation to engage in analytical thinking was 
given, i.e. doing so perhaps does not seem like the ideal strategy. 
 
In line with this, evidence suggests that in a lot of cases individual 
differences in both, cognitive ability as well as thinking disposition predict 
performance on whether individuals engage in biased processing (Stanovich 
& West, 1998). Further, Stanovich and West (2008) found that for a number 
of cognitive bias tasks, performance is sometimes even independent of 
cognitive ability.  
 
Need to override heuristic response detected? 
Stanovich and West (2008) put forward a new framework, which 
demonstrates when cognitive ability will and when it will not be associated 
with Type 2 response patterns.  For example, when a task requires 
͞overriding͟ of heuristic responses but overriding is effortlessly done, 
cognitive ability is not thought to play a big role. Similarly, when detecting the 
need to override is very difficult, overall performance will be low and no 
association between performance and cognitive ability will be observed. 
Following this, when being made aware of the need to override (i.e. thinking 
disposition is changed), individuals with higher cognitive ability will be less 
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likely to engage in biased thinking. However, without prior warning (i.e., when 
a cue is absent or not known; see Kahneman, 2000), individuals with higher 
cognitive ability might not demonstrate difference in performance, as no 
conflict will have been detected.  
 
Perhaps, the same applies to both paradigms used in the current study. 
Neither the Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm nor the Ambiguous Movement 
Paradigm involves clear cues for what is a right or wrong answer. This is 
because both paradigms are thought to involve truly ambiguous actions. Also, 
no rule indicating the right response (i.e., a rule-based on logical deduction) 
can be learnt, i.e. more efficient learning and applying of rules facilitated by 
higher cognitive ability plays no role in the current paradigms. This could 
explain the missing link between cognitive ability and intentionality 
endorsement scores.  
 
Challenging prior beliefs 
Alternatively, the missing link could be due to the desire to sustain prior 
beliefs and the nature of the used scenarios. Decoupling from prior beliefs is 
more likely to occur when it does not greatly challenge epistemic goals, i.e. 
when sustaining prior beliefs is not of high importance. For example, if one 
does not have strong knowledge or opinion on painting, they might find it 
easier to detach from the prior belief that all actions are done intentionally 
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when judging whether someone inhaled paint fumes on purpose or by 
accident. In contrast, in highly contextualised situation (e.g., when an 
individual has a vast knowledge and a strong opinion on something, e.g., 
inhaling fumes is an efficient way to get high), decontextualizing might not 
necessarily be or seem like the optimum use of cognitive capacity. 
Considering the paradigm used in this study, participants are presented with 
rather contextualised situations (everyday actions in the Ambiguous 
Sentence Paradigm; finger pressing computer key in Ambiguous Movement 
Paradigm), which most participants have extensive experience of.  Therefore, 
it is possible that decoupling the evaluation of the action from prior beliefs is 
unlikely to occur. Future studies could consider developing a paradigm 
including actions that participants have no or little experience with and are, 
therefore, not contextualised, as for example, nonsense verbs. 
 
Domain-specific vs domain-general 
Another possibility for the lack of age-related or cognitive ability-related 
effects is that the domain-general development of intentional reasoning as 
proposed by the NICED framework (i.e., applicable to all types of actions) 
does not reflect typical development. The NICED framework suggests a 
context-independent developmental trajectory that predicts a general 
decrease of intentional explanations for ambiguous behaviour, rather than a 
context-dependent increase in accuracy of interpreting specific social 
situations. For example, judging actions such as sneezing is assumed to show 
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the same developmental trajectory as leaving the window open on a hot day. 
More precisely, within the framework, intentional reasoning is presented as 
a skill that an individual acquires over time and can apply to all social 
situations. An accidental explanation is, therefore, always seen as a 
cognitively mature judgement. This, however, does not cater for situations in 
which intentional explanations are more probable (i.e., leaving window open 
on hot day) and for which an accidental explanation could be seen as the less 
cognitively mature judgement. Considering that a lot of behaviour is indeed 
intentional, it seems plausible that learning about all causes for behaviour 
(including intentional ones) would play a role. 
 
With age and experience, individuals become better at understanding and 
identifying causes for behaviour, be it intent, biological (e.g., sneezing or 
other reflexes), lack of ability (e.g., hitting the ball over the fence) or similar. 
Considering this, contrary to what Rosset and Rottman (2014) suggest, 
judging intentionality could be domain-specific rather than domain-general 
development after all. Such a context-dependent development of intentional 
reasoning would suggest that individuals become more accurate in their 
interpretations of behaviour but would not necessarily predict a shift towards 
more accidental explanations with age and maturity. For example, for actions 
such as sneezing, tripping over curb or breaking objects, one might indeed 
see more accidental explanations with an increase in age and cognitive 
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maturity. However, for actions such as leaving a window open on a hot day 
or deleting unimportant emails, the opposite could be the case. 
 
A domain-specific development does not fit the dual-process model as 
proposed by Rosset but would be supported by unimodal frameworks of 
learning and development such as for example unsupervised learning models 
(e.g., Hebbian learning; Cleeremans & Jiménez͛ ;ϮϬϬϮͿ Dynamic Graded 
Continuum; etc.). Such approaches assume a cognitive system that develops 
a practical model of its environment by learning correlations of occurrences 
(Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002). In other words, a system learns what 
occurrences are probable to cue other events. Rather than context-
independent expertise, over time the cognitive system acquires expertise in 
situations it has been exposed to. In terms of intentional reasoning, this 
would suggest that individuals judge intentionality of action based on 
whether in the past such actions have usually been intentional or 
unintentional.  
 
A domain-specific development (i.e., improved accuracy), could explain 
the decrease of range of scores with age as seen in the previous chapter. The 
idea behind this is that as individuals͛ judgements improve in accuracy, their 
responses align and appear to be less random.   
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However, domain-specific development is arguably impossible to be 
detected with binary forced-choice tasks such as utilised in the current study. 
Therefore, future research should consider developing a paradigm that 
allows for a more nuanced investigation of changes in explanation for action 
causation and a measure of accuracy. For example, using a Likert scale 
ranging from accidental to intentional could give indication over whether 
more mature participants are more likely to choose either end of the scale 
than less mature participants. Similarly, one could study whether individuals 
who have expertise in a particular field, as for example experienced chess 
players, judge intentionality of another͛s advantageous move as intentional 
and whether this judgement pattern is different to that of inexperienced 
players or specific to the domain of chess. 
 
Limitations and future directions 
As already mentioned, the sample size of this study was relatively small, 
which makes it difficult to establish whether the non-significant findings truly 
reflect no association between intentionality endorsement and our variables 
of interest or whether there was not sufficient statistical power to detect an 
effect. 
 
Furthermore, in addition to a more nuanced investigation of intention 
attribution patterns, future research could consider including a condition 
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limiting the availability of cognitive capacity to augment differences caused 
by cognitive ability and executive functioning skills (see previous chapter). 
Also, as discussed in the previous chapter, it is possible that any age-related 
changes happen prior to the age of our youngest participants. This is a major 
limitation and particularly important if we assume a domain-specific 
development of judging intentionality, as one might see very different 
judgement patterns for actions with which younger individuals have little 
experience, as for example, giving the wrong change or violating traffic rules. 
Therefore, future studies should include younger participants. 
 
Furthermore, future studies should increase the age range. In this study, 
participants͛ age ranged from roughly eight to 12 years, which could be a too 
narrow frame to depict an age-trend. Although, we cannot draw any strong 
conclusions from comparing results between studies, mean intentionality 
endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental test sentences were higher 
than of the sample discussed in the previous chapter (including older 
individuals). This could mean that eight to 12-year olds judge indeed more 
actions as intentional than adults, but which can only be detected when a 
sufficiently wide age range is tested. 
 
In addition, based on the participants͛ feedback, a potential limitation of 
the current study is that the ͞cover story͟ of a pulley mechanism causing an 
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unintentional movement in the Ambiguous Movement Paradigm might have 
been too abstract for some children to grasp and as a result, their responses 
could be somewhat random. Although in total, our sample judged 
significantly more trials to show intentional movements than unintentional 
ones, the mean is below what has been previously reported (Moore & Pope, 
2014). This could mean that participants did not fully believe or understand 
the cover story and as a result responded more arbitrarily.  
Lastly, future research could consider including a measure of thinking 
disposition to investigate whether it is the motivation to inhibit an automatic 
response/ consider alternative causation, and not primarily the capacity to 
do so, that influences intentionality endorsement.  
 
Conclusion 
In line with results of the study discussed in the previous chapter, our data 
do not support the NICED framework. A number of possible reasons for the 
lack of association between age, cognitive ability and intentionality 
endorsement for ambiguous action including the role of thinking disposition 
and a domain-specific development were discussed. Also, suggestions on 
how future research could be improved were given, with the one we want to 
emphasise the most being inclusion of younger participants. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Judging Intentionality of Ambiguous Action in an 
Adult ASC Sample2 
Abstract 
Discerning intentional from unintentional actions is a key aspect of social 
cognition. Mental state attribution tasks consistently show that people with 
Autism Spectrum Conditions (ASC) tend to be less accurate in attributing an 
agent͛s intention when there is clearly a right answer. However, little is 
known about how they judge intentionality of ambiguous action, i.e. their 
intention attribution style. The aim of this study was to find out whether 
individuals with ASC differ in their interpretation of ambiguous action 
compared to neurotypical controls. This has great ecological validity, as we 
often face ambiguous actions in our every-day social life. We found that 
participants with ASC showed a higher intentionality endorsement score for 
ambiguous but prototypically accidental action than controls. Theory of Mind 
(ToM) scores did not correlate with intentionality endorsement scores in 
either group, therefore, group differences could not be explained by ToM 
ability. Other potential underlying factors are discussed. 
 
 
2 Eisenkoeck, A., Slavny, R., and Moore, J. (Manuscript in preparation). 
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Introduction 
In previous chapters, we studied judging intentionality of ambiguous actions 
in neurotypical populations. In this study we turn our attention to individuals 
with ASC, which are associated with atypical patterns of social cognition and 
social difficulties. By studying cases in which intention attribution might 
deviate from the norm, we hope to gain better understanding of the 
underlying process of judging intentionality of ambiguous action in general 
and potentially help to explain some aspects of social difficulties in ASC.   
 
Intentionality judgements in ASC 
A vast body of the literature on social cognition in ASC addresses the question 
of how and when people with a diagnosis accurately attribute intentions to 
actions. Performance on mental state attribution tasks in which there is 
clearly a right or wrong answer consistently show deficits in intention 
attribution accuracy in those with ASC.  Even in the case of high functioning 
autism, when standard behavioural tasks such as theory of Mind (ToM) tasks 
are passed, long developmental delays to develop mentalising skills have 
usually been observed and individuals are prone to errors on more advanced 
tests (e.g., Roeyers, Buysse, Ponnet, & Pichal, 2001; BaronͲCohen et al., 
2001; Klin, 2000; Happé, 1994). Hence, there is strong evidence to suggest 
individuals with ASC tend to be less accurate in their intentionality 
judgements for actions that have a clear goal or intention (e.g. comic strip 
paradigm;  see Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1986). However, we know 
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relatively little about how individuals with ASC judge ambiguous action (i.e. 
action where intentionality is not clearly evident). The present study focuses 
on the interpretation of such actions. This has great ecological validity 
because many social actions are ambiguous and require some interpretation 
on part of the viewer. 
 
Some evidence including the work discussed in Chapter 2 suggests that 
typically developing individuals have an automatic tendency to judge 
ambiguous behaviour to be intentional, especially apparent when under 
conditions of cognitive load or time pressure (e.g., Moore & Pope, 2014; 
Rosset, 2008). This biased processing style is augmented under alcohol 
intoxication (Bègue et al., 2010), in schizophrenia (Peyroux et al., 2014) and 
in Tourette͛s syndrome (Eddy, Mitchell, Beck, Cavanna, & Rickards, 2010), all 
of which are associated with social dysfunction.  
 
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, Rosset and Rottman (2014) put forward 
a framework that suggests perceiving an action to be accidental requires 
higher cognitive demand and reflects greater maturation of intentional 
reasoning than simply understanding intentionality. The framework is based 
on Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ dual-process model of intention attribution, which 
suggests an automatic tendency to judge all behaviour to be intentional that 
can only be overridden by a more controlled cognitive pathway when enough 
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cognitive capacity is available. Following this, Rosset and Rottman (2014) 
argued that it is primarily the controlled pathway, i.e. the one that requires 
more mature cognitive processing skills and inhibitory control, that develops 
with age rather than solely the ability to understand intention. (This trend, 
however, could not be observed in the studies discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, 
which could partly be due to a too old age range.) In line with the notion of 
unintentional judgements being reliant on controlled processing, an 
underlying reason for the association between over-attribution of 
intentionality and, for example, alcohol intoxication, schizophrenia and 
Tourette͛s syndrome could be the impairment of this mature intentional 
reasoning process.  
 
In the case of ASC, prior studies report over-attribution of intent in 
Asperger Syndrome (AS) for Faux-pas tasks, i.e. individuals were less likely to 
think the person having committed a faux-pas did so out of a false belief but 
rather out of intention (Zalla et al., 2009). Similarly, it was found that 
individuals with ASC were more likely than neurotypical controls to judge a 
clearly accidental agent to have acted out of intent (Buon et al., 2013). 
(Notably actions in both studies are associated with a negative 
outcome/harmful effect.) Also, results of a recently published study suggest 
that autistic traits in a neurotypical sample predict intentionality 
endorsement of ambiguous actions that lead to negative side effects, in that 
higher autistic traits are associated with high intentionality endorsement 
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scores ;βരсര.Ϯϴ; Zucchelli, Nori, Gambetti, & Giusberti, 2018). These findings 
suggest it is not understanding intentionality per se that individuals with ASC 
or with high autistic traits struggle with ;i.e., they are not ͞blind͟ to 
intentions), but rather that their intention attribution style differs to that of 
neurotypicals (i.e., they show different patterns of attributing intent). 
Because discerning intentional from unintentional behaviour is a key aspect 
of social cognition and because individuals with ASC often exhibit difficulties 
in social interaction, it is important to get a better understanding of their 
intentional reasoning style, of any potential differences to neurotypicals and 
of the underlying reasons for those differences. 
 
Theory of mind and judging intentionality  
Results from Zucchelli et al.͛s ;ϮϬϭϴͿ study also suggest that the association 
between autistic traits and attribution of intentionality is partially mediated 
by a theory of mind (ToM) ability, which is understood as the ability to 
attribute mental states to oneself and to others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). 
More specifically, decreased ToM abilities mediate the positive association 
between autistic traits and intentionality endorsement. Their findings can be 
interpreted in a sense that it requires a ToM to understand that overt 
behaviour does not necessarily correspond to an agent͛s mental state, i.e., 
that an action can be done accidentally and can lead to an unintended 
outcome.  
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There is broad consensus that ASC is associated with ToM difficulties (for 
review see Baron-Cohen, 2000). However, affected adults without 
intellectual disability often pass commonly used ToM tasks, as lab-based 
experimental measures sometimes cannot pick up subtle deficits, in other 
words, they do not very well represent real-world social interactions and can 
even be passed by people with deficits. Hence, in this study, we use a recently 
developed video task (Strange Stories Film Task [SSFt]), which was designed 
to test ToM abilities in naturalistic video scenarios (Murray et al., 2017). The 
SSFt is based on the Strange Stories Task (Happé, 1994), but conversely 
requires individuals to process social information at a pace corresponding to 
that of naturalistic social interactions rather than reading the scenarios at 
one͛s own pace ;see Methods for more detail).     
 
Present Study  
This study will investigate differences between an ASC and a control group in 
the perceived intentionality of ambiguous actions. A verbal paradigm will be 
used, which consists of sentences depicting every-day ambiguous actions and 
asking participants to make a two-alternative forced-choice judgment on the 
actions͛ intentionality (Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm; Rosset, 2008). As 
discussed in previous chapters, the original paradigm involves two categories 
of ambiguous action: ambiguous but prototypically accidental, and 
ambiguous but prototypically intentional. We make no predictions as to 
whether group differences will only be apparent in one or both categories. 
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However, as some of the previous work discussed in this thesis suggests that 
both categories measure different concepts, they will be analysed separately. 
Furthermore, the SSFt will be used to investigate whether ToM abilities partly 
explain group differences, if found. 
 
Hypotheses 
Considering the evidence discussed above we arrived at the following two 
hypotheses: 
o Individuals with ASC will show a difference in the extent of 
intentionality endorsement for ambiguous actions (ambiguous but 
prototypically accidental; ambiguous but prototypically intentional), 
compared to neurotypical controls. (As the current study differs in 
some respects to previously published results, a non-directional 
hypothesis was made.)  
 
o If this is the case, we predict deficits in ToM to partly explain this 
difference. 
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Methods 
Participants 
The study was approved by Goldsmiths University Psychology Department 
Ethics Committee. 20 individuals with an ASC diagnosis (7 female) and 20 
neurotypical controls (11 female) took part in the study. They were recruited 
via the National Autism Society UK, social media platforms and community 
platforms, as well as through London-based community organisations. All 
participants in the ASC group had been diagnosed by a clinician. The ASC 
group and the control group differed significantly in autism traits measured 
by the Autism Quotient (t(38)=9.83, p<.001; Table 5.1). Additionally, they 
significantly differed in all three sub-measures of the ToM task used (SSFt); 
namely, ToM accuracy (t(38)=-2.86, p=.007), interaction based on inferring a 
ToM (t(38)=-4.25, p=.006) and the use of mental state language (t(31.51)=-
2.68, p=.012) with the ASC group scoring lower on all three sub-measures 
(Table 5.1). There were no significant group differences in the control items 
(p>.05). Hence, it was concluded that the two groups differed in our variables 
of interest; autism traits and ToM ability.  
 
There were no significant group differences in verbal reasoning ability 
(verbal IQ; VCI) between the ASC group and controls (t(38)=-1.07, p=.292; 
Table 5.1). Nor were there group difference in perceptual reasoning ability 
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(PRI; t(38)=.16, p=.876; Table 5.1). In light of these non-significant 
differences, IQ was not controlled for in the main analysis.  
Table 5.1. Age in years, AQ scores, verbal reasoning abil ity (VCI),  perceptual 
reasoning abil ity and performance on SSFt sub-measures (accuracy, 
interaction, mental state words, memory)  with standard deviations in 
brackets.   
 
Age 
AQ            
(max 50) 
VCI PRI 
ToM 
accuracy 
(max 24) 
ToM 
interaction 
(max 24) 
ToM     
MS    
(max 24) 
ToM 
memory 
(max 12) 
AS
C 36.05 
(10.32) 
36.05 
(6.37) 
108.75 
(15.53) 
110.10 
(14.99) 
15.40 
(4.67) 
12.25 
(4.49) 
8.95 
(3.20) 
11.40 
(.94) 
Co
nt
ro
ls 
30.00 
(10.32) 
14.25 
(7.60) 
114.15 
(16.40) 
109.35 
(15.30) 
19.05 
(3.30) 
16.50 
(4.70) 
11.20 
(1.96) 
11.90 
(.308) 
 
Measures and Procedure 
At the beginning of each testing session, participants͛ IQ was measured using 
the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence II (WASI-II; Wechsler, Zhou, 
Corporation., & Laboratory, 2011). Every participant received a score for 
verbal reasoning ability (VCI) and non-verbal perceptual reasoning ability 
(PRI).  
 
Subsequently, participants were asked to complete a modified version of 
Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm to measure their tendency to 
judge ambiguous actions to be intentional. For details of the version used, 
please refer to Chapter 4. There are two ambiguous test categories 
(Prototypically Accidental test sentences; Prototypically Intentional test 
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sentences) and two unambiguous control categories (Accidental control 
sentences; Intentional control sentences). Intentionality endorsement scores 
were calculated for both types of test sentences and both types of control 
sentences, comprising of the percentage of items for which actions were 
judged to be intentional.  
 
Next, participants completed the Autism Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001), a self-report measure of 
autistic traits, to ensure both groups were representative samples. It consists 
of 50 items, made up of ten items measuring five relevant aspects of autistic 
traits (social skills, attention switching, attention to detail, communication, 
and imagination). For each item, participants can score 1 point for mild or 
strong autistic-like behaviour. Hence, participants can reach a total score 
from 0 to 50, with a score of 32 and above indicative of high autistic traits. 
Good test-retest reliability and construct validity has been reported (Simon 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001). 
 
Finally, Murray et al.͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ Strange Stories Film Task ;SSFtͿ was 
conducted to measure participants͛ ToM abilities using naturalistic scenarios. 
The SSFt consists of short videos showing acted social interactions. It was 
designed to detect subtle impairments in mentalising that are observed in 
high functioning adults with ASC. There are 12 experimental clips that use the 
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following types of scenarios: lie, irony, double-bluff, pretence, joke, 
appearance/reality, white-lie, persuasion, misunderstanding, forgetting, 
contrary emotions, and idioms. After each clip participants are asked three 
questions to evaluate their social understanding; namely, what the actors͛ 
intention was (accuracy), how they would react to what had been said 
(interaction) and a memory question (memory). Responses to the intention 
question were also scored for the use of mental state language (mental state 
language). Additionally, there were three control items that did not require 
mentalising to make sure that any group differences would not be due to 
differences in cognitive reasoning. To assess the consistency of scoring, 
interrater reliability was calculated with two coders, using two-way random 
model intraclass correlations (absolute agreement). All scores showed good 
or excellent agreement (ToM accuracy: r=.930; ToM interaction: r= .774; 
mental state language: r=.948; memory: r=.914; control accuracy: r=.889, 
control interaction: r=.907, control mental state language: r=.838, control 
memory: r=.930).  
 
Results  
One statistical outlier (based on inter-quartile range rule with a multiplier of 
3.0; Hoaglin, Iglewicz, & Tukey, 1986) in the ASC group with an intentionality 
endorsement score for Prototypically Accidental test sentences of 77.27 was 
removed prior to analysis. 
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Control sentences/ Manipulation check 
Scores of the control items revealed that participants were generally 
attentive and followed task instructions. All control participants responded 
correctly to all control items. Participants in the ASC group on average 
responded correctly to 94.7% of the Accidental control items and 97.4% of 
the Intentional control items. Data were not normally distributed. Results of 
non-parametric Mann Whitney-U tests revealed no significant difference 
between the ASC and control group for either control category (Accidental: 
U=150, p=.270; Intentional: U=170, p=.588; Table 5.2).  
 
Table 5.2. Means and standard deviations for intentionality endorsement 
scores for Prototypically Accidental test sentences (PA), Prototypically  
Intentional test sentences (PI),  Accidental Control sentences (UA) and 
Intentional control sentences (UI) for ASC - and control group.  
 PA 
test sentences 
(max 100) * 
PI 
test sentences (max 
100) 
 
UA 
 
(max 100) 
UI 
 
 
ASC 
(n=19) 
18.42 (7.34) 65.35 (13.96) 5.27 (11.72) 97.37 (9.33) 
Controls 
(n=20) 
13.18 (8.59) 60.83 (19.7) 0 (0) 100(0) 
 
 
In the main analysis, we decided not to exclude any participants on the 
basis of unusual control category-scores for the main analysis (unlike in 
previous chapters). Our reasoning was that we are investigating potentially 
atypical intention attribution patterns in a clinical population. In this way, we 
felt it was inappropriate to exclude those who may have not responded 
accurately to the control items. However, we acknowledge that with this 
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approach it is difficult to establish whether group differences are due to 
differences in intention attribution or to factors such as inattentiveness or 
reading comprehension. Therefore, the analysis was repeated with a sub-
sample consisting of only participants who had not responded incorrectly to 
more than one item of any control category. 
 
Main analysis: Ambiguous test sentences 
As explained, in this part of the analysis we investigated group differences in 
intentionality endorsement scores without excluding participants on the 
basis of too many incorrect control items. As can be seen in Figure 5.1, the 
ASC group showed a higher intentionality endorsement score than controls 
for both types of test sentences. An independent sample t-test revealed a 
significant difference in intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically 
Accidental test sentences between the two groups (t(37)=2.04, p=.048). 
There was no significant group difference in intentionality endorsement 
scores for Prototypically Intentional test sentences, although there was a 
trend (t(37)=.82, p=.416; Figure 5.2).  
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Figure 5.1. Intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental (PA) test sentences 
for ASC- and conƚƌol gƌoƵƉ͘ Each gƌoƵƉ͛Ɛ mean Ɛcoƌe iƐ maƌked bǇ a horizontal line. 
Intentionality endorsement scores reflect the percentage of trials judged to depict intentional 
actions. 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically Intentional (PI) test sentences 
for ASC- and conƚƌol gƌoƵƉ͘ Each gƌoƵƉ͛Ɛ mean Ɛcoƌe iƐ maƌked bǇ a horizontal line. 
Intentionality endorsement scores reflect the percentage of trials judged to depict intentional 
actions. 
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Analysis repeated with sub-sample 
After excluding participants who had responded incorrectly to more than one 
item of any control condition, differences in intentionality endorsement 
scores between the ASC and the control group were investigated. The ASC 
group (n=16) showed a higher intentionality endorsement scores than 
controls (n=20) for Prototypically Accidental test sentences (ASC: M=17.32, 
SD=7.08; Controls: M=13.18, SD=8.59) as well as Prototypically Intentional 
test sentences (ASC: M=67.71, SD=8.59; Controls: M=60.83, SD=19.70). 
However, independent sample t-tests revealed this difference not to be 
significant neither for Prototypically Accidental test sentences (t(34)=1.55, 
p=.130; Figure 5.3) nor Prototypically Intentional test sentences (t(34)=1.2, 
p=.240; Figure 5.4).  
  
Figure 5.4. Intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental (PA) test sentences 
for ASC- and control group excluding participants who had respondent incorrectly to too many 
conƚƌol iƚemƐ͘ Each gƌoƵƉ͛Ɛ mean Ɛcoƌe iƐ maƌked bǇ a horizontal line. Intentionality 
endorsement scores reflect the percentage of trials judged to depict intentional actions. 
  138 
 
Figure 5.4. Intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically Intentional (PI) test sentences 
for ASC- and control group excluding participants who had respondent incorrectly to too many 
conƚƌol iƚemƐ͘ Each gƌoƵƉ͛Ɛ mean Ɛcoƌe iƐ maƌked bǇ a horizontal line. Intentionality 
endorsement scores reflect the percentage of trials judged to depict intentional actions. 
 
ToM accuracy and intention attribution of ambiguous but accidental action 
To explore the role of ToM in judging intentionality of ambiguous but 
prototypically accidental action, the relation of ToM accuracy scores and 
intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental test 
sentences was investigated. The SSFt sub-measure ToM-accuracy reflects the 
ability to understand what others are thinking (Murray et al., 2017), which 
were assumed to be the most relevant of the three sub-measures in relation 
to intention attribution and, hence, was included in this part of the analysis. 
Simple linear regression analyses in both groups separately were conducted 
to examine whether ToM accuracy scores would linearly predict 
intentionality endorsement scores for the test sentence category of interest. 
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Results indicated that ToM accuracy did not significantly predict 
intentionality endorsement scores in either group (ASC: F(1,17)=3.61, 
p=.074; Controls: F(1,18)=.37, p=.548). (Please note that for this and 
subsequent analyses no participants had been excluded on the basis of too 
many incorrect control items.) 
 
ToM and verbal reasoning ability 
To explore the relationship between ToM scores and verbal reasoning ability 
(VCI) and to get a better understanding of whether participants would rely on 
verbal skills when solving the SSFt, Pearson͛s correlation analyses were run in 
both groups separately. In the ASC group, VCI significantly positively 
correlated with all three ToM sub-measures (p<.05; Table 5.3). In the control 
group there was no significant correlation between VCI and either of the ToM 
sub-measures (p>.05, Table 5.3). (Please note that one control participant 
who had a considerably lower VCI than the rest of the sample was excluded 
prior to this analysis.) 
 
Table 5.3. Correlation coefficients between verbal reasoning abil ity  (VCI) and 
ToM sub-measures for ASC- and control group.  
 ToM accuracy ToM interaction ToM mental state 
language 
ASC (n=19) .621** .631** .499* 
Controls (n=19) -.095 .047 .160 
*p<.05 
**p<.01 
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Discussion 
General 
In this study, we investigated how individuals with ASC judge intentionality of 
ambiguous actions. The results suggest that when presented with ambiguous 
but prototypically accidental action, high functioning adults with ASC show 
an increased tendency to perceive ambiguous behaviour to be intentional 
rather than accidental compared to neurotypical controls. Although this 
difference is only marginally significant, it is a noteworthy result in a small 
sample and suggests group differences in intention attribution style. 
 
Individuals with ASC often show poor performance on mental state 
attribution tasks, which is sometimes understood as an indication for a deficit 
in the ability to perceive intentionality (Ciaramidaro et al., 2014). However, 
our results suggest that this might not be the only issue. Instead, our results 
indicate differences in intention attribution styles between with ASC and 
neurotypical controls, in so far as individuals with ASC seem to over-attribute 
intention for ambiguous action. Similar patterns can be seen in other 
disorders associated with social dysfunction such as schizophrenia or 
Tourette͛s syndrome (Peyroux et al., 2014; Eddy et al., 2010). Hence, atypical 
intention attribution styles could play a causal role in social difficulties. 
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For the sake of completeness, the main analysis was repeated excluding 
participants who had incorrectly responded to too many control items, which 
showed no significant effect. However, we draw no strong conclusion from 
this result, firstly because the sample size of the ASC group was reduced by 
over 15% (resulting in decreased power), and secondly because ASC is a 
spectrum disorder and by excluding participants ͞abnormally͟ responding to 
control items, participants falling on the end of the spectrum who make 
atypical social attributions were excluded. Importantly, our results support 
the argument made in Chapter 2 that when studying a neurotypical 
population, control sentences should be used as a screening tool as 
otherwise effects can be driven by individuals who tend to make such atypical 
social attributions. 
 
ToM 
Notably, in both the control and clinical group, intentionality endorsement 
scores for ambiguous but prototypically accidental action were not 
significantly related to ToM scores (results reached marginal significance in 
the ASC group). However, the small sample size (nASC=19; nControl=20) makes 
it difficult to establish whether ToM abilities are truly not involved in 
discerning the intentionality of ambiguous actions or whether our analysis 
was simply under-powered. According to Klin (2000), it is an 
oversimplification (or even mistake) to assume that ToM deficits can explain 
all aspects of social communication impairments in autism. Klin puts forward 
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two lines of evidence. Firstly, he argues that good performance on ToM tasks 
does not necessarily guarantee good social adaption skills (see Klin, 2000; 
Klin, Volkmar, Schultz, Pauls, & Cohen, 1997). Secondly, empirical evidence 
suggests teaching children ToM skills improves their performance on 
experimental ToM tasks but not necessarily their social- or communicative 
capabilities (see Ozonoff & Miller, 1995; Hadwin, Baron-Cohen, Howlin, & 
Hill, 1997).  
 
One of the possible factors that might enable individuals with ASC to pass 
ToM tasks but does not necessarily lead to good naturalistic social adaption 
is verbal scaffolding. Previous research suggests that individuals with ASC 
often use their verbal skills on ToM tasks (e.g., Happé, 1995a), however, these 
can potentially not be used to the same extent in our spontaneous everyday 
social interactions, in which situations change quickly, problems are not 
verbally formulated and learnt scripts are not suitable (Klin, 2000). In our ASC 
sample, performance on all three ToM sub-measures significantly and 
positively correlate with verbal IQ, whereas there is no relation between 
verbal IQ and ToM abilities in the control group (Table 5.3), which could be a 
result of individuals in the ASC group relying more heavily on their verbal skills 
when solving the ToM task rather than genuine social skills. 
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A point worth noting, however, is that Zuccheli and colleagues (2018) 
found a mediating role of ToM in attributing intent to ambiguous behaviour. 
One underlying reason for this could be that in their study, ToM could be 
indexing executive functioning skills. Previous research suggests that ToM 
abilities are strongly linked to executive functioning (e.g., Carlson, Moses, & 
Breton, 2002), hence, it is possible executive functioning skills rather than 
ToM per se are driving their results.   
 
Role of executive functioning 
Rosset and Rottman͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ framework suggests perceiving behaviour to be 
accidental is what indicates mature intentional reasoning. Accordingly, 
understanding that an agent͛s overt behaviour does not necessarily 
correspond to its mental state requires more cognitive demand than simply 
perceiving intentionality. This is because, 1) it entails processing and taking 
into account additional sources of information such as the observer͛s past 
experience, alternative (e.g. environmental) causes for behaviour and the 
agent͛s motivation, and ϮͿ it requires inhibition of an automatic response of 
judging behaviour to be intentional. Both aspects involve executive 
functioning. 
 
Executive functioning is an umbrella term used to talk about functions 
including planning, inhibitory control, working memory and cognitive 
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flexibility (see Hill, 2004). In fact, a number of disorders associated with social 
dysfunction are also associated with frontal lobe or executive functioning 
deficits (see Alvarez & Emory, 2006; Willcutt, Doyle, Nigg, Faraone, & 
Pennington, 2005; Royall et al., 2002), and the general consensus is that 
executive functioning skills play a major role in social cognition and 
interaction. As mentioned above, individuals with ASC have also been found 
to exhibit executive functioning deficits (see Hill, 2004). These could come 
into play when judging intentionality of ambiguous action. A special focus 
here should be put on inhibition and cognitive flexibility: inhibition could be 
necessary for stopping any automatic responses and allowing for more 
thorough processing of social information ;based Rosset͛s dual-process 
theory); and cognitive flexibility could be necessary to shift to an alternative 
thought or response and may permit the idea that information (agent͛s overt 
behaviour and mental state) can be conflicting. 
 
Unfortunately, in this study no measure of executive functioning was 
employed, but future research could consider including tasks such as the 
Go/No-Go task (Ozonoff, Strayer, McMahon, & Filloux, 1994) to investigate 
the role of inhibition, or the Intradimensional-Extradimensional shift (ID/ED 
shift) task of the CANTAB (Hughes, Russell, & Robbins, 1994) to investigate 
the role of cognitive flexibility.  
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Ambiguous but prototypically intentional action 
Notably, there was no significant group difference in intentionality 
endorsement scores for Prototypically Intentional test sentences. We assume 
that this indicates an unsuitable test category rather than a meaningful 
finding. Pilot work conducted by our research group consistently fails to 
detect group differences in intentionality endorsement scores of 
Prototypically Intentional tests sentences. A contributing factor for this could 
be the small number of stimuli (12 compared to 22 in the other test category), 
which means that a single item accounts for a bigger proportion of 
intentionality endorsement scores and, hence, the variability within each 
group is inflated. This could make it more difficult to detect any potential 
differences. Also, as previously mentioned, Prototypically Intentional test 
sentences involve cues marking the action to be intentional, hence, 
automatic as well as analytical processing is assumed to lead to similar 
judgements. This means there would be no difference in response due to 
executive functioning deficits (as common in ASC). Therefore, in future 
investigations, we suggest excluding the category of Prototypically 
Intentional test sentences, as they do not seem to be an appropriate test 
category.  
 
Limitations 
In addition to the lack of an executive functioning measure discussed above, 
there are a number of limitations to the study that are briefly outlined here.  
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Firstly, as already mentioned, in the current design, it is impossible to 
assess whether participants with ASC, who responded incorrectly to any 
control items, did so because of factors such as reading comprehension or 
inattentiveness or because of a social information processing style related to 
their condition. As we assumed the latter, for the main analysis we did not 
exclude participants on the basis of incorrectly responding to control items. 
However, future studies should consider including a new control category 
asking participants to judge a different aspect of the agent͛s action than its 
intentionality to assess reading comprehension/attentiveness. This would be 
conclusive in terms of the nature of incorrect responses.  
 
Secondly, the sample size of this study was low and as a result our analysis 
is likely underpowered. A follow-up study with a bigger sample should be 
considered to replicate the group difference in intentionality endorsement 
scores for ambiguous but prototypically accidental actions and to establish 
whether ToM can predict intentionality endorsement scores with sufficient 
power. 
 
Thirdly, our ASC group consists of high functioning adults only. Although 
this comes with the benefit that the ASC- and control group are matched in 
IQ, it has to be taken into account that our sample only represents a subgroup 
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and our results cannot necessarily be generalised to the entire ASC 
population.   
 
Conclusion and future directions 
The current study investigated the intention attribution style of individuals 
with ASC when facing ambiguous action. Individuals with ASC had a tendency 
to over-attribute intention compared to neurotypical controls. This 
difference could not be explained by deficits in ToM abilities, which, however, 
could be due to insufficient power. Therefore, future research should aim to 
replicate the effect and further explore the role of ToM in a bigger sample. 
As discussed, a non-intentional control condition for the intention attribution 
task and an executive functioning measure could be included in future 
studies. Additionally, future research could explore intention attribution for 
ambiguous actions in children with ASC to explore whether there can be 
found similar group differences between children with ASC and controls. 
Given that ASC is a neurodevelopmental condition, one could assume that 
there would be delays in maturation of intentional reasoning, which may lead 
to an augmented difference between children with ASC and controls.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Differences in Intention Attribution Style between 
Children with ASC and Neurotypical Controls 
Abstract 
A study was conducted investigating differences in intention attribution style 
between children with ASC and neurotypicals. 15 children with ASC and 15 
neurotypical controls were asked to judge whether actions ambiguous in 
intentionality were done on purpose or by accident. Our results showed that 
participants with ASC judged significantly more ambiguous but prototypically 
accidental actions to be intentional than neurotypical controls. This is the 
same pattern found in adults with ASC in the experiment presented in 
Chapter 5. The number of actions judged to be done on purpose was not 
related to verbal ability, i.e. verbal ability could not explain group differences. 
Possible factors contributing to the group difference are discussed, including 
anxiety and executive functioning deficits. 
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Introduction 
In a previous study (Chapter 5), we investigated differences in intention 
attribution style between adults with ASC and neurotypical controls. We 
found that individuals with ASC judged significantly more ambiguous but 
prototypically accidental actions to be intentional. This difference in intention 
attribution style could be an underlying factor for social difficulties in ASC. For 
example, individuals act more aggressively towards harmful behaviour they 
perceive to be intentional rather than accidental (e.g., Taylor, Shuntich, & 
Greenberg, 1979). Over-attribution of intent has an impact on social 
interaction and as a result can lead to predicaments or to rejection by others. 
Therefore, studying intention attribution style in ASC is of great importance. 
 
As a logical progression of the study with an adult ASC sample, in this 
study, we will investigated whether differences between individuals with ASC 
and neurotypicals are already present in childhood and early adolescence, an 
important developmental period in the context of social cognition (Bukowski, 
Newcomb, & Hartup, 1998; Parker & Gottman, 1989).  
 
Difficulty accurately inferring intention 
A key feature of ASC is delayed or reduced development of communicative 
understanding and social skills, a crucial aspect of which is attributing mental 
states and making accurate conclusions based on them (Simon Baron-Cohen, 
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2001). This ability is also referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM) or mentalising 
and includes the ability to infer all types of mental states, as for example 
beliefs, desires, emotions, imagination and intentions. A vast body of 
literature suggests weaker performance on different ToM tasks of children 
with ASC compared to neurotypical controls, i.e. the ability to mentalise is 
compromised or develops at a later stage (for review see Baron-Cohen, 
2000).  
 
Of special interest for this study is the apparent difficulty of understanding 
intentions in ASC. For example, children with ASC have been found to show 
deficits in understanding figurative speech (for review see Happé, 1995b). 
Figurative speech (e.g., irony, sarcasm, metaphors, etc.) requires the listener 
to have an idea of the speaker͛s intention to move beyond the literal level of 
what is being said and is considered to be an advanced ToM skill. Evidence 
suggests that children with ASC have a harder time understanding intentions 
behind figurative utterances compared to neurotypical controls (e.g., MacKay 
& Shaw, 2004; Peterson, Wellman, & Slaughter, 2012; Wang, Lee, Sigman, & 
Dapretto, 2006). According to Happé (1995b), the failure to interpret the 
speaker͛s utterance based on their thoughts and mental states is an 
underlying reason for communication difficulties. Whereas a literal 
interpretation might work for some cases ;e.g., ͞Can you give me an apple?͟, 
͞The water is boiling.͟Ϳ, it might lead to confusion for others ;e.g., ͞Can you 
give me a hand?͟, ͞It͛s boiling today.͟Ϳ. The evidence suggests that the 
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difficulty lies in understanding that the overt behaviour (i.e., literal meaning 
of utterance) does not necessarily align with the covert behaviour (i.e., 
intention). This is of particular interest in this study, as the focus is the 
perception of ambiguous action, in which the action does not necessarily 
correspond to an intention.  
 
Similarly, previous literature suggests that children with ASC have 
difficulties with faux-pas detection, i.e. they have deficits in understanding 
that a negative outcome was not intended (e.g., Baron-Cohen, O͛riordan, 
Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999). Children͛s deficits in faux-pas detection are 
associated with peer-rejection (Banerjee & Watling, 2005; Banerjee, Watling, 
& Caputi, 2011), which could indicate that a lack of understanding of 
accidental insults fosters negative social interactions. Therefore, it is 
important to study intention attribution styles in childhood and adolescence 
ʹ at an age at which social behaviour and cognition is developing and being 
consolidated through interaction with others (see Forrester, 2013), self-
identity develops (Coleman & Hendry, 1990) and positive peer-relationships 
are crucial for an individual͛s wellbeing (Asher & Coie, 1990).  
 
Differences in social attribution style 
It is widely known that there is a high prevalence of comorbid psychiatric 
symptoms such as anxiety or depression in ASC (see Simonoff et al., 2008). 
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Meyer and colleagues (2006) argue that atypical information processing in 
social situations might be an underlying reason for the high prevalence of 
such symptoms in children with ASC. This suggests that affected children are 
indeed socially aware ;as opposed to ͞ mind-blind͟Ϳ and suffer under negative 
social experiences. Children with Asperger syndrome showed deficits in 
psychosocial adjustment, which was linked to how they processed social 
information (hostile vs benign), i.e. their social information processing 
patterns or -style (Meyer, Mundy, Van Hecke, & Durocher, 2006). Similarly, 
so-called hostile attribution biases (the tendency to perceive action as having 
hostile intent) have been found in children diagnosed with conduct disorder, 
depression and paranoid ideation (Dodge, 1993; Quiggle, Garber, Panak, & 
Dodge, 1992; Turkat, Keane, & Thompson-Pope, 1990), and are associated 
with feeling threatened (Dodge & Somberg, 1987) and with impulsivity 
(Dodge & Newman, 1981).   
 
There are various factors that might shape a child͛s social information 
processing style, one of them being past experience. First, children encode 
and interpret social information and then they consider an appropriate 
reaction. Previous experience can influence how information is processed 
and, hence, reinforce a negative interaction. For example, in the case of 
judging intentionality of ambiguous action, a child that has previously been 
bullied might tend to interpret being hit with a ball as an intentional rather 
than accidental action. As a result, the child might be more likely to react 
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aggressively. This, in turn, would likely make the interaction an unpleasant 
experience, which would influence how information is processed in the 
future. This can lead to a self-reinforcing cycle of negative social experiences. 
 
To date, there has been little research on social attribution styles of 
children with ASC. One underlying reason for this is that ASCs are considered 
to entail deficits in all aspects of socio-cognitive abilities, as for example, 
executive functions, ToM and emotional decoding (Capps, Yirmiya, & Sigman, 
1992; Dahlgren & Trillingsgaard, 1996; Klinger & Renner, 2000; Macdonald et 
al., 1989; Ozonoff & Griffith, 2000; Ozonoff, Rogers, & Pennington, 1991; 
Schultz, Romanski, & Tsatsanis, 2000). Because of this assumption, past 
research has put an emphasis on what they cannot do rather than on how 
they do it. However, even though children with ASC might have socio-
cognitive deficits, they could still try to interpret and attribute social 
information. The pattern of how they do it, in other words, their social 
information attribution style, might be conclusive in terms of psychological 
well-being and interventions (Meyer et al., 2006). 
 
Previous research has found that adults diagnosed with Asperger 
syndrome (AS; an autism condition associated with relatively spared 
intellectual ability) performed worse on a ToM task but scored higher on a 
measure of paranoid attributions compared to controls (Blackshaw, 
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Kinderman, Hare, & Hatton, 2001). According to the authors, the paranoia 
was caused by confusion about social interactions and was linked to private 
self-consciousness. Similarly, it has been argued that the diminished ability to 
consider alternative perspectives when processing social information in AS 
might contribute to increased suspicion and hostile attributions (Frith, 2004). 
Hence, atypical socio-cognitive processing may not prevent individuals with 
ASC from making social interpretations and attributions but rather 
predispose them to such that might be faulty and/or do not encourage 
positive social interactions. This might play a role in the high prevalence of 
comorbid psychiatric symptoms. 
 
Intention attribution style specifically 
As mentioned above, in the case of intention attribution style, specifically, 
adults with ASC show an increased tendency to perceive ambiguous but 
prototypically accidental action to be intentional compared to neurotypical 
controls (Chapter 5). In contrast to studies on hostile attributions, in which 
participants either attribute hostile or benign intent to behaviour associated 
with a negative outcome, the focus of the present research is whether 
participants attribute intention to ambiguous behaviour. As discussed in 
previous chapters, ambiguous behaviour is assumed to be of great 
importance as not only social actions are often ambiguous, but also studying 
judgements of ambiguous actions allows us to capture differences in 
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processing styles rather than in accuracy. Also, ASC individuals with spared 
cognitive ability may use coping mechanisms to achieve accuracy, which 
makes it difficult to detect subtle differences to neurotypical controls (Hull 
et al., 2017; Livingston & Happé, 2017).  
 
The aim of this study, therefore, is to investigate whether there are 
differences in intention attribution style between children with ASC and 
neurotypical controls. As in the previous study with an adult ASC sample, 
Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm will be used. However, in the 
current study, the focus will be only on Prototypically Accidental test 
sentences, as we assume this to be the only suitable test category (for 
discussion see Chapter 5). 
 
Hypothesis 
In line with results from the previous chapter, we predict children with ASC 
to judge significantly more ambiguous but prototypically accidental actions 
to be intentional (directional hypothesis). 
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Methods 
Participants 
The study was approved by Goldsmiths College Department of Psychology 
Ethics Committee. Participants were recruited in four different schools based 
in London and other parts of South East England (United Kingdom). Three of 
them were Primary Schools and one of them a Secondary School. 16 
participants with an ASC diagnosis participated in the study, however, one of 
them had to be excluded due to an insufficient number of trials responded to 
(<75%), which resulted in a group size of 15 participants (Age in months: 
M=145 (SD=30.02), mean equivalates to 12.08 years; Age range: 101-185 
months, equivalates to 8.4-15.4 years; 3 females). The control sample was 
drawn from the sample of neurotypical children collected for the study 
investigating the effects of age and cognitive ability on judging intentionality 
(Chapter 4). To match the groups in age as closely as possible, data of the 
oldest 15 participants who had responded to a sufficient number of trials 
were used from this sample (Age in months: M=142 (SD=13.3), mean 
equivalates to 11.83 years; Age range: 132-181 months, equivalates to 11-
15.08 years; 5 females). Importantly, the control sample was chosen blind to 
scores on the variables of interest (intentionality endorsement scores). 
Analysis revealed no significant differences of age (t(19.3)=-.362, p=.721), 
verbal reasoning ability (VCI; t(28)=.977, p=.337) or perceptual reasoning 
ability (PRI; t(28)=-.76, p=.453) between the ASC and control group (Table 
6.1). All participants could read independently. 
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Table 6.1. Group means for age in months, verbal reasoning abil ity  (VCI) and 
perceptual reasoning abil ity (PRI) with standard deviations in brackets.  
 
 
Measures 
IQ Measure 
To measure participants͛ IQ, the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
II was used (WASI-II; Wechsler, Zhou, Corporation., & Laboratory), 2011). It 
consists of four sub-tasks, two of them (Vocabulary, Similarities) assessing 
verbal reasoning ability and the other two (Block Design, Matrix Reasoning) 
assessing non-verbal perceptual reasoning ability. Each participant received 
a verbal reasoning ability score (VCI) and a perceptual reasoning score (PRI) 
score, which reflect performance taking into account age.  
 
Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm 
To measure participants͛ tendency to judge ambiguous behaviour to be 
intentional, they were asked to complete Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ Ambiguous 
Sentence Paradigm. Every participant completed the task on a computer or 
laptop in their own time. For details of the paradigm, please refer to Chapter 
4. For each participant, an intentionality endorsement score for 
 Age (months) VCI PRI 
ASC 145 (30.02) 89.87 (13.8) 96.4 (18.67) 
Controls 142 (13.30) 95.33(16.71) 91.53 (16.32) 
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Prototypically Accidental test sentences was calculated. Stimuli of the other 
test condition of Rosset͛s original paradigm ;Prototypically Intentional test 
sentences) were treated as filler questions, as we believe it not to be a useful 
test category and have no predictions regarding any group differences or 
similar. 
 
Results 
Control Sentences 
A non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test revealed no significant difference 
between groups for either category of control sentences (Accidental: 
U=73.50, p=.092; Intentional: U=82.00, p=.161). Based on this, we assume 
that task comprehension and attention to the task did not differ significantly 
between groups. For the main analysis, participants were not excluded based 
on incorrect responses to control trials as atypical response patterns could 
be inherent to ASC in children. However, for completeness, the analysis was 
repeated only including participants who had not incorrectly responded to 
more than one item of any control category.  
 
Main analysis: Judging intentionality of ambiguous action 
As discussed above, the focus of the analysis was Prototypically Accidental 
test sentences. A one-tailed independent samples t-test revealed a significant 
difference in intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental 
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test sentences (t(21.31)=-2.01, p=.029). Participants with ASC (M=33.58, 
SD=20.21) scored significantly higher than neurotypical controls (M=21.73, 
SD=10.72; Figure 6.1). 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental (PA) test sentences 
for ASC- and control group. Each gƌoƵƉ͛Ɛ mean Ɛcoƌe iƐ maƌked bǇ a horizontal line. 
Intentionality endorsement scores reflect the percentage of trials judged to depict intentional 
actions. 
 
 
Analysis repeated with sub-sample 
Excluding participants who had incorrectly responded to more than one item of any 
control category reduced the sample size to 16 participants. Although ASC 
participants (n=7; M=26.48, SD=17.55) still showed higher intentionality 
endorsement scores than controls (n=9; M=18.42, SD=7.44), a one-tailed 
independent samples t-test revealed that this difference was not significant (t(14)=-
1.249, p=.116; Figure 6.2). 
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Figure 6.2. Intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental (PA) test sentences 
for ASC- and control group excluding participants with too many incorrect control items. Each 
gƌoƵƉ͛Ɛ mean Ɛcoƌe iƐ maƌked bǇ a hoƌiǌonƚal line͘ InƚenƚionaliƚǇ endoƌƐemenƚ ƐcoƌeƐ ƌeflecƚ 
the percentage of trials judged to depict intentional actions. 
 
 
Relation to verbal reasoning ability 
To investigate the role of verbal ability in judging intentionality of ambiguous 
action, Pearson͛s correlation analyses were conducted in each group 
separately. There was no significant correlation between verbal reasoning 
ability (VCI) and intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically 
Accidental test sentences in either group (ASC: r=-.230, p=.411; Control: r=-
.090, p=.749). 
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Discussion 
A study was conducted investigating the differences in intention attribution 
style of children with ASC and neurotypical controls. In line with our 
predictions, results indicated that overall children with ASC more readily 
judge ambiguous but prototypically accidental behaviour to be intentional 
than controls.  Although the Ambiguous Sentence paradigm is a verbal task, 
we are confident that the group difference is not caused by verbal ability as 
a) there were no significant differences in verbal ability between ASC and 
control group, and b) there was no correlation between verbal ability and 
intentionality endorsement scores in either group. Therefore, we assume our 
results reflect a genuine cognitive difference in intention attribution style. 
This is a noteworthy result, as it provides insight into the nature of intention 
attribution in children with ASC, which might play a role in social- and mental 
well-being. 
 
Importantly, as in the previous chapter, an analysis with a sub-sample of 
participants who had not incorrectly responded to more than one item of any 
control category did not reach significance. As argued previously, reasons for 
this could be that a) in this analysis, we excluded individuals with atypical 
social attribution patterns who had been driving the group difference, and b) 
there was insufficient power to detect group differences due to a too small 
sample size.  
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Intention attribution style and anxiety  
Previously, it has been suggested that differences in social attribution 
patterns might be a mediating factor for the high comorbidity of psychiatric 
symptoms such as anxiety or depression in children with ASC (Meyer et al., 
2006). Children with ASC might process social information in a way that does 
not necessarily promote successful social interaction. Especially for more 
socially aware individuals, this can have a negative impact on self-confidence 
and feeling socially connected. Additionally, negative experiences in social 
interactions could perhaps increase social anxiety and influence how social 
information is processed in the future. An individual who has had one 
negative social interaction, therefore, is more likely to experience another 
one. This highlights the importance of studying intention attribution styles in 
ASC, as it might give us some insight into diminished social- and mental 
wellbeing.  
 
Additionally, it suggests that there might be a reciprocal relationship 
between social anxiety and atypical patterns of intention attribution, in which 
being anxious promotes over-attributing intent and the other way around. 
Affected individuals might be confused over how to interpret an ambiguous 
social situation and feel threatened and as a result err on the side of caution 
by judging an action to be intentional (i.e., targeted). In line with this, 
previous findings suggest that socially anxious children are more likely to 
attribute (hostile) intent to accidental situations associated with negative 
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outcomes (Bell-Dolan, 1995). Perhaps, the increased tendency to attribute 
intent to ambiguous but prototypically accidental action in the current study 
could be partly explained by social anxiety. To investigate this, future 
research should, therefore, consider including a measure of social anxiety to 
investigate whether it can explain group differences. 
 
Role of executive functioning 
Another possible underlying reason for the group differences in intention 
attribution style are deficits in executive functioning skills. As discussed in 
previous chapters, according to Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ dual-process model of 
intention attribution, unintentional explanations of behaviour are only 
possible when an automatic intentional explanation is overridden by a 
cognitively higher-level process. This implies, when executive functioning 
ability is temporarily compromised or generally diminished, most behaviour 
will be judged to be intentional. ASC is associated with deficits in executive 
functioning, including inhibition (Hughes & Russell, 1993; Hughes et al., 1994; 
McEvoy, Rogers, & Pennington, 1993). Meyer and colleagues (2006) found 
some measures of executive functioning (including verbal inhibition) to be 
negatively related to the likelihood of attributions of hostile intent. This 
strengthens the argument that there could be an association between 
executive functioning deficits and intention attribution. Future research 
should, therefore, include a measure of executive functioning skills to 
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investigate whether it can explain group differences in judging intentionality 
of ambiguous action.  
 
Reduced ability to generate other possible causes for behaviour 
Following on, an integral aspect of judging behaviour to be accidental is 
taking into consideration alternative causes for behaviour (i.e., generating 
novel potential underlying reasons for an event; Rosset, 2008). It is possible 
that children with ASC are less able to consider alternative explanations for 
an event than their neurotypical peers. Frith (2004), for example, argued that 
the reduced ability to consider alternative perspectives when processing 
social situations might contribute to more hostile attributions in AS.  
 
Evidence supporting the hypothesis that children with ASC are less likely 
to consider causes alternative to the overt behaviour comes from studies 
demonstrating imaginative deficits in ASC (for review see Crespi, Leach, 
Dinsdale, Mokkonen, & Hurd, 2016). It is possible that these deficits 
contribute to the decreased likelihood of judging an action to be non-
intentional in children with ASC. For example, there are a number of non-
intentional reasons an agent can break a vase: the vase could be wet and slip 
through the agent͛s hands; the agent could accidentally push the vase off the 
table when walking by; the agent could accidentally apply too much pressure 
when cleaning the vase; etc. Coming up with such explanations requires a 
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participant to imagine a situation or some additional information that is not 
presented.  
 
The executive dysfunction theory (Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991) 
states, that individuals with ASC have difficulty withholding or overriding 
automatic responses to allow for the generation of novel thoughts (Craig & 
Baron-Cohen, 1999). This directly relates to Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ dual-process 
model and the role of executive functioning discussed above. Therefore, in 
addition to a measure of executive functioning, future research could 
consider including a measure of imaginative fluency (e.g., Craig & Baron-
Cohen, 1999). 
 
Wider range of scores in the ASC group 
When looking at the distribution of intentionality endorsement scores (Figure 
6.1), it becomes apparent that participants in the ASC group showed a wider 
range of scores than neurotypical controls. In fact, the lowest intentionality 
endorsement score of the entire sample can be found in the ASC group.  A 
reason for this could be that children with ASC have a decreased 
understanding of social situations and, therefore, do not conform on similar 
judgement patterns. It further suggests that it might be a sub-group of 
children with ASC which is driving the difference in intentionality 
endorsement to neurotypical controls. In light of this, it would be 
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unsurprising that when those with atypical response patterns are excluded 
(see Analysis repeated with sub-sample), the group difference does not reach 
significance anymore. 
 
Limitations  
It is important to note that the age range of our sample was eight to 15 years. 
Practical constraints did not allow us to collect a large enough sample to split 
the age range into children and young adolescents. We are aware that 
individuals undergo substantial social, cognitive and socio-cognitive 
development in this period of their lives, and therefore, it might not be ideal 
to combine this age range into one group. We acknowledge this limitation, 
however, we believe our results still demonstrate valid and noteworthy group 
differences. 
 
Furthermore, due to the nature of the Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm, we 
were restricted to including only individuals who could read independently. 
ASC is often associated with deficits in verbal ability and a number of affected 
children never learn how to read or only at a later stage. Therefore, our 
sample is only representative of a subgroup of ASC individuals with relatively 
spared verbal ability. 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to investigate how children with ASC judge the 
intentionality of ambiguous but prototypically accidental action, in other 
words, to study their intention attribution style. Against more traditionally 
hold views of ASC being characterised by overall deficits in responsiveness to 
others, in this study we took the approach that children with ASC are indeed 
socially aware in their own way. Our results suggest that they judge more 
ambiguous behaviour to be intentional than neurotypical controls. This 
shows that in our sample rather than being socially unresponsive, children 
with ASC indeed attribute intentional states to others, however, the way they 
go about it is different to that of neurotypicals. Identifying socio-cognitive 
style differences rather than simply deficits is important, as it allows us to 
understand how individuals with an ASC handle social situations, what coping 
mechanisms they apply (see Klin, Jones, Schultz, & Volkmar, 2003) and might 
be conclusive in terms of comorbidity of psychiatric symptoms (Meyer et al., 
2006). In contrast, knowing about deficits in socio-cognitive abilities alone 
might not reveal how individuals with ASC process social information and try 
to manage situations.  
 
As discussed above, there are a number of factors that could explain the 
difference in intention attribution style between children with ASC and 
neurotypicals, including social anxiety and executive functioning deficits. The 
aim of future studies should be to include the appropriate measure to 
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investigate contributing factors and, thus, help to gain an even better 
understanding of intention attribution in ASC. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The role of autistic traits and executive control in 
judging intentionality of ambiguous action 
Abstract  
In this experiment we tried to a) replicate the findings of increased 
intentionality endorsement in adults with ASC, this time in an online study, 
and b) explore the relationship between intention attribution and certain 
individual differences variables. We found that the ASC group showed an 
increased tendency to attribute intent to ambiguous but prototypically 
accidental behaviour compared to neurotypical controls, thus replicating the 
findings from Chapter 5. In addition, the role of autistic traits, ToM skills, 
executive functioning deficits and cognitive ability was explored. There was 
some evidence for autistic traits and executive functioning deficits predicting 
intentionality endorsement scores, which did not differ as a function of 
diagnostic group (ASC vs Control). However, the effect of executive 
functioning deficits seemed to be reliant on including individuals who 
performed considerably worse on the executive functioning task than the 
rest of the sample. Nevertheless, the findings highlight a potentially 
important association between intentionality endorsement and autistic traits 
as well as executive functioning.  
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Introduction 
Results from the study discussed in Chapter 5 revealed an increased tendency 
to judge ambiguous but prototypically accidental behaviour to be intentional 
in adults with ASC. As argued in Chapter 5, these results could indicate a 
difference in intention attribution style between individuals with ASC and 
neurotypical controls. However, the study was based on a small sample and 
the effect was only marginally significant. Therefore, the primary aim of the 
current study is to replicate findings in a bigger sample. The secondary aim is 
to investigate possible underlying factors for the difference in intention 
attribution style by exploring the role of autistic traits, ToM skills, executive 
functioning skills and cognitive ability for a sub-sample of our participants for 
which test scores from an existing database could be obtained. 
 
Role of autistic traits 
Previous findings in a neurotypical population indicate that high autistic traits 
predict high intentionality endorsement for accidental action with negative 
side effects (Zucchelli et al., 2018). This suggests that an increased tendency 
to judge behaviour to be intentional is not necessarily down to belonging to 
a diagnostic group (ASC vs neurotypical), but rather to having high traits 
associated with such a group. The idea here is that psychopathology lies on a 
continuum with individuals on the extreme end of the continuum fulfilling 
diagnostic criteria. Therefore, in this study scores on the Autism Quotient 
(AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001) will not 
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only be used to confirm that individuals are representative of the two groups 
under investigation (neurotypical vs. ASC) but will also be used to investigate 
the role of autistic traits in judging intentionality across individuals, 
irrespective of group membership.  
 
Furthermore, it will be explored whether autistic traits predict 
intentionality endorsement differently in the ASC and the control group. In 
other words, we will investigate whether the relation between autistic traits 
and intentionality endorsement is dependent on being a member of a 
diagnostic group. This would give an indication of whether autistic traits 
affect intention attribution patterns similarly across a continuum, with 
individuals with an ASC diagnosis being at one end of this continuum, or 
whether intention attribution patterns are strictly different between both 
groups. 
 
Role of Theory of Mind (ToM) 
In addition to autistic traits, the role of ToM will be explored. In the previous 
study (Chapter 5), ToM deficits did not correlate with intentionality 
endorsement scores, i.e., they could not explain group differences in 
intentionality endorsement. However, with a sample size of 20 individuals per 
group, the study was likely under-powered, therefore, it is difficult to 
ascertain whether intentionality endorsement of ambiguous action is truly 
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independent of ToM skills. Therefore, in the current study, a measure of ToM 
skills will be included to explore its role in judging intentionality of ambiguous 
action.  
 
Previously, ToM skills have been shown to partly mediate the association 
between autistic traits and intentionality endorsement of ambiguous action 
(Zucchelli et al., 2018). However, as argued in Chapter 5, in Zucchelli and 
colleagues͛ ;ϮϬϭϴͿ study, ToM skills could be an index for executive 
functioning skills. ToM abilities have been shown to be strongly linked to 
executive functioning (e.g., Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002), therefore, 
executive functioning skills rather than ToM per se could be driving Zucchelli 
and colleagues͛ ;ϮϬϭϴͿ results.  One aim of the current study, therefore, is to 
get a clearer understanding of the role of ToM in judging intentionality of 
ambiguous action. In contrast to the study discussed in Chapter 5, a non-
verbal ToM measure will be used (The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, 
RMET). It has previously been used by Zucchelli and colleagues and has the 
advantage that it does not need to be conducted in a lab-setting. 
 
Role of executive functioning 
According to Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ dual-process model, humans have an automatic 
tendency to judge behaviour to be intentional. This automatic response can 
be inhibited and overridden by a more controlled process leading to an 
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unintentional explanation for behaviour. Therefore, judging behaviour to be 
unintentional likely involves executive functioning (Rosset, 2008; Rosset & 
Rottman, 2014). ASC has been associated with executive functioning deficits 
(see Hill, 2004), which could be a contributing factor for increased 
intentionality endorsement of ambiguous action. In previous chapters of this 
thesis, the role of executive functioning was indirectly explored by studying 
factors such as age and cognitive ability, which are positively related to 
executive functioning (see Chapter 3 and 4). In the present study, the role of 
executive functioning will be looked at directly by using a measure of 
inhibitory control (Go/No-Go Task; GNG task), a main aspect of executive 
functioning (see Lehto, Juujärvi, Kooistra, & Pulkkinen, 2003).  
 
Role of cognitive ability 
In addition to impaired executive functioning, ASC is often associated with 
decreased cognitive ability (or cognitive capacity, i.e., efficiency of 
information processing; e.g., Ballaban-Gil, Rapin, Tuchman, & Shinnar, 1996; 
Volkmar, Klin, Marans, & McDougle, 1996). According to Rosset and 
Rottman͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ framework, efficient information processing ;as indicated 
by higher performance on cognitive ability tests) facilitates inhibition and 
overriding of default responses. In previous studies (e.g., Chapters 5 and 6) 
measures of cognitive ability were included to test for this assumption. 
Results suggested no relation with intentionality endorsement scores and, 
hence, cognitive ability could not explain differences in intentionality 
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endorsement scores between individuals with ASC and controls. However, 
the previous studies only included small samples, therefore, a measure of 
cognitive ability (Ravens Advanced Progressive Matrices, RAPM) will also be 
included in this study to once more explore its relation to intentionality 
endorsement in a bigger sample. 
 
Present study 
In line with Chapter 6, the present study only focuses on ambiguous but 
prototypically accidental actions (i.e, Prototypically Accidental test 
sentences). As previously discussed, this is the only test category of the 
Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm assumed suitable to detect individual 
differences in intention attribution style. Therefore, in the present chapter, 
when speaking of intentionality endorsement scores, intentionality 
endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental test sentences are referred 
to. 
 
Hypotheses 
o Firstly, based on previous results, we predict that individuals with ASC 
will show a greater tendency to judge ambiguous action to be 
intentional.  
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o Secondly, we predict that intentionality endorsement scores will be 
positively related AQ (autistic traits)- and GNG task error (executive 
functioning deficits) scores and negatively related to scores RMET 
(ToM)- and RAPM (cognitive ability) scores. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
The study was approved by Goldsmiths Psychology Department Ethics 
Committee. Participants were recruited via an email newsletter sent out to 
members of the Cambridge Autism Research Database (CARD). This is a 
database containing data and contact details of 30,000 individuals and 
families with and without an autism spectrum diagnosis. To participate, 
individuals had to follow a link included in the email. Participants were asked 
whether they had an ASC diagnosis at the beginning and at the end of the 
study. Only participants who indicated the same diagnosis status both times 
were included in the study.  
 
The study was started by 164 individuals (nASC=92, nControl=72). Duplicates, 
as well as participants who had responded to fewer than 75% of the test 
sentences of the Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm, were excluded. Participants 
of the control group who had AQ scores of 32 or above were excluded from 
analysis, as 32 is commonly used as a cut-off point to exclude individuals with 
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clinically significant levels of autistic traits (Simon Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Skinner, et al., 2001). One participant had to be excluded because they 
indicated being a ͞basic͟ English speaker, all remaining participants were 
either native or fluent English speakers. This resulted in a final sample size of 
143 participants (nASC=87, nControl=56; Table 7.1). There was a significant 
difference in AQ scores between participants with an ASC diagnosis and 
controls, i.e., the groups are representative (t(99.36)=17.92, p<.001).  
 
Table 7.1. Age in years, performance on AQ with standard deviation in 
brackets, number of females, number of  native speakers and intentionality 
endorsement scores for Prototypically Ambiguous test sentences (PA), 
Accidental- (UA) and Intentional control sentences (UI) with standar d 
deviations in brackets for both groups.  
 Age AQ     
(max 50) 
Nr of 
females 
Nr of native 
speakers 
PA UA UI 
ASC 
(n=87) 
38.01 
(10.8) 
39.47 
(5.86) 
56 79 23.88 
(18.94) 
1.84 
(5.61) 
99.65 
(2.39) 
Controls 
(n=56) 
43.58 
(8.08) 
18.71 
(7.21) 
46 51 17.78  
(9.39) 
2.14 
(6.24) 
99.64 
(1.87) 
 
 
Unfortunately, data for some participants were missing for the Raven͛s 
Advanced Progressive Matrices (RAPM), Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test 
(RMET), and the Go/No-Go (GNG) Task. The reason for this was that 
participants had either not completed the tasks or they provided no, or 
incorrect, personal identifiers. This issue was particularly acute in the 
neurotypical group. To check whether the sub-sample was representative of 
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the whole sample, t-tests comparing AQ scores and intentionality 
endorsement scores of the sub-sample and the whole sample were 
conducted. Analysis revealed no significant differences in intentionality 
endorsement scores nor AQ scores between the sub-sample and the whole 
sample for neither the ASC (intentionality endorsement: t(130)=-.325, 
p=.746; AQ: t(130)=.189, p=.850) nor the control group (intentionality 
endorsement: t(67)=-1.804, p=.076; AQ: t(67)=-1.730, p=.088). (Please note 
that results reach marginal significance for the control group and it is, 
therefore, hard to ascertain whether the control sub-group was 
representative of the whole control group.) 
 
Group differences for the sub-sample of participants for which all CARD 
scores could be obtained were explored (Table 7.3). Both groups performed 
generally well on the RAPM and the. GNG Task, i.e., data were skewed. Non-
parametric Mann-Whitney U tests revealed no significant differences in 
RAPM percentage scores (U=268, p=.647), nor in the number of GNG errors 
(U=279, p=.801) between groups. Therefore, groups were assumed to have 
similar non-verbal cognitive ability and executive control. Furthermore, there 
was no significant difference in test scores for the RMET (t(56)=-1.006, 
p=.319). However, unsurprisingly, there was a significant difference in AQ 
scores (t(56)=8.692, p<.001). 
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Measures and Procedure 
After reading the information sheet and giving consent to taking part in the 
study, participants were asked to complete a modified version of the 
Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm (Rosset, 2008) and subsequently the AQ 
(Simon Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001). For details of the 
measures, please refer to Chapters 4 and 5. As in the previous chapter, 
Prototypically Intentional test sentences were treated as filler questions. 
 
In addition, participants were asked for permission to link their responses 
to their data stored on the CARD. For participants who had given permission, 
scores from the following measurements (collected online between 2007 and 
2019) were obtained:  
 
The Raǀen͛Ɛ Adǀanced PƌogƌeƐƐiǀe MaƚƌiceƐ ;RAPMͿ 
A timed test which functions as a non-verbal index of cognitive ability 
involving the completion of matrices (Raven, Court, Raven, & 
Kratzmeier, 1994). It consists of 60 trials. Scores reflect the 
percentage of trials answered correctly.  
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The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test 
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) is a timed test 
measuring ToM ability in which participants are asked to choose from 
a set of mental state terms and match them to pictures of people͛s 
eyes (Simon Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001). 
It consists of 36 grey-scale photographic images of human eyes. 
Participants are asked to choose one of four options describing what 
the person the eyes belong to is thinking or feeling. There is only one 
correct answer and participants are given 20 seconds to respond. If 
the participant fails to respond within the given time, the trial is 
treated as incorrect. The maximum total score is 36. 
 
Go/No-Go Task,  
The Go/No-Go (GNG) Task is a timed test measuring the executive 
function of sustained attention and response control (i.e., inhibitory 
control). Participants are asked to press buttons in response to 
pictures as quickly as possible and sometimes withholding a response. 
More specifically, they are presented an arrow pointing to the left or 
the right and press the corresponding button. If they are presented 
with an arrow pointing up, they are not supposed to press any button. 
The task consists of 300 trials, 220 of which asks for a response (110 
arrow pointing right, 110 arrow pointing left); and 80 of which asks 
for no response. Participants have to respond within 1200 ms. An 
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incorrect response would be pressing the wrong key, failing to 
withhold a key or failing to press a key within the time given (for 
details, please see Uzefovsky, Allison, Smith, & Baron-Cohen, 2016). 
An overall error score consisting of the number of incorrect trials was 
calculated (GNG error score). (Due to technical reasons it was not 
possible to differentiate between false-alarms and false-responses, 
which is why an overall error score was used for analysis). 
 
Results 
Control Sentences 
As in Chapter 5 and 6, for the main analysis, no participants were excluded 
on the basis of answering incorrectly to too many control items, however, for 
completeness the analysis was repeated with a sub-sample of participants 
who did not respond incorrectly to too many control items. Generally, 
participants responded accurately to control items with a mean accuracy of 
99.65% for Intentional control items and a mean accuracy of 98.04% for 
Accidental control items. Two Mann-Whitney U tests revealed no significant 
difference between the ASC- and the control group for either control 
category (Intentional: U=2406, p=.664; Accidental: U=2430.5, p=.968; Table 
7.1).  
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Main analysis: Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm 
There were no extreme outliers in intentionality endorsement scores in 
either group. As predicted, a one-tailed t-test revealed a significant difference 
between intentionality endorsement scores of individuals with ASC and 
neurotypical controls (t(133.72)=2.56, p=.006, Figure 7.1). This replicates 
findings from Chapter 5. 
 
Figure 7.1. Intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental test items for ASC- 
and control group. Each gƌoƵƉ͛Ɛ mean Ɛcoƌe iƐ maƌked bǇ a horizontal line. Intentionality 
endorsement scores reflect the percentage of items judged to be intentional. 
 
 
Analysis with sub-sample 
For completeness, the same analysis was also conducted on a sub-sample 
consisting of participants who did not make more than one incorrect 
response of any control category. A one-tailed t-test revealed a significant 
difference between intentionality endorsement scores of individuals with 
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ASC and controls (t(115.12)=2.04, p=.022). ASC participants (n=75; M=20.73, 
SD=16.34) judged significantly more ambiguous but prototypically accidental 
actions to be intentional compared to controls (n=48; M=16.19, SD=8.12; 
Figure 7.2). Therefore, excluding participants based on incorrectly 
responding to control items did not change the significance of results. 
 
 
Figure 7.2. Intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental test items for ASC- 
and conƚƌol gƌoƵƉ eǆclƵding ƉaƌƚiciƉanƚƐ ǁiƚh ƚoo manǇ incoƌƌecƚ conƚƌol iƚemƐ͘ Each gƌoƵƉ͛Ɛ 
mean score is marked by a horizontal line. Intentionality endorsement scores reflect the 
percentage of items judged to be intentional. 
 
 
Multiple regression analyses 
To investigate the role of autistic traits (AQ scores), ToM (RMET scores), 
cognitive ability (RAPM scores) and executive functioning deficits (GNG error 
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scores), a hierarchical multiple regression analysis using the enter method 
was conducted combining participants of both groups for whom the relevant 
scores could be obtained. Scores were standardised prior to analysis (zAQ, 
zRMET, zRAPM, zGNGerror). An examination of correlations (Table 7.2) prior 
to conducting the multiple regression revealed that no independent variables 
were correlated, with the exception of RMET scores and GNG error scores. 
However, values of the collinearity statistics (i.e., Tolerance & VIF) did not 
exceed commonly accepted limits (Field, 2013), hence, collinearity was not 
assumed to pose a problem.  
 
Table ϳ͘Ϯ͘ PeaƌƐon͛Ɛ coƌƌelaƚion coefficienƚ foƌ ƐƚandaƌdiƐed AQ ƐcoƌeƐ͕ 
standardised GNG error scores, standardise RMET scores and standardised 
RAPM percentage scores and p-values.  
 zAQ zGNG zRMET zRAPM 
zAQ - .036 
p=.787 
-.183 
p=.169 
-.002 
p=.986 
zGNG - - -.323* 
p=.013 
-.146 
p=.273 
zRMET - - - .120 
p=.369 
 
Data screening revealed some univariate and multivariate outliers. As 
removing the outliers (especially univariate outliers with significantly higher 
GNG error scores) would considerably decrease the variance in our variables 
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of interest and, hence, make it difficult to detect associations between 
variables, first, the analysis with outliers included (Regression Analysis 1) and, 
then, with outliers excluded (Regression Analysis 2) was conducted. 
 
Multiple regression - outliers included (Regression Analysis 1) 
In this section, no outliers were excluded from analysis. A two-stage 
hierarchical multiple regression was conducted with intentionality 
endorsement scores as the dependent variable (n=58; Table 7.3). At stage 
one, standardised AQ scores, GNG error scores, RMET scores and RAPM 
percentage scores were entered (Model 1). At stage two, the interaction 
terms of all four standardised independent variables with group (zAQ x 
zGroup, zGNG x zGroup, zRMET x zGroup, zRAPM x zGroup) were added, to 
see whether there was an interaction between the independent variables 
and diagnostic group (Model 2). 
 
Table 7.3. Means and standard deviations for variables taken from CARD: RAPM 
percentage scores, The Reading the Mind in the Eyes test scores, nr of G o/No-
Go Task errors, AQ scores and intentionality endorsement scores for 
Prototypically Accidental test sentences (PA) with standard deviations. 
Intentionality endorsement scores reflect the percentage of items judged to be  
intentional.  These scores are inclusive of all  participants for which all  CARD 
scores could be obtained, no outliers had been removed.  
 RAPM % 
RMET           
(max 36) 
GNG errors    
(max 300) 
AQ             
(max 50) PA 
ASC 
(n=45) 91.11 (8.66) 23.73 (6.35) 11.38 (13.74) 39.27 (5.94) 25.05 (21.07) 
Controls 
(n=13) 
93.36 (4.07) 25.62 (4,.09) 11.62 (13.9) 22.54 (6.69) 23.08 (10.24) 
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Results revealed that Model 1 was statistically significant (F(4, 53)=4.547, 
p=.003; R2=.255; R2adjusted=.199). ZAQ scores (β=.344, p=.006; Figure 7.3) and 
zGNG errors (β= .310, p=.017; Figure 7.4) significantly predicted intentionality 
endorsement scores, however, neither zRMET scores (β= .038, p=.766) nor 
zRAPM percentage scores (β=-.173, p=.155) significantly contributed to the 
model. 
 
When the interaction terms were added to the model, the model was still 
significant, however, R2adjusted of Model 2 decreased in comparison to Model 
1 (F(8, 49)=2.612, p=.018; R2=.299; R2adjusted=.185), with R2change being non-
significant (R2change=.043; p=.556). As in Model 1, zAQ scores (β=.388, p=.004) 
and zGNG errors (β =.341, p=.012) significantly predicted intentionality 
endorsement scores. No other independent variables nor interactions were 
significant (p>.05). Therefore, adding the interaction terms did not improve 
the model (Table 7.4). 
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Table 7.4.  Regression table for the hierarchical regression analysis  with all  
participants for whom CARD scores could be obtained.  
Predictor variable B SE B β t value p value R2adjusted F 
Model 1      .199 4.547 
zAQ 6.489 2.274 .344 2.854 .006   
zGNG error 5.839 2.378 .310 2.455 .017   
zREMT .725 2.426 .038 .299 .766   
zRAPM -3.474 2.409 -.173 -1.442 .155   
        
Model 2      .185 2.612 
zAQ 7.310 2.416 .388 3.026 .004   
zGNG 6.424 2.464 .341 2.608 .012   
zRMET 1.141 2.469 .060 .462 .646   
zRAPM -3.819 2.769 -.191 -1.379 .174   
zAQ x  zGroup -2.217 2.649 -.115 -.837 .407   
zGNG x zGroup -2.210 2.553 -.118 -.866 .391   
zRMET x zGroup -.720 2.499 -.037 -.288 .774   
zRAPM x zGroup -2.841 3.772 -.109 -.753 .455   
Note: Unstandardised beta (B); Standard error of  unstandardized beta (SE B); Standardised 
beta ;βͿ 
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Figure 7.3. A scatterplot showing the relation between of Autism Quotient (AQ) scores (max. 
50) and intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental test sentences (PA) 
for Regression Analysis 1. Intentionality endorsement scores reflect the percentage of trials 
judged to depict intentional actions. 
 
 
Figure 7.4. A scatterplot showing the association of number of GNG errors (max. 300) and 
intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental (PA) test sentences for 
Regression Analysis 1. Intentionality endorsement scores reflect the percentage of trials 
judged to depict intentional actions. 
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Multiple regression - outliers excluded (Regression Analysis 2) 
As mentioned above, four univariate and four multivariate outliers were 
detected. In this section, outliers were excluded form analysis (Table 7.5). 
 
Table 7.5. Means and standard deviations for variables taken from CARD: RAPM 
percentage scores, The Reading the Mind in the Eyes test scores, number of 
Go/No-Go Task errors, AQ scores and intentionality endorsement scores for 
Prototypically Accidental test sentences (PA) with standard deviations and 
sample s izes in brackets. Intentionality endorsement scores reflect the 
percentage of items judged to be intentional.  13 out liers had been removed 
prior to analysis. 
 RAPM 
RMET       (max 
36) 
GNG              
(max 300) 
AQ            
(max 50) PA 
ASC 
(n=38) 
93.36     
(4.41) 
23.82      
(6.41) 
7.39            
(8.37) 
39.58      
(5.22) 
22.85 
(19.9) 
 
Controls  
(n=7) 
 
92.77     
(4.68) 
 
27.57      
(1.72) 
 
6.57            
(4.99) 
 
20.86      
(5.96) 
 
22.08 
(12.15) 
 
 
 A two-stage hierarchical multiple regression was conducted with 
intentionality endorsement scores as the dependent variable. At stage one, 
standardised AQ scores, GNG error scores, RMET scores and RAPM 
percentage scores were entered (Model 1). At stage two, the interaction 
terms of all four standardised independent variables with group (zAQ x 
zGroup, zGNG x zGroup, zRMET x zGroup, zRAPM x zGroup) were added, to 
see whether there was an interaction between the independent variables 
and diagnostic group (Model 2). 
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Results revealed that Model 1 was statistically non-significant (F(4, 
40)=2.364, p=.069; R2=.191; R2adjusted=.110). However, closer inspection 
revealed that the zAQ score͛s coefficient was significant (β=.310, p=.039; 
Figure 7.5). No other coefficients were significantly contributed to the model 
(zGNG: β=.065, p=.718, Figure 7.5; zRMET: β с-.079, p=.659; zRAPM: β=-.237, 
p=.106; Table 7.6; Figure 7.6).  
 
When the interaction terms were added, the model remained non-
significant, again with R2adjusted of Model 2 decreasing in comparison to Model 
1 (F(8, 36)=1.219, p=.316; R2=.213; R2adjusted=.038). Same as before, R2change 
was non-significant (R2change=.252; p=.907). No coefficient significantly 
contributed to the model (p>.05). In sum, adding the interaction terms did 
not improve the model (Table 7.6). 
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Table 7.6. Regression table for the hierarchical regression analysis  excluding 
outliers. 
Predictor variable B SE B β t value p value R2adjusted F 
Model 1      .110 2.364 
zAQ 6.636 3.115 .310 2.130 .039   
zGNG  2.085 5.729 .065 .364 .718   
zRMET -1.526 3.435 -.079 -.444 .659   
zRAPM -8.343 5.042 -.237 -1.655 .106   
        
Model 2      .038 1.219 
zAQ 8.270 4.107 .386 2.014 .052   
zGNG  1.018 6.375 .032 .160 .874   
zRMET -.794 4.520 -.041 -.176 .862   
zRAPM -9.850 6.233 -.279 -1.580 .123   
zAQ x zGroup 2.412 5.877 .094 .410 .684   
zGNG x zGroup -4.388 7.065 -.123 -.621 .538   
zRMET x zGroup .305 7.039 .011 .043 .966   
zRAPM x zGroup -6.706 8.427 -.201 -.796 .431   
Note: Unstandardised beta (B); Standard error of unstandardized beta (SE B); Standardised 
beta ;βͿ 
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Figure 7.5. A scatterplot showing the association of Autism Quotient (AQ) scores (max. 50) 
and intentionality endorsement scores for Regression Analysis 2. Intentionality endorsement 
scores reflect the percentage of trials judged to depict intentional actions. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6. A scatterplot showing the association of number of GNG errors (max. 300) and 
intentionality endorsement scores for Regression Analysis 2. Intentionality endorsement 
scores reflect the percentage of trials judged to depict intentional actions. 
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Discussion 
In this study, we investigated differences in intentionality endorsement 
between individuals with ASC and neurotypical controls. The study was 
conducted online which allowed us to reach a bigger sample size than in our 
previous study (Chapter 5) and to include participants who would not have 
been comfortable with travelling to our campus and face-to-face 
interactions. In line with previous findings, participants with ASC judged 
significantly more ambiguous but prototypically accidental actions to be 
intentional. 
 
In addition, the role of autistic traits, executive functioning skills, ToM skills 
and cognitive ability was investigated. An analysis with the entire sample 
revealed that autistic traits and executive functioning significantly predicted 
intentionality endorsement scores. There was no interaction with diagnostic 
group, i.e., the relation between the independent variables and intentionality 
endorsement scores appears to be similar in individuals with an autism 
diagnosis and neurotypical controls. 
 
Furthermore, the same analysis was conducted on the sample excluding 
statistical outliers. Neither Model 1 (AQ, ToM, executive functioning and 
cognitive ability only) nor Model 2 (added interactions) was significant. 
However, the β coefficient of AQ scores was significant and of similar value 
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as in Regression Analysis 1, which could suggest there is indeed a relation 
between autistic traits and intentionality endorsement, however, with the 
reduced sample there was not enough power to detect it. Executive 
functioning, on the other hand, could not significantly predict intentionality 
endorsement, which is unsurprising given that removing outliers substantially 
decreased the variance in GNG error scores. Therefore, studying only 
individuals whose executive functioning skills allow them to perform well on 
tasks such as the GNG Task, makes it difficult to detect relations between 
executive functioning and intentionality endorsement. 
 
Implications of findings of group differences  
The findings of the current study are in line with findings from Chapter 5 and 
6, in which individuals with ASC judged significantly more ambiguous but 
prototypically accidental actions to be intentional. This suggests differences 
in intention attribution style in individuals with ASC. As discussed in the 
previous chapters, the premise is that individuals with ASC are indeed socially 
aware and have an understanding of intentionality, however, their social 
information processing style is different to that of neurotypicals. This 
difference in style becomes apparent when judging ambiguous action as no 
strong situational or perceptual cues regulate responses. In this study, factors 
contributing to differences in intention attribution style were explored, which 
are discussed below.  
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Role of autistic traits 
Results of Regression Analysis 1 revealed that autistic traits could predict 
intentionality endorsement scores. This means individuals with higher 
autistic traits showed higher intentionality endorsement scores. The same 
trend was found in Regression Analysis 2, although effects were non-
significant.  
 
The relation between autistic traits and intentionality endorsement scores 
goes in hand with the detected group differences in intentionality 
endorsement scores between the ASC- and control group. Individuals with 
high autistic traits (i.e., participants from the ASC group) were more likely to 
judge ambiguous but prototypically accidental sentences to be intentional 
than individuals with low autistic traits. 
 
Importantly, results indicate that this relationship did not interact with 
group, which could suggest that social attribution patterns (e.g., tendency to 
attribute intent to behaviour) lie on a continuum with individuals with an ASC 
diagnosis lying on the extreme end and that autistic traits affect intention 
attribution patterns similarly across the continuum. This would mean that 
there are not two distinct groups of intention attribution style but rather that 
patterns of intention attribution vary as a function of autistic traits. It has to 
be noted, though, that at this point such conclusions are somewhat 
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speculative as the present study could have been underpowered due to 
relatively small and unequal sample sizes. 
 
Role of executive functioning 
Another focus of this study, which has direct implications to Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ 
dual-process model, was the role of executive functioning. The dual-process 
model suggests that one can only ever arrive at an accidental judgement if an 
automatic response judging all action to be intentional is inhibited and 
overridden by a higher-level cognitive process. Individuals, who have better 
executive functioning skills are predicted to have an easier time inhibiting 
such automatic responses and, consequently, to show lower intentionality 
endorsement scores. As results from Regression Analysis 1 suggest, 
individuals who commit more errors in the GNG task (i.e., have lower 
executive functioning skills) show higher intentionality endorsement scores. 
These findings support Rosset͛s dual-process model of intention attribution 
and also potentially explain differences in intentionality endorsement 
between individuals with ASC and neurotypical controls. Although it is hard 
to ascertain whether this was the case in the present study (as GNG error 
scores could not be obtained for all participants), ASC is generally associated 
with diminished executive functioning skills (see Hill, 2004). This alludes to 
executive functioning deficits potentially explaining some socio-
communicative difficulties in ASC related to attributing intention. If, for 
example, individuals with ASC find it more difficult to inhibit default 
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judgements of intentionality because of executive functioning deficits, they 
are more likely to over-attribute intent ʹ even for accidental action. This 
could be detrimental for harmful accidental action, for which misattributing 
intent could lead to inappropriate and/or aggressive reactions in the 
observer. 
 
Importantly, in Regression Analysis 2, when outliers ʹ of which some had 
significantly higher GNG error scores ʹ were removed, GNG errors could no 
longer predict intentionality endorsement scores. As mentioned above, this 
is unsurprising given that by removing the outliers the variance in GNG errors 
was substantially decreased. When only including individuals who performed 
well on the GNG Task, no relation could be detected. 
 
The advantage of studying atypical populations such as individuals with 
ASC is that it allows for exploring attribution patterns in individuals with 
‘extreme͛ cognitive profiles ;e.g., executive functioning deficits), who are less 
likely to be included in a purely neurotypical sample. Therefore, results from 
Regression Analysis 1, in which outliers were not excluded, highlight some 
potentially important relation between executive functioning and 
intentionality endorsement. With an increased sample size more individuals 
with executive functioning deficits could be targeted (i.e., they would not 
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count as outliers) and in that way, a better understanding of the role of 
executive functioning in judging intentionality could be gained.  
 
Role of ToM  
Notably, in neither Regression Analysis 1 nor Regression Analysis 2, ToM 
could predict intentionality endorsement. In comparison, in Chapter 5, a 
correlation analysis of ToM scores and intentionality endorsement scores 
reached marginal significance in the ASC group, i.e., power could have been 
too low and no strong conclusions could be drawn from the results. Although 
a different ToM measure was used in the present study, findings in the 
comparatively larger sample provide more concrete evidence that ToM skills 
are not related to intentionality endorsement of ambiguous action. This 
finding is of potential importance, as it suggests it is not the ability to 
mentalise per se that enables individuals to understand that action was not 
necessarily driven by the agent͛s intention. Rather, arriving at unintentional 
explanations of behaviour seems to be reliant on factors different to ToM.  
 
It is worth noting that contrary to results of the current study in which ToM 
and autistic traits did not correlate, previously ToM skills have been shown to 
partly mediate the association between autistic traits and intentionality 
endorsement of ambiguous action (Zucchelli et al., 2018). As argued in the 
introduction of this chapter, ToM skills could index executive functioning 
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skills in Zucchelli and colleagues͛ study, which would be in line with the 
current results. 
 
Furthermore, it has been argued that attributing all deficits or differences 
in social cognition to ToM deficits is likely to be an over-simplification (Klin, 
2000). For example, some individuals with ASC who perform well on ToM 
tasks, still show social deficits in social adaption in the real world (see Klin, 
2000; Klin, Volkmar, Schultz, Pauls, & Cohen, 1997). A possible explanation 
for this could be that individuals use verbal scaffolding to pass ToM tasks (e.g., 
Happé, 1995a), which is potentially harder to do in everyday social 
interactions, in which problems are not verbally formulated and learnt scripts 
are unlikely to be fitting for specific situations (Klin, 2000). In sum, the results 
of this study suggest that ToM skills are not related to intentionality 
endorsement of ambiguous action and, hence, cannot explain higher 
intentionality endorsement in ASC. 
 
Social anxiety as a potential contributing factor to intentionality endorsement 
Another possible underlying reason for differences in intentionality 
endorsement between individuals with ASC and neurotypical controls, which 
was not explored in this study, is that individuals with ASC might be more 
likely to judge ambiguous behaviour to be intentional because of increased 
social anxiety. There is a higher prevalence of social anxiety in ASC compared 
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to neurotypicals  (Bejerot, Eriksson, & Mörtberg, 2014; Maddox & White, 
2015). As discussed in Chapter 6, previously, increased social anxiety in ASC 
has been linked to hostile attributions of intent (Meyer et al., 2006; White, 
Kreiser, Pugliese, & Scarpa, 2012) and potentially, increased social anxiety is 
also a reason for why individuals with ASC attribute more intent in general. 
Affected individuals might perceive it as ‘safer͛ to assume an action is 
intentional as it is more conclusive in terms of an agent͛s aims and 
subsequent behaviour. Future research, therefore, should consider including 
a measure of social anxiety to explore its role in attributing intent to 
ambiguous action.  
 
LeƐƐ eǆƉoƐƵƌe ƚo Ɛocial ƐiƚƵaƚionƐ and ͚oǀeƌ-coƌƌecƚion͛ aƐ a Ɖoƚenƚial 
contributing factor to intentionality endorsement 
Because of associated symptoms such as social difficulties, anxiety and 
increased threat perception, individuals with ASC tend to have fewer friends, 
frequently show avoidance of social situations and have a preference for 
solitary activities (Howlin, 2000; Jennes-Coussens, Magill-Evans, & Koning, 
2006; Orsmond, Krauss, & Seltzer, 2004; Richer, 1976). This results in them 
generally having less exposure to social situations. As has been suggested 
(Rosset, 2008; Rosset & Rottman, 2014), detecting cues for accidental 
behaviour and having a broad knowledge of causes alternative to intention is 
key in judging behaviour to be accidental. The ability to interpret cues and 
the understanding of alternative causes is assumed to develop over time, in 
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line with increased exposure to social situations. If there is an avoidance of 
social situations in ASC, this could result in increased intentionality 
endorsement owing to deficits in social knowledge and cue-understanding. 
In the current design, this hypothesis cannot be tested, however, future 
research could consider including a suitable measure to explore it further.  
 
Limitations 
There were two main limitations in the current study. Firstly, a limitation 
exclusive to the regression analyses is that CARD scores could only be 
obtained for a sub-sample of the participants included in this study, most of 
them being ASC participants. This not only resulted in a small sample size but 
also decreased the power of detecting an interaction between the role of 
relevant scores and diagnostic group. This essentially means that although 
none of the independent variables appears to predict intentionality 
endorsement differently in both groups, this might be due to a lack of 
statistical power rather than a genuine lack of difference. Furthermore, the 
sub-sample of control participants included in the regression analyses is 
potentially not representable for the entire control group. Although not 
significantly, AQ scores and intentionality endorsement scores are slightly 
higher in the sub-sample compared to the entire control sample.  
 
  201 
Secondly, because of the nature of the tasks and procedure, only 
participants who could independently sign up for online research and 
complete the tasks were included in this study. This implies that our sample 
is not representative of the entire autism spectrum. 
 
Conclusion 
In a large-scale online study, findings from previous studies were replicated: 
Individuals with ASC judged significantly more ambiguous actions to be 
intentional than neurotypical controls. Furthermore, for ASC individuals as 
well as neurotypicals, there was some evidence of autistic traits as well as 
deficits in executive functioning predicting intentionality endorsement of 
ambiguous action. This evidence, however, was somewhat inconclusive as it 
could only be reliably established prior to excluding outliers from the sample. 
Nevertheless, results of the current study are important as they highlight the 
role of autistic traits and executive functioning in intentionality endorsement 
of ambiguous action independent of diagnostic group. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
The effect of cognitive load on intentionality 
endorsement of ambiguous actions3 
Abstract 
According to Rosset͛s dual-process model of intention attribution, our 
judgements of intentionality can be guided either by an automatic process 
leading to intentional explanations of behaviour or by a higher-level and 
cognitively more demanding process enabling unintentional explanations of 
behaviour. Based on this model, under conditions of compromised cognitive 
capacity, individuals should judge more behaviour to be intentional rather 
than unintentional. This prediction was tested in one lab-based experiment 
and one online experiment. Specifically, we investigated whether increased 
working memory load would lead to higher intentionality endorsement of 
ambiguous action when controlling for individual differences in working 
memory. Results of both experiments indicated no effect of working memory 
load on intentionality endorsement. The implications of these results for the 
dual-process model of intention attribution are discussed.  
 
 
3 Eisenkoeck, A, De Fockert, J.W., and Moore, J.W. (Manuscript submitted for publication). 
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Introduction 
In the studies presented in previous chapters, assumptions based on Rosset͛s 
(2008) dual-process model of intention attribution, such as the role of age, 
cognitive ability, executive functioning skills and time pressure were 
investigated. So far, our findings do not consistently support the dual-process 
model (no effect of age and cognitive ability, inconclusive evidence for the 
involvement of executive functioning). In these final two experiments, we set 
out to test the dual-process model more directly by manipulating the 
availability of cognitive capacity and hence interfering with processing of the 
controlled pathway (i.e., Type 2 processing; see Chapter 1). To do so, we used 
the Ambiguous Movement Paradigm, a visual paradigm involving judging of 
low-level action (Moore & Pope, 2014). 
 
Dual-process theory of intention attribution 
As discussed in the Introduction of this thesis, dual-process models generally 
assume two types of information processing: a fast, parallel and automatic 
Type 1 process and a slower, sequential and analytical Type 2 process (Evans 
& Stanovich, 2013; Evans, 2003).  As already explained in previous chapters, 
Rosset͛s (2008) dual-process model of intention attribution suggests that 
humans͛ automatic response to others͛ behaviour is to judge it to be 
intentional (Figure 8.1). This automatic (Type 1) response can be inhibited by 
a more controlled pathway (Type 2) deploying higher-level cognitive 
processes. However, this can only occur when enough cognitive capacity is 
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available and circumstances allow for the involvement of higher-level 
cognitive processing. Consequently, when availability of cognitive capacity is 
reduced or deployment of higher-level cognitive processes is prevented 
otherwise, more behaviour should be judged to be intentional. Indeed, 
empirical data discussed in Rosset (2008) and Chapter 2 seem to confirm this 
prediction: when participants had to judge the intentionality of others͛ 
behaviour under time constraints (i.e. decreased possibility to deploy higher-
level processes) intentionality endorsement scores were higher than under 
no time constraints. Also, in another study, intentionality endorsement 
scores were found to be increased when Type 2 processing was disrupted by 
acute alcohol intoxication (Bègue et al., 2010).  
 
 
Figure 8.1. Schemaƚic illƵƐƚƌaƚion of RoƐƐeƚ͛Ɛ ;ϮϬϬϴͿ dƵal-process model of intention 
attribution. An automatic process leads to intentional explanations of behaviour, which can 
either be confirmed or inhibited and overridden by a controlled process leading to 
unintentional explanations of behaviour. 
 
 
Despite this apparent support for the dual-process model, there are some 
key limitations in these previous studies. For example, when employing time 
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pressure, it is hard to ascertain which cognitive functions are affected. It has 
been suggested that dealing with time pressure involves several processes, 
such as selective attention, affect control, and parsimony of information 
processing (Stiensmeier-Pelster & Schürmann, 1993). Also, previous findings 
suggest that when individuals have to make decisions under time pressure 
they experience increased anxiety (Maule et al., 2000). Therefore, a possible 
reason for higher intentionality endorsement scores could be due to changes 
in affect rather than having insufficient time to engage in controlled 
processing. Furthermore, an issue with alcohol manipulations is that such 
interventions are not well-controlled, in the sense that alcohol intoxication 
affects a number of cognitive functions (e.g., Field, Wiers, Christiansen, 
Fillmore, & Verster, 2010; Peterson, Rothfleisch, Zelazo, & Pihl, 1990).   
 
Therefore, although results from Rosset (2008) and the study discussed in 
Chapter 2 show increased intentionality endorsement under time 
constraints, they are inconclusive in regard to which cognitive processes are 
affected. The aim of the current study was to focus on and manipulate WM 
load (i.e., availability of WM capacity) specifically, and to study its role in 
intention attribution to ambiguous behaviour. According to Evans and 
Stanovich (2013), the requirement of WM is a defining feature of Type 2 
processing, hence, we have reason to believe it is involved in the higher-level 
process of intentional reasoning. 
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Dual-task design  
To manipulate working memory (WM) load a dual-task approach was chosen. 
It is based on the assumption that available WM capacity is limited and can 
be flexibly distributed (see Baddeley, 1986; Miyake & Shah, 1999). When two 
tasks have to be completed simultaneously and both require cognitive 
resources, available capacity has to be split between both of them. As a 
result, the availability of cognitive resources for each individual task 
decreases compared to a single-task condition (see Brünken, Steinbacher, 
Plass, & Leutner, 2002). If response patterns are contingent on available 
capacity then a dual-task condition should alter these. Baddeley and 
colleagues (Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley & Logie, 1999) 
have employed different versions of this paradigm to empirically test their 
model of WM, which assumes that working memory is divided into multiple 
components and when two tasks rely on the same component, performance 
decreases.  
 
In the current study, the role of WM in judging intentionality of ambiguous 
action was investigated by asking participants to complete a WM task while 
simultaneously being asked to judge intentionality of ambiguous action. 
More precisely, participants in the experimental conditions were presented 
with digit strings of varying lengths and were asked to retain these digits until 
the end of the trial, at which point participants had to indicate whether a 
probe given digit had been previously present (for previous studies using 
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similar manipulation of WM load see De Fockert & Bremner, 2011; Lavie, 
Hirst, De Fockert, & Viding, 2004).  
 
Whilst maintaining the digits in their memory, they were asked to 
complete a version of Moore and Pope͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ Ambiguous Movement 
Paradigm. This paradigm involves video stimuli of ambiguous finger 
movements, i.e. movements that can be done either intentionally or 
unintentionally. Participants are asked to judge the intentionality of the 
observed movement. The advantage of using non-linguistic stimuli is that 
they do not draw on cognitive resources as heavily as linguistic stimuli (Moore 
& Pope, 2014), making them more suitable for a dual-task design. 
Additionally, as Rosset (2008) highlighted, intentional causation could have 
been inadvertently implied as a result of a linguistic bias rather than an 
intentionality bias (see Chapter 1), which was another incentive for using a 
non-linguistic paradigm.  
 
To ensure individual differences in WM capacity4  do not confound the 
results, a version of Johnson et al.͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ Change Localisation task to 
measure participants͛ visual WM capacity was included. It is assumed to 
provide a pure measure of visual WM capacity (i.e., amount of information 
 
4 Note, when talking about WM capacity we are referring to an individual͛s WM capacity, 
which is assumed to be stable over time, as opposed to available WM capacity, which is 
dependent on conditions.   
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that individuals can retain in short-term storage) that is not heavily influenced 
by non-storage-specific processing strategies such as chunking or verbal 
rehearsal (Cowan, 2010). In the version used in the current research, a 
sample array of four stimuli is presented for a brief period. After a short delay, 
a test array is shown and participants are asked to indicate which of the four 
stimuli has changed colour (see Methods section for details).   
 
Hypothesis 
When participants͛ WM capacity is controlled for, we predict there will be a 
significant effect of WM load on intentionality endorsement scores, in that 
increased WM load will be associated with increased intentionality 
endorsement scores. 
 
Experiment 1: 
Methods Experiment 1 
Participants 
In total 46 participants took part in the experiment, but two had to be 
excluded because of technical issues and another two were excluded because 
they had indicated that they had noticed that the videos always showed the 
same movement. Hence, data of 42 participants were included in the analysis 
(mean age in years=20.43, SD=4.06; 37 females). Participants were recruited 
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through a combination of opportunity sampling and a course credit system 
(n=35). Participants were randomly allocated to one of the three conditions 
(no WM load, low WM load, high WM load). The experiment was approved 
by the Goldsmiths Psychology Department Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Measures and Procedure 
Participants completed two tasks. All stimuli were presented on a 24-inch 
computer screen. 
 
Change Localisation Task 
All participants first completed a version of Johnson et al.͛s Change 
Localisation Task (Johnson et al., 2013). The task consists of 12 practice trials 
and two experimental blocks of 32 trials. For each trial, participants were first 
presented with a fixation cross for 1000 ms, subsequently they were 
presented with four coloured dots on random locations around the fixation 
cross, followed by a screen with the fixation cross only for 900 ms, and finally 
the fixation cross and four coloured dots on the same spatial locations as 
before but one of them being in a different colour. There was an inter-trial 
interval of 500 ms (Figure 8.2; for more details on this version of the Change 
Localisation Task please refer to Ortells, De Fockert, Romera Álvarez, & 
Fernández García, 2018). Participants were asked to click on the circle they 
think has changed colour. For the practice trials, participants were given 
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feedback on whether they have correctly responded to ensure they had 
understood the task instructions, however, no feedback was given for the 
experimental trials. The researcher stayed in the room for the practice trials 
to answer any questions but left the room thereafter. 
 
  
Figure 8.2. Sequence of events for one trial of the Change Localisation Task. 
 
Ambiguous Movement Paradigm 
After the Change Localisation Task, participants were asked to complete a 
version of Moore and Pope͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ Ambiguous Movement Paradigm either 
under the condition of no -, low- or high WM load. In the no WM load (NL) 
condition participants were presented with a fixation cross for two seconds, 
followed by a blank screen for two seconds, followed by the video stimulus 
+
+
+
+
1000ms
100ms
until response
500ms
900ms
Time
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showing the ambiguous finger movement (three seconds), after which they 
had to indicate their response by saying unintentional or intentional out loud. 
In the load conditions, a simultaneous WM task had to be completed: 
Participants were shown a fixation cross for two seconds, followed either by 
one digit (one second; LL condition) or six digits (three seconds; HL condition) 
and then the video stimulus. They then had to verbally indicate first whether 
the movement was intentional or unintentional and then whether a single 
probe digit had been previously present (Figure 8.3). 
 
Before the start of the experiment, all participants were informed that the 
finger movement would either be intentional, with the person pressing the 
key, or unintentional, with a mechanism under the key pulling the finger 
down. In reality, the same video was shown in all trials, however, with three 
different movement onset delays (100ms, 400ms, 700ms) randomised across 
trials. It showed an unintentional movement, in which the finger was pulled 
down. As the same movement was shown every trial, we ensured that 
perceptual cues would not confound intention attribution judgements. 
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Figure 8.3. Sequence of events for one trial of each condition (NL, LL, HL) of the Ambiguous 
Movement Paradigm.  
 
The researcher, who stayed in the room for this task, wrote down each 
participant͛s responses. There were two practice trials and 24 experimental 
trials. After the task was completed, the participant was debriefed and 
thanked for their participation. 
 
Results Experiment 1 
For each participant, we calculated an intentionality endorsement score 
(percentage of trials judged intentional) for the Ambiguous Movement 
Paradigm. We also calculated their K score for the Change Localisation Task, 
which was computed by dividing the hit rate by the number of trials and 
multiplying it by the set size of the visual displays (K=hit rate/nr of trials*set 
sizeͿ. Consequently, each participant͛s K score ranged from Ϭ and ϰ ;Table 
8.1). Additionally, participants of the load conditions received a WM-task 
* * *
5 482591
intentional
unintentional
intentional
unintentional
intentional
unintentional
7? 7?
2s 2s2s
3s1s1s
2s2s2s
until response until response until response
until response until response
1s 1s1s
Time
No WM load High WM loadLow WM load
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performance score (i.e., number of correct trials; 0-24). There were two 
outliers in the LL conditions, however, as they were no extreme outliers 
(based on inter-quartile range rule with a multiplier of 3.0; Hoaglin, Iglewicz, 
& Tukey, 1986), they were not excluded from analysis.   
 
Table 8.1. Experiment 1. Intentionality endorsement scores, K scores and WM -
task performance scores with standard deviations in brackets  for no WM load-  
(NL), low WM load- (LL) and high WM load (HL) condition. Possible 
intentionality endorsement scores range from 0 to 100, possibl e K scores from 
0 to 4 and possible WM-task performance scores from 0 to 24.  
Condition Intentionality 
endorsement score 
K score WM-task 
performance score 
NL (n=14) 61.61 (10.98) 2.87 (.3) - 
LL (n=14) 64.88 (15.48) 2.71 (.49) 20.93 (4.34) 
HL (n=14) 61.94 (20.90) 2.96 (.39) 14.71 (1.49) 
 
 
Working memory capacity 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to test whether groups differed in WM 
capacity. Results revealed no significant differences between groups in WM 
capacity (F(2, 39)=1.42, p=.254).  
 
Manipulation check ʹ Working memory task 
A non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test revealed a significant difference in 
number of correct trials between the low- and the high WM load condition 
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for the working memory task (U=28, p<.001; Table 8.1). Based on this, we 
assume the WM load manipulation was successful. 
 
Intentionality bias 
In Moore and Pope͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ study, participants were significantly more likely 
to judge ambiguous movements to be intentional than unintentional (i.e., 
intentionality bias). To examine whether participants in the current study 
showed a similar biased processing style (i.e., whether they would be 
significantly more likely to judge over 50% of the trials to be intentional) a 
one-tailed one-sample t-test on intentionality endorsement scores with a test 
value of 50 was conducted. Results suggested that participants judged 
significantly more than half of the trials to be intentional (M=62.5 (SD=16); 
t(41)=5.065, p<.001). 
 
Main analysis- the effect of cognitive load on intentionality endorsement 
A one-way ANCOVA was conducted to determine the effect of WM load (no 
load, low load, high load) on intentionality endorsement scores controlling 
for WM capacity (K). It revealed no significant difference between groups 
(F(2, 38)=.114, p=.892; Figure 8.4). One underlying reason for incorrect 
responses for the cognitive load task could be failing to attempt to remember 
the digit(s), i.e. no increased cognitive load. As such, the analysis was also 
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performed including only trials with a correct working memory task response, 
which can be found in Appendix 4. It did not change significance of results. 
 
 
Figure 8.4. Intentionality endorsement scores for each WM load condition (no WM load, low 
WM load, high WM load) in Experiment 1. Intentionality endorsement scores reflect the 
percentage of trials judged to show intentional movements. Each mean is marked by a 
horizontal line. 
 
 
Exploratory analysis: correlation working memory capacity 
Involvement of WM is an essential feature of Type 2 processing (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013), which is associated with making unintentional attributions. 
To establish whether there was a negative association between WM capacity 
;as a possible index for participants͛ capability to engage in Type Ϯ processingͿ 
and intentionality endorsement, one-tailed Pearson͛s correlation analyses 
were conducted. Analyses were conducted for each condition separately 
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(n=14) as well as pooled across groups (n=42) in order to increase the sample 
size. Results suggested no association between working memory capacity and 
intentionality endorsement for each group separately (NL: r=.275, p=.171; LL: 
r=-.293, p=.155; HL: r=-.099, p=.369) nor for all three groups combined (r=-
.131, p=.204; Figure 8.5). 
 
 
Figure 8.5. A scatterplot showing the association of K scores and intentionality endorsement 
scores for all three conditions for EǆƉeƌimenƚ ϭ͘ K ƐcoƌeƐ ƌeflecƚ indiǀidƵalƐ͛ WM caƉaciƚǇ 
(ranging from 0 to 4) and intentionality endorsement scores reflect the percentage of trials 
judged to show intentional movements. 
 
 
 Preliminary Discussion 
In Experiment 1 we investigated the effect of increased WM load on 
intentionality endorsement scores for ambiguous action. It was predicted 
that WM load would lead to increased intentionality endorsement scores. In 
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a between-participants design with three groups that did not differ in terms 
of WM capacity, we compared intentionality endorsement scores under 
conditions of no WM load, low WM load and high WM load. All groups 
showed a bias towards judging the movement to be intentional. Results of 
the effect of WM load on intentionality judgements are not in line with our 
predictions. It is possible that the parameters used for the a priori sample size 
calculations were inaccurate and, hence, our sample size was too low. 
Therefore, in Experiment 2, we decided to re-test our hypothesis.  
 
Our sample size calculations for the second experiment were based on 
detection of a correlation between WM capacity and intentionality 
endorsement. As argued by Evans and Stanovich (2013) the involvement of 
WM is essential for Type Ϯ processing. According to Rosset͛s dual-process 
unintentional explanations for behaviour are based on Type 2 processing. In 
light of this, we had formed a second hypothesis: Individuals with higher WM 
capacity (i.e. individuals who find easier to engage in Type 2 processing) will 
show overall lower intentionality endorsement scores. Results from 
Experiment 1 do not show a significant correlation, though, this could be due 
to the small sample size (N=42), which is why we decided to investigate the 
association in a larger sample.  
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Experiment 2 
Methods Experiment 2 
Participants 
Based on the results from Experiment 1, the sample size required to detect a 
significant negative correlation between WM capacity (K) and intentionality 
endorsement scores pooled across all three conditions (for simplicity and 
feasibility) was calculated using G*Power 3.1 (r=0.131, Power=0.8; one-tailed 
hypothesis; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009), which resulted in a 
required sample of 358 participants. Participants were recruited via Testable 
Subject Pool, an online platform on which participants get reimbursed 
monetarily for their participation. The study was online for 20 days during 
which a sample size of 329 participants (Mean age in years=34.96; SD=11.83; 
143 female) was reached, which is slightly below the a priori calculated 
sample size. Participants were randomly allocated to one of three conditions: 
no WM load condition (NL; n=107), low WM load condition (LL; n=108), or 
high WM load condition (HL; n=114). The study was approved by the 
Goldsmiths Psychology Department Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Measures and Procedure 
Experiment 2 was an online replication of Experiment 1, i.e. online versions of 
the same tasks were conducted: After reading the online information sheet 
and consent form, participants completed an online version of the Change 
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Localisation Task. Thereafter, they were asked to complete the Ambiguous 
Movement Paradigm under the condition of no WM load (NL), low WM load 
(LL) or high WM load (HL).  
 
For details of both paradigms, please refer to Experiment 1. As this was an 
online experiment and, hence, screen size could not be controlled, an 
average screen size and distance from the screen was estimated. Based on 
this estimate, a window with a fixed size (pixels) was created on which stimuli 
were displayed. This ensured that, for the Change Localisation Task, the 
angles of the circle-positionings relative to the fixation cross would not differ 
greatly between participants. Because of a technical error, only one of two 
experimental blocks of the Change Localisation was presented, i.e. the 
number of trials was 32 in total. (As can be seen from the Results section, 
performance on this shorter version of the task was similar to the full task run 
in Experiment 1.) 
 
Results Experiment 2 
As in Experiment 1, for each participant, a K score (WM capacity) and an 
intentionality endorsement score (percentage of trials judged intentional) 
were calculated. Participants from the two WM load conditions additionally 
received a WM-task performance score. Six extreme outliers who had 
significantly poorer WM-task performance scores than the other participants 
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in their group (based on inter-quartile range rule with a multiplier of 3.0; 
Hoaglin, Iglewicz, & Tukey, 1986), were excluded from the analysis, as such 
scores could be a sign of inattentiveness or misunderstanding of the task 
instructions. All of them were from the LL group. Excluding them resulted in 
a new sample of 323 participants. 
 
Table 8.2. Experiment 2. Intentionality endorsement scores, K scores and WM -
task performance scores with standard deviations in brackets for no WM load-  
(NL), low WM load- (LL) and high WM load (HL) condition. Possible 
intentionality endorsement scores range from 0 t o 100, possible K scores from 
0 to 4 and possible WM-task performance scores from 0 to 24.  
Condition Intentionality 
endorsement score 
K score WM-task performance 
score 
NL (n=107) 59.07 (17.23) 2.79 (.73) - 
LL (n=102) 60.74 (20.96) 2.94 (.52) 22.03 (3.19) 
HL (n=114) 63.38 (20.75) 2.88 (.55) 21.41 (3.15) 
 
 
Working memory capacity 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to test whether groups differed in WM 
capacity. Results revealed no significant differences between groups in WM 
capacity (F(2, 320)=1.57, p=.209).  
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Manipulation check ʹ Working memory task 
Participants in the LL- as well as the HL condition,  responded correctly to a 
large proportion of trials of the WM task, with the LL group scoring slightly 
higher (Table 8.2). A one-tailed Mann-Whitney U test revealed that this 
difference was statistically significant (U=4639.5, p=.008). Based on this, we 
assume that the WM load manipulation was successful. 
 
Intentionality bias 
To examine whether participants in this experiment showed a bias in their 
intentionality judgements (i.e., whether they would be significantly more 
likely to judge over 50% of the trials to be intentional) we conducted a one-
tailed one-sample t-tests on intentionality endorsement scores with a test 
value of 50. Results suggested that participants judged significantly more 
than half of the trials to be intentional (M=61.12 (SD=19.75); t(322)=10.12, 
p<.001). 
 
Main analysis- the effect of cognitive load on intentionality endorsement 
A one-way ANCOVA was conducted to determine the effect of WM load (no 
WM load, low WM load, high WM load) on intentionality endorsement scores 
controlling for working memory capacity (K). Although the trend pointed in 
the right direction, analysis revealed no significant difference between 
groups (F(2)=1.49, p=.227; Figure 8.6). As can be seen in Appendix 5, the 
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significance of the results was the same when outliers were included. (As 
participants responded correctly to most trials and therefore a lack of 
engagement to the task could not explain results, no analysis on correct WM-
task trials only was conducted.) 
 
 
Figure 8.6. Intentionality endorsement scores for each WM load condition (no WM load/NL, 
low WM load/LL, high WM load/HL) in Experiment 2. Intentionality endorsement scores 
reflect the percentage of trials judged to show intentional movements. Each mean is marked 
by a horizontal line. 
 
 
Correlation WM capacity and intentionality endorsement  
To investigate the relation between WM capacity (K) and intentionality 
endorsement scores, a one-tailed Pearson͛s correlational analysis was 
conducted. It revealed no significant correlation between K scores and 
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intentionality endorsement scores, however, results indicated a trend in the 
predicted direction (r=-.088, p=.057; Figure 8.7). 
 
 
Figure 8.7. A scatterplot showing the association of K scores and intentionality endorsement 
scores for all three conditions for EǆƉeƌimenƚ Ϯ͘ K ƐcoƌeƐ ƌeflecƚ indiǀidƵalƐ͛ WM caƉaciƚǇ 
(ranging from 0 to 4) and intentionality endorsement scores reflect the percentage of trials 
judged to show intentional movements. 
 
 
Exploratory analysis: Correlation WM capacity and intentionality 
endorsement for each condition separately 
As individual differences in WM capacity might play a role only under certain 
conditions (e.g., under NL when participants can make full use of their WM 
capacity, or under conditions of increased WM load, as only then individual 
differences in WM capacity become apparent), in this part of the analysis we 
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looked at the relation between WM capacity and intentionality endorsement 
in each group separately (one-tailed).  
 
i) No Load Condition 
There was no significant correlation between intentionality endorsement 
scores and WM capacity (K) in the NL condition (r=.046, p=.319; Figure 8.8). 
 
 
Figure 8.8. A scatterplot showing the association of K scores and intentionality endorsement 
ƐcoƌeƐ in EǆƉeƌimenƚ Ϯ foƌ ƚhe no WM load condiƚion onlǇ͘ K ƐcoƌeƐ ƌeflecƚ indiǀidƵalƐ͛ WM 
capacity (ranging from 0 to 4) and intentionality endorsement scores reflect the percentage 
of trials judged to show intentional movements. 
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ii) Low Load Condition 
There was a significant negative correlation between intentionality 
endorsement scores and WM capacity (K) in the LL condition (r=-.291, p<.001; 
Figure 8.9)5. 
 
 
Figure 8.9. A scatterplot showing the association of K scores and intentionality endorsement 
ƐcoƌeƐ in EǆƉeƌimenƚ Ϯ foƌ ƚhe loǁ WM condiƚion onlǇ͘ K ƐcoƌeƐ ƌeflecƚ indiǀidƵalƐ͛ WM 
capacity (ranging from 0 to 4) and intentionality endorsement scores reflect the percentage 
of trials judged to show intentional movements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 This effect was not dependent on exclusion of outliers.  
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iii) High Load Condition 
There was no significant correlation between intentionality endorsement 
scores and WM capacity (K) in the HL condition (r=-.078, p=.201; Figure 8.10). 
 
 
Figure 8.10. A scatterplot showing the association of K scores and intentionality endorsement 
ƐcoƌeƐ in EǆƉeƌimenƚ Ϯ foƌ ƚhe high WM load condiƚion onlǇ͘ K ƐcoƌeƐ ƌeflecƚ indiǀidƵalƐ͛ WM 
capacity (ranging from 0 to 4) and intentionality endorsement scores reflect the percentage 
of trials judged to show intentional movements. 
 
 
Preliminary Discussion 
In Experiment 2 we set out to re-test our hypothesis from Experiment 1. 
Participants showed a bias towards judging the movement to be intentional. 
Although our results of the between-group analysis go in the predicted 
directions and intentionality endorsement scores are higher under conditions 
of increased WM load, differences are not significant. 
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In addition, we tested whether WM capacity was negatively correlated 
with intentionality endorsement. Whereas there is no significant correlation 
when pooled across groups, an exploratory analysis revealed a significant 
negative correlation between WM capacity and intentionality endorsement 
scores in LL condition only. One possible explanation is that only under a 
condition in which WM capacity is compromised ;i.e., an individual͛s entire 
WM capacity cannot be dedicated to the task) but not compromised enough 
to demand most WM capacity of all participants including high WM-capacity 
individuals, individual differences in WM capacity play a role.  
 
In addition, on average, participants in the HL condition of Experiment 2 
scored relatively high on the WM task (compared to Experiment 1 and 
previous pilot results), which suggests that these participants dedicated a 
large part of their WM capacity to the WM-task. This alludes to the possible 
role of thinking disposition, as it influences which task the available cognitive 
capacity is allocated to (see Chapter 4). However, it has to be emphasised 
here that at this stage such possibilities remain speculative, as we did not 
specifically test for the involvement of thinking disposition. 
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Discussion 
Rosset (2008) proposed a dual-process model for intention attribution which 
suggests that when observing an ambiguous action, humans automatically 
attribute intent. This attribution can, however, be inhibited and overridden 
by a higher-level process, given enough cognitive resources are available. A 
prediction from this model is that decreasing the availability of such cognitive 
resources would lead to increased intentionality endorsement. Rosset gave 
no clear indication as of which cognitive resources were likely to be involved 
in judging intentionality of ambiguous action, however, according to Evans 
and Stanovich (2013) a defining feature of Type 2 processing is the 
dependency on WM. Therefore, in two experiments, the role of WM load on 
judging intentionality of ambiguous action was investigated. In line with 
Moore and Pope͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ results, in both experiments, participants of all 
three conditions were more likely to judge the ambiguous finger movements 
to be intentional than unintentional, which suggests an automatic tendency 
to perceive ambiguous behaviour to be intentional. However, the null 
hypothesis was not rejected: Participants did not show higher intentionality 
endorsement under conditions of increased WM load.  
 
Apart from potential design-limitations (discussed at the end of this 
chapter), we identify three explanations for the lack of effect of WM load on 
intentionality endorsement:ϭͿ Rosset͛s dual-process model is incomplete or 
inaccurate, 2) WM is not the main cognitive function involved in controlled 
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processing of intentionality and 3) individual differences such as thinking 
disposition play a bigger role in judging intentionality of ambiguous action 
and, hence, ͞over-shadow͟ any relation between WM  and intentionality 
endorsement.  
 
Dual-process model - too simplistic a model? 
A possible explanation for why manipulating WM capacity did not have an 
effect on intentionality endorsement could be that Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ dual-
process model is a too simplistic or is even an incomplete model of intention 
attribution. The model implies two predictions: 1) An unintentional response 
always requires the involvement of Type 2 processing, and 2) the default 
heuristic response is always intentional. 
 
Regarding the first point, according to Rosset͛s dual-process model, an 
unintentional judgment always needs to be preceded by and is caused by 
mental simulation and cognitive decoupling (i.e., Type 2 processing). 
Essentially, this means that an unintentional judgement can never be made 
automatically and independent of analytical thought. The question arises 
whether it is plausible that for all the accidental behaviour we observe, we 
always ͞stop and think͟ about it before judging it to be an accident. 
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Regarding the second point, this inevitably means that neither varying 
prior beliefs and experience nor other individual differences play a big role in 
identifying intentional action. The heuristic (default) response is always 
intentional and does not change as a function of what an observer knows or 
thinks about a certain action. However, traditional approaches to dual-
process models assume processing based on beliefs to be the essence of Type 
1 processing (see Evans, 2007; Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983; Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013). Taking the paradigm used in the current studies as an 
example, there are two options of prior beliefs: key-presses are intentional 
versus key-presses are unintentional. Even if it were the case that most 
people͛s prior belief was that such movements were intentional, the dual-
process model put forward by Rosset (2008) seems to be incomplete as it 
does not allow for a single participant having the prior belief of key-presses ʹ 
or any other actions for that matter - being unintentional. As participants 
receive a description of the set-up that explains how and why the movement 
could be unintentional, it is likely, however, that for at least some of them 
prior beliefs are altered in a way that favours unintentional explanations. We, 
therefore, argue that the dual-process model of intention attribution as it 
stands now needs to be reviewed.  In the discussion chapter of this thesis, a 
revised model dual-process model of intention attribution, as well as an 
alternative approach to model intention attribution, will be discussed. 
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WM capacity ʹ successful obstruction of Type 2 processing? 
Availability of WM was manipulated through a working memory task 
completed simultaneously to the intention attribution task. In both 
experiments, participants͛ performance on the WM task in the HL condition 
was significantly lower than in the LL condition, so we can assume that task 
difficulty ʹ and therefore WM capacity demand - was increased with the 
number of digits participants were asked to remain in their memory. 
However, we do not know whether i) available WM capacity was sufficiently 
impaired to interfere with the controlled processing of intentionality of 
others͛ action, and iiͿ whether our manipulation targeted a cognitive 
resource required for such controlled processing. 
 
In other words, firstly, it is possible that task demands might still have been 
insufficient to interfere with analytical processing for the intentionality task. 
The paradigm used in the current study involves a very low-level action. 
Perhaps it requires little WM capacity to engage in analytical processing in 
response to such simple actions, which could be why our WM load 
manipulation had no effect. 
 
And secondly, it is possible that our manipulation did not tap into the type 
of cognitive resource or function required for analytical and controlled 
processing of intentionality of others͛ action. For example, it is possible that 
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instead of manipulation of WM load, interfering with inhibitory control or 
selective attention would have had a more pronounced effect on 
intentionality endorsement. 
 
Other individual differences: thinking disposition 
Furthermore, as already mentioned above, it is possible that other individual 
differences, such as for example thinking disposition ͞over-shadow͟ the role 
of availability of WM capacity in judging intentionality of ambiguous action. 
For example, the participants͛ ‘felt need͛ to override an automatic response 
(i.e., detection of possible violation of normative correct response) might 
have differed between groups. Perhaps, although participants in the NL 
condition had capacity available to detect a heuristic response and to give an 
analytical one instead, they might have not felt the need to do so (Stanovich 
& West, 1997, 1998a, 2008).  
 
Similarly, groups might have differed in their preferred target for the 
allocation of cognitive resources. Our exploratory analysis in Experiment 2 
revealed a significant correlation between individuals͛ WM capacity and 
intentionality endorsement scores in the LL condition only. This could 
potentially suggest that only participants of this condition dedicated a large 
enough proportion of their WM capacity towards the intentionality 
judgement task for individual differences in WM capacity to make a 
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difference. Furthermore, the difference between WM-task performance 
scores of participants of the LL- and HL condition was not as big as in 
Experiment 1 and previous experiments, which could indicate that in 
Experiment 2 participants of the HL condition dedicated a large part of their 
WM capacity to the WM-task. 
 
Limitations 
One limitation of the current research is that the WM task involves number 
stimuli which potentially did not strain visual working memory but rather 
verbal working memory. Future research involving visual intentionality 
attribution tasks should consider using a visual WM task, for example, 
involving shapes instead of numbers.  
 
Another limitation, specific to Experiment 2, is that it was an online 
experiment and therefore, it was impossible to control participants͛ 
environment. Judging from the high mean WM-task performance scores and 
K scores, we assume participants paid attention to the tasks. However, we 
cannot know whether they used additional aids such as taking notes for the 
WM-task. 
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Additionally, we did not explicitly ask participants whether they had 
noticed that the videos always show the same movement as this would pose 
a leading question. However, apart from the two participants in Experiment 
1, who made us aware of having noticed that the same movement was 
presented repeatedly, we do not know whether other participants noticed 
too. 
 
Conclusion 
In two experiments we investigated the effect of WM load on intentionality 
endorsement of ambiguous action. In neither of the experiments, WM had 
an effect on intentionality endorsement. This undermines Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ 
dual-process model of intention attribution, which we argue is incomplete 
and needs to be revised. In the discussion chapter of this thesis possible 
revised models are proposed. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
General Discussion 
Judgements of intentionality are a crucial aspect of social cognition and social 
interaction. We react differently to behaviour that we judge to be intentional 
rather than accidental (Cushman, 2008; Gilbert et al., 2004; Gray & Wegner, 
2008; Shaver, 1985; Swap, 1991; Taylor et al., 1979), and decisions about 
criminal responsibility rest on attributions of intent ;͞Homicide; Murder and 
Manslaughter: Legal Guidance: The Crown Prosecution Service,͟ ϮϬϭϳͿ. In 
this thesis, I investigated the psychological processes that underpin these 
attributions, and in doing so, I hope to have shed light on this key aspect of 
our social lives.  
 
The theoretical framework for this thesis was provided by Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ 
dual-process model of intention attribution. By testing predictions based on 
this model, I investigated different factors that might come into play when 
interpreting behaviour. More specifically, I investigated the role of age, 
cognitive ability, WM load and -capacity, time constraints, executive 
functioning skills and social information processing in individuals with ASC. 
Results of my empirical work suggest no effect of age, cognitive ability, WM 
load or capacity on judging intentionality of ambiguous action. However, 
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individuals with ASC showed a bias towards intentional explanations of 
ambiguous but prototypically accidental behaviour.  
 
Overall, my results suggest that intention attribution is not fully captured 
by Rosset͛s dual-process model. These are informative and important 
findings because they tell us that a different model or approach is required 
to describe human intentional reasoning. Additionally, the observed 
difference in intentionality endorsement in the context of ambiguous action 
between neurotypicals and individuals with ASC gives us a better 
understanding of intention attribution in ASC and could be useful in 
explaining social difficulties. In this Discussion chapter, I will summarise key 
findings and subsequently, I will consider alternatives to Rosset͛s dual-
process model as well as additional contributing factors to judgments of 
intentionality. I will then highlight similarities between the so-called 
intentionality bias and other attributional biases and briefly discuss some 
general limitations. 
 
Differences in intention attribution style between individuals with ASC 
and neurotypicals  
Previous research suggests, individuals with ASC tend to be less accurate in 
discerning agents͛ intentions when actions are unambiguous ;e.g., Roeyers, 
Buysse, Ponnet, & Pichal, 2001; BaronͲCohen et al., 2001; Klin, 2000; Happé, 
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1994). However, little is known about how they attribute intentions when 
making judgements about ambiguous actions. In Chapters 5 and 7, 
differences in intentionality endorsement of ambiguous actions between 
adults with ASC and neurotypicals were investigated. In two studies, adults 
with ASC showed higher intentionality endorsement scores for ambiguous 
but prototypically accidental actions than controls. In neither study could 
group differences be explained by cognitive ability or ToM skills. As argued in 
the relevant chapters, the results suggest that differences in intention 
attribution between individuals with ASC and neurotypicals are not only or 
always a question of deficit but rather a question of style (i.e., difference in 
tendencies to judge ambiguous action).  
 
The same pattern could also be found in children with ASC (Chapter 6), 
which suggests a bias towards intentional explanations of behaviour to either 
be inherent to ASC or acquired at an early stage. Our findings are important, 
as they highlight that adults as well as children with ASC do not necessarily 
lack the ability to process and respond to social action, but that this can differ 
from neurotypicals. It is possible that social behaviour elicited by an over-
attribution of intent could be a contributing reason to social difficulties in 
individuals with ASC. As discussed in previous chapters, social difficulties 
could be impairing and distressing in ASC, hence, it is important to gain a 
better understanding of why and how social difficulties arise and how they 
can be counteracted. With the work presented in this thesis, I hope to have 
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shed some light on a possible contributing factor and paved the way for 
further investigations. 
 
Proposing a revised dual-process model 
Another aim of this thesis was to investigate whether human intentional 
reasoning is well described by Rosset͛s dual-process model. This was done by 
testing predictions made by the dual-process model, as for example, the 
involvement of age, cognitive ability, availability of WM capacity and time 
pressure. However, apart from increased time pressure leading to increased 
intentionality endorsement and some evidence of the involvement of 
executive functioning, my findings do not support the dual-process model of 
intention attribution as described by Rosset (2008).    
 
As discussed in Chapter 8, Rosset͛s dual-process model makes two 
predictions: 1) Unintentional judgements always involve analytical (Type 2) 
processing, and 2) an automatic (Type 1) process always leads to intentional 
explanations of behaviour as a default response (Figure 9.1). Considering the 
first prediction, this means an unintentional judgment always needs to be 
preceded and achieved by mental simulation and cognitive decoupling (i.e., 
Type 2 processing), which implies an unintentional judgement can never be 
formed automatically and independent of analytical thought. However, a lot 
of behaviour we observe is accidental, and, moreover, there are certain 
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behaviours that are only ever performed unintentionally. In this way, the 
plausibility of Rosset͛s model is questionable. The advantage of Type 1 
processing is that it is computationally less demanding. Information 
processing ͞short-cuts͟ can be used to arrive at conclusions and to choose 
appropriate responses. In fact, Type 1 processing can be a sign of proficiency 
and skill when complex cognitive processes become automatic and do not 
require analytical thought any longer (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). 
Considering the amount of social information we have to process every day, 
it is important that we process this information in the most efficient way. 
Given that some actions are almost always accidental, it is plausible one 
should automatically judge them to be so, in order to save cognitive 
resources. Therefore, unintentional snap-judgements seem to be necessary. 
This directly contradicts one of the key tenets of Rosset͛s model.  
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Figure 9.1. An illustration of the dual-process model put forward by Rosset. Automatic (Type 
1) processing leads to intentional judgments of behaviour. Controlled (Type 2) processing 
leads to intentional or unintentional explanations of behaviour.  
 
Leading on, considering the second prediction (that an automatic (Type 1) 
process always leads to intentional explanations of behaviour as a default 
response), this means that prior beliefs and past experience play no role in 
judging intentionality. As the heuristic (default) judgment is always 
intentional, what an observer knows about a certain action or what their past 
experience is, has little impact. However, belief-based (rather than logic-
based) processing is generally assumed to be the essence of Type 1 
processing (see Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983; Evans, 2007; Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013). As mentioned above, with proficiency and skill often comes 
increased engagement of Type 1 processing. This means that complex 
cognitive processes are migrated from Type 2 to Type 1 processing as one 
Experience: key presses are generally intentional (heuristic process)
Autonomous judgement: 
intentional
Type 1 processing
Mental simulation: “Did s/he 
move intentionally?”
Analytical judgement: 
intentional
e.g. “I could see the muscle 
moving shortly before the 
finger moved, therefore, I 
know movement was 
intentional.”
Analytical judgement: 
unintentional
e.g. “Although key presses are 
generally intentional, I know 
this movement was 
unintentional because the 
movement looked unnatural.”
Type 2 processing
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becomes more experienced. Kahneman and Frederick (2002) give the 
example of a highly skilled chess player, who perceives the strength of a chess 
position instantly without serial processing. As social beings, throughout our 
lives, we acquire a great amount of knowledge about behaviour, and it seems 
plausible that the experiences we have shape how we process information. 
For example, if someone has grown up in an environment in which harmful 
behaviour towards others is commonly not intentional, that person is 
perhaps more likely to perceive someone bumping into them as accidental, 
compared to another individual who has grown up in an intentionally harmful 
environment.  
 
As illustrated in Figure ϵ.ϭ, according to Rosset͛s dual-process model the 
only route to an unintentional judgement is via mental simulation during 
which alternative causes for behaviour are considered.  Although this might 
be appropriate for some actions (e.g., pressing a key) which are generally 
more likely to be intentional, for others it appears less plausible. Now, let us 
consider the opposite case, in which the heuristic judgement is unintentional 
(Figure 9.2). For example, an observer might have the prior belief that 
strapped fingers generally are not moved intentionally. Their default would 
be to judge such finger movements to be unintentional. Only if mental 
simulation gets involved and the automatic judgement is inhibited and 
overridden by a controlled process evaluating the information at hand (e.g., 
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visual cue signalling intentional movement), the action would be judged to 
be intentional.  
 
 
Figure 9.2. An illustration of an alternative dual-process model, in which automatic (Type 1) 
processing leads to unintentional judgments of behaviour and controlled (Type 2) processing 
leads to intentional or unintentional explanations of behaviour.  
 
It becomes apparent that an observer͛s prior belief and experience likely 
influences or determines what the default explanation for behaviour is. 
Although a lot of our experience with certain actions might be similar (e.g., 
most of us have experienced tripping over a curb as an accidental action), for 
some of us our prior beliefs might be different (e.g., stuntmen often 
experience falling as intentional actionͿ. Therefore, neither Rosset͛s dual-
Experience: strapped fingers generally don’t move intentionally (heuristic process)
Autonomous judgement: 
unintentional
Type 1 processing
Mental simulation: “Did s/he 
move intentionally?”
Analytical judgement: 
intentional
e.g. “The movement looked 
unnatural, therefore I know 
this movement was 
unintentional.”
Analytical judgement: 
unintentional
e.g. “Although key presses are 
generally intentional, this 
movement was unintentional 
because I could see the 
muscle moving shortly before 
the finger moved.”
Type 2 processing
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process model nor the alternative outlined in Figure 9.2 seem to be complete 
as they do not allow for differences between actions nor individuals. 
 
In light of this, I propose a revised dual-process model for intention 
attribution, which is a further development of Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ model in that 
it allows for two default options - unintentional or intentional, which are 
based on past experience, beliefs, contextual cues etc. (Figure 9.3). The new 
model is similar to Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ in a sense that heuristic processes are 
assumed to lead to a default judgement, which guides the response unless 
there is an intervention by analytical processes. 
 
Figure 9.3. Illustration of a revised dual-process model. There are two possible autonomous 
judgements: intentional OR unintentional. An analytical intervention can inhibit and override 
and autonomous judgement. 
Autonomous judgement: 
intentional
Type 1 process 
(heuristic process)
Mental simulation: “Did s/he 
move intentionally?”
Analytical judgement: 
intentional
e.g. “I could see the muscle 
moving shortly before the 
finger moved, therefore, I 
think movement was 
intentional.”
Analytical judgement: 
unintentional
e.g. “I think this movement 
was unintentional because 
the movement looked 
unnatural.”
Type 2 process 
(analytical intervention)
Response: 
”intentional”
Autonomous judgement: 
unintentional
Response: 
”unintentional”
Based on past experience, beliefs, 
contextual cues etc.
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Considering both experiments of Chapter 8, with added WM load, we 
observed increased variability in intentionality endorsement scores, i.e., 
͞more extreme͟ scores in either direction could be found in the load 
conditions. This could mean that increasing WM revealed a default 
intentional judgement in some individuals and a default unintentional 
judgement in others. This would support a revised dual-process model of 
intention attribution allowing for two alternative default options and 
suggests that when there are fewer cognitive resources available participants 
engage in more heuristic (biased) processing that could either mean they 
perceive most movements to be intentional or most movements to be 
unintentional.  
 
Contrary to Rosset͛s model, in the model proposed here, there are three 
routes to an intentional judgement: intentional as the heuristic response with 
no analytical intervention (Figure 9.4a), intentional as the heuristic response 
with analytical intervention confirming the heuristic response (Figure 9.4b), 
unintentional as the heuristic response with analytical intervention changing 
the response to intentional (Figure 9.4c).  Notably, only one of them (Figure 
9.4a) involves purely Type 1 processing. This implies that intentional 
judgements would not necessarily be free of analytical processing or 
independent of cognitive ability, which could explain the apparent lack of 
effect of availability of WM capacity, cognitive ability and age. 
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A  
 
 
B  
Autonomous judgement: 
intentional
Type 1 process 
(heuristic process)
Mental simulation: “Did s/he 
move intentionally?”
Analytical judgement: 
intentional
e.g. “I could see the muscle 
moving shortly before the 
finger moved, therefore, I 
think movement was 
intentional.”
Analytical judgement: 
unintentional
e.g. “I think this movement 
was unintentional because 
the movement looked 
unnatural.”
Type 2 process 
(analytical intervention)
Response: 
”intentional”
Autonomous judgement: 
unintentional
Response: 
”unintentional”
Based on past experience, beliefs, 
contextual cues etc.
Heuristic intentional, no 
analytical intervention
Autonomous judgement: 
intentional
Type 1 process 
(heuristic process)
Mental simulation: “Did s/he 
move intentionally?”
Analytical judgement: 
intentional
e.g. “I could see the muscle 
moving shortly before the 
finger moved, therefore, I 
think movement was 
intentional.”
Analytical judgement: 
unintentional
e.g. “I think this movement 
was unintentional because 
the movement looked 
unnatural.”
Type 2 process 
(analytical intervention)
Response: 
”intentional”
Autonomous judgement: 
unintentional
Response: 
”unintentional”
Based on past experience, beliefs, 
contextual cues etc.
Heuristic intentional,
analytical intervention 
leading to intentional
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C  
Figure 9.4. Illustration of three possible routes to arrive at an intentional judgement in a 
revised dual-process model: A) Response is driven by a heuristic intentional judgement with 
no analytical intervention; B) Response is driven by an analytical intervention confirming the 
heuristic judgement; C) Response is driven by analytical intervention overriding an analytical 
judgement.  
 
 
Single-system approach 
Another possibility worth considering is that intention attribution does not fit 
a dual-process model at all, but rather that it is better accommodated by a 
single-system framework. In fact, dual-process theories of cognition have 
been critically assessed by a number of authors (Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996; 
Keren & Schul, 2009; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018; 
Osman, 2004, 2013).  
Autonomous judgement: 
intentional
Type 1 process 
(heuristic process)
Mental simulation: “Did s/he 
move intentionally?”
Analytical judgement: 
intentional
e.g. “I could see the muscle 
moving shortly before the 
finger moved, therefore, I 
think movement was 
intentional.”
Analytical judgement: 
unintentional
e.g. “I think this movement 
was unintentional because 
the movement looked 
unnatural.”
Type 2 process 
(analytical intervention)
Response: 
”intentional”
Autonomous judgement: 
unintentional
Response: 
”unintentional”
Based on past experience, beliefs, 
contextual cues etc.
Heuristic intentional,
analytical intervention 
leading to intentional
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The main line of argument here is that the dichotomy proposed by dual-
process theories does not reflect the nature and variety of human reasoning 
but that the two processes might be unified within a single-system (Osman, 
2004). In other words, single-system accounts question two distinct 
qualitatively different processes and attempt to capture human reasoning 
within a single dynamic model.  
 
One point of evidence against dual-process accounts of reasoning is the 
misalignment of processing features. As argued by Melnikoff and Bargh 
(2018), there is empirical evidence for processing that contains features of 
both Type 1 and Type 2 processing, such as for example uncontrollability and 
inefficiency. The question, therefore, arises whether the dual-process 
distinction truly reflects human reasoning if their features are not stable but 
rather can be applied to both types of processing.   
 
An example of a single-system model of human cognition is the 
connectionist framework. This framework understands human cognition as a 
dynamic and adaptive system that learns and develops through its experience 
(Feldman, 1981; Feldman & Ballard, 1982). A premise of connectionist 
models in the context of social cognition is that a substantial part of social 
judgements results from basic associative learning processes (Van Overwalle, 
Schachtman, & Reilly, 2011). Connectionism, therefore, views social 
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cognition as learning and adapting to a constantly shifting environment, 
which shapes our attributions and judgements. Information about the social 
environment is thought to be represented by interconnected units and social 
attributions are understood as the output of their distributing activation (Van 
Overwalle et al., 2011).  
 
Connectionist networks characteristically comprise at least two layers 
(input layer and output layer) of these units. Inherent to such models is that 
the storage of social information is dependent on the strength of 
connections, which can increase with repeated paired activation of units. 
Importantly, connections between units can change, which allows for the 
network to update and learn. In other words, internal representations of the 
environment (internal activations) are gradually approximating towards the 
environment (external activations) (for more detailed account of the 
components of social connectionist models please refer to Van Overwalle et 
al., 2011).  
 
This would imply that, in contrast to what Rosset (2008) proposed, there 
is no default judgement for actions in general, but rather that each action 
specifically is either associated with being done intentionally or 
unintentionally. For example, actions such as described in Rosset͛s Accidental 
control category as well as Prototypically Accidental test category are largely 
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associated with not being caused by intention. In comparison, actions such 
as described in the Intentional control category as well as Prototypically 
Intentional test category are largely associated with an intentional cause. 
Such an association would be reflected in the participants͛ judgements. 
Similarly, most individuals frequently experience a key-press being an 
intentional action. Therefore, from a connectionist perspective, the observed 
tendency to judge the key-press in the Ambiguous Movement Paradigm to 
be intentional could be explained by a strong association between key-
presses and intentional causation. This would question whether there is a 
general intentionality bias or whether this bias only applies to certain actions 
that are associated with intentional causations. 
 
Importantly, although a system might have strong associations, this does 
not imply the association truly represent the environment. For reasons, as for 
example generalising information about one concept to other concepts or 
ignoring new information that would call for updating of a connection, a 
representation of the environment can be inaccurate and lead to incorrect 
judgements. Establishing cause-effect relations and predicting similar events 
in the future is key in human survival (Van Overwalle & Van Rooy, 1998), 
however, some of these established relations and predictions can simply be 
wrong or inappropriate.  
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Importantly, using a connectionist approach one could potentially explain 
the difference in judging intentionality of ambiguous action between 
neurotypicals and individuals with ASC. ASCs have been associated with 
atypical pattern of perceptual generalisation and learning (e.g., Church et al., 
2015; Dovgopoly & Mercado, 2013). This implies that individuals with ASC are 
likely to have different representations of their social world compared to 
neurotypicals. For example, if an affected individual is less likely to generalise 
the accidental action of falling to other accidental actions such as tripping, 
they could be prone to judge the latter to be intentional. 
 
A single-system approach such as a connectionist approach or similar 
allows for an intentional reasoning system that is dynamic and constantly 
updates as one͛s representations of the world change. In contrast, the dual-
system model initially proposed by Rosset (2008) is relatively rigid. The only 
variables that can change are an individual͛s capacity and the possibility to 
engage in Type 2 processing enabling an unintentional judgement. As 
discussed in previous chapters, no strong evidence for an involvement of 
cognitive ability, nor WM capacity or load was found, therefore, variability in 
responses must be affected by other factors (some of which are discussed 
below). Perhaps a single-system approach can better account for such 
additional components than a dual-process approach as it allows for the 
incorporation of many connected concepts (e.g., type of action, nature of 
agent, etc.). Unfortunately, it is not in the scope of this thesis to develop a 
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detailed account of a single-system model of intention attribution, however, 
in this section I offered a possible alternative approach and highlighted some 
advantages it could bring. 
 
Potential other components that should be included in the model 
In this thesis, not only the plausibility of theoretical models was explored but, 
importantly, the role of several factors in judging intentionality of ambiguous 
action was investigated, including age, cognitive ability, WM load and 
capacity, executive functioning, ToM, etc. However, as discussed in previous 
chapters, there are some factors which were not covered in the empirical 
part of this thesis but that might influence how individuals judge each other͛s 
behaviour. In this section, I will briefly outline some of them. 
 
Social anxiety  
A factor worth exploring is social anxiety. As previously discussed, higher 
levels of social anxiety in ASC could be an underlying factor for differences in 
intention attribution style compared to neurotypical controls (Meyer et al., 
2006). However, this is not exclusive to ASC, but social anxiety might also 
influence how individuals without ASC process ambiguous behaviour.  
 
The prediction here is that socially anxious individuals process information 
in a way that favours intentional over unintentional explanations for 
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behaviour. For example, it might appear ͞safer͟ to judge every action to be 
targeted and to have a purpose. This would make it easier to predict whether 
it is safe to interact with another person and what they are trying to achieve 
and are going to do next. Previous research has shown that socially anxious 
children are more likely to attribute (hostile) intent to unintentional harmful 
behaviour (Bell-Dolan, 1995). This supports the argument of an association 
between social anxiety and intentionality endorsement. This could also 
explain the link between high intentionality endorsement and schizotypy 
(Moore & Pope, 2014) and schizophrenia (Peyroux et al., 2014). Social anxiety 
is a common feature of schizotypy (e.g., Brown, Silvia, MyinʹGermeys, 
Lewandowski, & Kwapil, 2008) and schizophrenia (e.g., Penn, Hope, 
Spaulding, & Kucera, 1994), which could be a driving factor for perceiving 
ambiguous behaviour to be intentional.  
 
A point worth reiterating here, is that there might be a reciprocal 
relationship between social anxiety and judging ambiguous behaviour to be 
intentional, in that a tendency to judge accidental harmful behaviour to be 
intentional might lead to negative appraisal of social situations and 
unsuccessful social interaction, both of which can promote social anxiety 
(Meyer et al., 2006). 
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Thinking disposition 
Another factor that might influence judging intentionality of ambiguous 
action, especially when assuming a dual-process model, is thinking 
disposition. The possible role of thinking disposition in a dual-process 
framework is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, therefore, it will only be 
briefly outlined here. The main premise is that differences in thinking 
disposition might over-shadow the role of other factors such as cognitive 
ability and WM capacity. This is because individuals might differentially 
choose whether to dedicate processing capacity towards the task of judging 
intentionality and engaging in Type 2 processing. Even highly cognitively able 
individuals might not detect or feel the need to decouple and to analytically 
assess prior beliefs and, hence, still engage in biased processing. Therefore, 
the missing effect of cognitive ability on intentionality endorsement (as found 
in Chapter 3) alone, is insufficient to reject a dual-process model of intention 
attribution and future research should consider exploring the role of thinking 
disposition. 
 
 
Belief in free will  
Another component that possibly contributes to perceiving intentionality is a 
belief in free will. It has been suggested that whether individuals believe in 
free will shapes their judgements of intentionality, in that individuals with a 
stronger belief in free will are more likely to judge behaviour to be intentional 
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(Genschow, Rigoni, & Brass, 2019). This highlights that it might not only be 
purely cognitive aspects and ability that play a role but factors such as beliefs 
about human action in general that play a role, which vary greatly across 
individuals, cultures and societies. 
 
Nature of agent 
In the empirical work of this thesis, I exclusively looked at factors relating to 
the individuals who form the judgements. More specifically, I investigated 
traits and states that would influence judgement making.  However, there 
might be factors within the agent that play a role in whether their actions are 
perceived to be intentional. For example, the agent͛s perceived ability or skill 
could influence whether their actions are judged to be intentional. For 
example, when an agent has never kicked a ball in their life before (i.e., they 
have no ability kicking a ball) but coincidentally strikes a goal, an observer is 
unlikely to perceive the action of kicking the ball into the goal to be 
intentional (Malle & Knobe, 1997).  
 
In both of the paradigms used in the empirical part of this thesis, there is 
a lack of information on the nature of the agents. This is because the focus of 
this research is ambiguous action and giving information about the agents 
could prime participants to respond in a certain way. However, it is worth 
highlighting that certain aspects of the agent, such as ability, age, gender and 
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whether the agent is perceived as an in-group or out-group member, likely 
will have an effect on how their actions are judged. Additionally, it is possible 
that certain factors within an agent might interact with an observer͛s 
conditions, as for example, biased judging of out-group members͛ actions 
might become primarily apparent under time constraints. Future research, 
therefore, could consider the role of the nature of the agent in judging 
intentionality of ambiguous action.  
 
Social context 
Leading on, another aspect worth mentioning is social context. With both 
paradigms used in the empirical part of this thesis, actions are assumingly 
studied in isolation with limited social context. In other words, there is neither 
any information about the agent nor the relationship between agent and 
observer and what situation they are in. However, when, for example 
considering, the sentence She broke the vase, perceived intentionality might 
vary as a function of whether She is a friend or a foe, or socially superior or 
inferior to the observer. Also, the type of situation might play a role. Whereas 
intentionally breaking a vase might be more likely during a row, the same 
action might be less likely to be intentional during birthday celebrations. In 
other words, the meaning of an action is derived from its context, it is, 
therefore, context-sensitive (Read & Miller, 1998). This poses the challenge 
for future research to incorporate social context into a model of intention 
attribution. From a theoretical view, social context could perhaps be 
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incorporated more easily into a connectionist model of intention attribution, 
in which several cues (about the action, the agent, the situation etc.) can be 
interconnected in various ways, rather than a dual-process approach which 
assumes a rather fixed model for all kinds of action. 
 
Other attributional biases 
A point worth noting is that there are some other attributional biases which 
overlap with the tendency to attribute intent to ambiguous behaviour as 
studied in this thesis. In this section, I will briefly discuss them and raise the 
question whether the so-called intentionality bias as observed by Rosset 
(2008) and Moore and Pope (2014) could be explained by other attributional 
biases. 
  
One potentially relevant bias is the fundamental attribution error; the 
failure to consider contextual ;i.e., situationalͿ factors when judging others͛ 
actions (Ross, 1977). In other words, individuals are inclined to 
overemphasise personal aspects and ignore external ones that might cause 
an action. One main personal aspect that drives action is intent. And 
overemphasising of intent could, therefore, be explained by the fundamental 
attribution error.  
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Similarly, it has been shown that people have a tendency to attribute 
motives to behaviour that are in line with the consequence of the behaviour 
(Pepitone & Sherberg, 1957). In other words, overt behaviour is assumed to 
be in accord with covert behaviour. For example, when an action leads to a 
negative consequence for another person, that person is more likely to 
attribute a hostile rather than a benign intent (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970). Any 
outcome is perceived to reflect the agent͛s intention. There is an obvious link 
to the intentionality bias here, in that a behaviour leading to a consequence 
is perceived to be intended, in that its consequence is perceived to be 
intended. 
 
Additionally, it has been suggested that individuals are biased towards 
accepting the first cause for behaviour that sufficiently explains an event, 
rather than continue looking for an alternative cause that might better 
explain the event (Kanouse, 1971; Simon, 1967). Hence, in situations where 
there is little context and no other obvious reasons for behaviour is apparent, 
intentionality might be the first and therefore also preferred explanation. For 
example, in the Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm, all actions are described 
within one sentence (e.g., She kicked her dog.), and causes for behaviour 
other than intent might not come to mind as easily. 
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Together this shows that there is some association between the tendency 
to judge ambiguous behaviour to be intentional (i.e., intentionality bias) and 
other attributional biases. Possibly, the tendency to judge ambiguous 
behaviour to be intentional could also be explained by these attributional 
biases. However, perhaps the importance does not lie in the terminology but 
rather in what these tendencies, patterns and styles can tell us about social 
information processing in general, and the effects they might have on social 
interaction.  
 
Other general limitations 
At the end of each chapter, I discussed limitations of the paradigms in context 
of each study and issues with the study designs. Here, I will outline and briefly 
discuss some more general limitations. 
 
For example, some of my studies only comprised small sample sizes and 
were, therefore, likely under-powered. In some instances, this prevents me 
from drawing clear conclusions from the non-signifcant effects. 
 
Moreover, a large part of the empirical work of this thesis involved online 
data collection. Although this allowed us to reach large sample sizes, there 
was limited control over what participants were doing when participating. 
Although we had some control over excluding inattentive participants by 
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using control sentences as a screening tool, we do not know whether all 
participants, for example, completed the tasks alone or in what environment. 
 
Furthermore, our sample largely comprised of English native speakers 
(with some exceptions of fluent but non-native speakers). This entails that 
our participants were ethnically and culturally similar. As mentioned 
previously, beliefs about intentionality and free will might differ across 
cultures. Therefore, our findings are perhaps not representative of other 
cultures or societies. 
 
Another major limitation concerns the nature of the Ambiguous Sentence 
Paradigm. Increased mean intentionality endorsement scores for 
Prototypically Accidental test sentences (our variable of interest) under time 
constraints (Chapter 2) as well as in ASC samples (Chapter 5 to 7) are closer 
to 50 than scores of the control groups. A score of 50 would be expected if 
individuals answer arbitrarily. Therefore, we do not know for certain whether 
increased intentionality scores for Prototypically Accidental test sentences in 
these samples reflect genuine increased intentionality endorsement or more 
arbitrary responding. An indicator for the latter could be that individuals 
under time constraints as well as the ASC groups generally performed worse 
on control items (i.e., closer to an endorsement score of 50) than control 
participants, although differences were largely non-significant. As outlined in 
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Chapter 2, we decided not to conduct an omnibus test including test- as well 
as control items, as both categories are qualitatively different. However, this 
means that we do not know for certain whether genuinely increased 
intentionality endorsement or more arbitrary responding when under time 
pressure/ specific to ASC are driving the results. 
 
Related to this is the issue that the Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm, as well 
as the Ambiguous Movement Paradigm, comprise no true control categories. 
For example, as discussed in Chapter 5, with the Ambiguous Sentence 
Paradigm it is impossible to detect whether increased intentionality 
endorsement scores in ASC are specific to intention attribution or reflect a 
more general tendency to attribute a cause to an event. As outlined in 
Chapter 2, the categories labelled control categories would not reveal 
whether increased attributions are specific to intention attribution and are 
better used as screening measures. However, future research should 
consider developing a paradigm including an appropriate control category. 
For example, participants could be asked to judge whether an event occurred 
by chance or was caused by external, non-intentional factors (e.g., weather 
conditions, computer code, etc.). 
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Concluding remarks 
As Dennett (2009) argued in his Intentional System Theory, perceiving others 
as intentional agents facilitates making sense of our social surroundings, 
choosing appropriate reactions to behaviour and predicting others͛ actions. 
However, not all actions that we are exposed to are intentional. We have to 
distinguish between actions that are intentional and actions that are 
accidental. These judgements play an important role in how we interact with 
each other. Although in some situations there might be a clear indication of 
whether an action was intentional or unintentional, in a lot of situations 
intentionality is ambiguous. In this thesis, I investigated how individuals judge 
intentionality of ambiguous actions and what factors influence our 
judgements. In every chapter, I discussed the findings of each specific study 
and their relevance. In this final section, my aim is to reflect on the overall 
implications of this work.   
 
Previously, a dual-process model to explain intention attribution has been 
suggested. In this thesis I directly and indirectly tested assumptions of the 
dual-process model by investigating factors including age, cognitive ability, 
WM load and -capacity, having ASC, ToM and executive functioning. Apart 
from a replication of Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ findings and an indication of the 
involvement of executive functioning, largely, the empirical evidence 
gathered in this thesis does not support the dual-process model of intention 
attribution. This suggests the model is either incomplete or that it is not an 
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appropriate model of intention attribution. Although in general it may be 
beneficial to perceive action to be intentional (as for example because it has 
higher predictive validity and enables us to use cognitive ͞short-cuts͟ when 
interpreting events), and under some circumstances we might show a 
tendency to judge ambiguous action to be intentional, this seems to be only 
one aspect of intentional reasoning. As complex social beings living in 
multifaceted social environments, a dual-process model does not seem to be 
able to fully capture how we judge the intentionality of others͛ actions.  
 
The work in this thesis shows that judgements of intentionality differ 
between individuals and certain conditions, i.e., they are not set. In fact, 
atypical intention attribution styles might be a contributing factor to social 
difficulties, as for example in ASC. Therefore, achieving a better conceptual 
understanding of intentional reasoning is of importance. In the Discussion 
chapter of this thesis, I proposed a revised model of the dual-process model 
and an alternative approach, which could form the starting point for further 
exploration into how we judge intentionality of ambiguous action. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: List of stimuli of the Ambiguous Sentence Paradigm 
This list comprises a full list of stimuli as used in this thesis: 34 ambiguous test 
sentences (22 Prototypically Accidental test sentences; 12 Prototypically 
Intentional test sentences) and 20 unambiguous control sentences (10 
Accidental control sentences; 10 Intentional control sentences). Please note 
that Rosset͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ original paradigm comprises ϮϬ items of each control 
category. 
 
Prototypically Accidental test sentences 
He hit the man with his car. 
He gave her the wrong change. 
She burnt the meal. 
She broke the vase 
He tracked mud inside. 
He forgot his homework. 
He arrived 5 min late for class. 
He bumped into a classmate in the hall. 
He broke the window. 
The painter inhaled the fumes. 
He drank the spoiled milk. 
She woke the baby up. 
He stepped in the puddle. 
He set off the alarm. 
He jumped when the bell rang. 
He dripped paint on the canvas. 
She kicked her dog. 
She left the water running. 
He set the house on fire. 
He ate the bruised part of the apple. 
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She told the same joke twice. 
The girl popped the balloon. 
 
 
Prototypically Intentional test sentences 
She cut him off driving. 
The boy knocked over the sand castle. 
She walked by without saying hello. 
He took an illegal left turn. 
He ripped the piece of paper. 
She sprayed him with water. 
The man left without leaving a tip. 
She made a mark on the paper. 
She drove over the speed limit. 
He deleted the email. 
She ignored the question. 
She averted her eyes. 
 
 
Accidental control sentences 
She lost her keys. 
The girl had a seizure. 
She tripped on the jump rope. 
The boy hiccupped. 
He poked himself in the eye. 
She broke her cell phone. 
He fell off the skateboard. 
He fell down the stairs. 
He sneezed from allergies. 
He broke his tooth playing hockey. 
 
 
Intentional control sentences 
He threw the football. 
He vacuumed the carpet. 
She threaded the needle. 
The boy smiled for the picture. 
She proofread her paper. 
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He shaved in front of the mirror. 
She followed the recipe. 
He listened attentively. 
She changed the flat tire. 
He drew a picture of the beach. 
 
 
Appendix 2: Results of non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests for test 
categories, Chapter 2 
As a supplementary analysis for Analysis I in Chapter 2 a Mann-Whitney U test 
was run to investigate whether group differences between the speeded and 
un-speeded condition would be significant if a non-parametric test was 
chosen. Results revealed a significant effect of time constraints on 
intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental test 
sentences, with participants in the speeded condition scoring higher 
(U=8835, p=.006, one-tailed). There was no significant difference between 
intentionality endorsement scores of the speeded compared to un-speeded 
group (U=9296.5, p=.062, two-tailed).  
 
Appendix 3: Results of regression analysis with logarithmic 
transformation of the predictor variable, Chapter 3 
Given that the distribution of age was positively skewed, as supplementary 
analyses, linear regression analyses were run after conducting a logarithmic 
transformation (log10) of the predictor variable age. Results revealed that the 
transformed predictor variables could not predict intentionality 
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endorsement scores for either type of test sentence: F(1, 310)=.118, p=.731, 
R2=.00, β=.02, Figure A3.1; Prototypically Intentional: F(1, 310)=1.737, 
p=.188, R2=.006, βс-.075, Figure A3.2. 
 
 
Figure A3.1. Scatterplot showing the association between the log-transformed predictor 
variable (age) and intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental test 
sentences with a linear trendline. Intentionality endorsement scores reflect the percentage of 
sentences judged to describe behaviour done on purpose. 
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Figure A3.2. Scatterplot showing the association between the log-transformed predictor 
variable (age) and intentionality endorsement scores for Prototypically Accidental test 
sentences with a linear trendline. Intentionality endorsement scores reflect the percentage of 
sentences judged to describe behaviour done on purpose. 
 
 
Appendix 4: Analysis with correct trials only, Chapter 8 
An underlying reason for incorrect responses for the cognitive load task could be the 
failure to attempt to remember the digit(s), i.e. no increased cognitive load. 
Therefore, for Experiment 1 an additional analysis was performed including only 
trials with a correct working memory task response. A one-way ANCOVA was 
conducted to determine the effect of cognitive load (no load, low load, high load) on 
intentionality endorsement scores controlling for working memory capacity (K). It 
revealed no significant difference between groups, F(2, 38)=.069, p=.934. 
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Table A.7. Intentionality endorsement scores for correct WM -trials only with 
standard deviations in brackets for the no WM load (NL) -,  low WM load (LL)-  
and high WM load (HL) condition. Intentionality endorsement scores reflect the 
percentage of items judged to be intentional.  
Condition Intentionality endorsement score 
NL 61.61 (10.98) 
LL 64.58 (16.86) 
HL 61.94 (17.42) 
 
 
Appendix 5: Analysis with outliers included, Chapter 8 
As a supplementary analysis for Experiment 2, a one-way ANCOVA was 
conducted to determine the effect of WM load (no WM load, low WM load, 
high WM load) on intentionality endorsement scores controlling for working 
memory capacity (K) with no outliers excluded (n=329). Although the trend 
pointed in the right direction, analysis revealed no significant difference 
between groups (F(2)=1.497, p=.225; Table A.9). 
 
Table A.9. Intentionality endorsement scores for each condition with standard 
deviations in brackets for the no WM load (NL) -,  low WM load (LL)- and high 
WM load (HL) condition. Intentionality endorsement scores reflect the 
percentage of items judged to be intentional.  
Condition Intentionality endorsement score 
NL 59.07 (17.22) 
LL 60.53 (20.75) 
HL 63.38 (20.75) 
 
 
